Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
489 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
254
128
40
20
20
Contributors
118
95
93
33
29
Categories
314
166
79
66
36
Platforms
477
2
2
2
2
Products / Services
169
116
90
25
21
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
IDS Classtypes
1
IDS Protocols
1
Detects the execution of Salat Stealer C2-pushed scripts involving the disabling of recovery environment via reagentc.exe and UAC disabling via registry modification on the same device within one hour.
Detects registry-based User Account Control (UAC) bypass activity where command keys for ms-settings or mscfile are created or modified under HKCU Software\Classes, correlated with a privilege adjustment (SeDebugPrivilege or SeLoadDriverPrivilege) by the same process within a 30-minute window.
The following analytic detects the execution of fodhelper.exe, which is known to exploit a User Account Control (UAC) bypass by leveraging specific registry keys. The detection method uses Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry to identify when fodhelper.exe spawns a child process and accesses the registry keys. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could execute commands with elevated privileges, leading to unauthorized system changes and potential full system compromise.
The following analytic identifies modifications to the registry key that controls the enforcement of Windows User Account Control (UAC). It detects changes to the registry path `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA` where the value is set to `0x00000000`. This activity is significant because disabling UAC can allow unauthorized changes to the system without user consent, potentially leading to privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain elevated privileges, making it easier to execute further attacks or maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects an Eventvwr UAC bypass by identifying suspicious registry modifications in the path that Eventvwr.msc references upon execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry changes and process execution details. This activity is significant because it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, persistence, and further compromise of the affected system.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities including local account creation, modification of account security policies, and enabling of administrative services or credential exposure settings within a short time window. This typically indicates post-exploitation behavior where an adversary is attempting to establish persistence or facilitate further lateral movement.
This rule detects instances where the MSP360 RMM Agent installer triggers an UAC elevation failure. The detection specifically monitors the execution of eventcreate.exe, which is often used to log events, when the command line includes strings indicating that the MSP360 installer failed to elevate privileges.
This rule identifies two distinct security threats on Windows systems: the execution or presence of files matching a known malicious SHA256 hash list, and modifications to the 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' registry key, which could indicate an attempt to weaken User Account Control (UAC) protections.
Detects the abuse of the CMSTPLUA COM object, a known technique for UAC bypass, to execute a hidden and non-profile PowerShell process. This behavior is associated with malicious activity chains like RemotePanel or BoundSiphon that aim to achieve elevated execution.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device involving a remote MSI installation followed by PowerShell-based process elevation and administrative checks using fltmc.exe. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to deploy malicious packages remotely and escalate privileges within the environment.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
This rule identifies two distinct security threats on Windows systems: the execution or presence of files matching a known malicious SHA256 hash list, and modifications to the 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' registry key, which could indicate an attempt to weaken User Account Control (UAC) protections.
Detects modifications to the Windows registry key 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' to set it to '0' (disabled). This configuration change effectively disables the secure desktop for User Account Control (UAC) prompts, which is a technique used by adversaries to facilitate UAC bypasses or simplify credential harvesting by making UAC prompts more easily spoofable or interceptable.
Detects modifications to the Windows registry key 'PromptOnSecureDesktop' to set it to '0' (disabled). This configuration change effectively disables the secure desktop for User Account Control (UAC) prompts, which is a technique used by adversaries to facilitate UAC bypasses or simplify credential harvesting by making UAC prompts more easily spoofable or interceptable.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window styles and encoded commands, initiated with High Integrity (Admin) privileges. This pattern is often indicative of bypasses for User Account Control (UAC) or malicious script execution where an adversary attempts to run elevated code while minimizing user visibility.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device involving a remote MSI installation followed by PowerShell-based process elevation and administrative checks using fltmc.exe. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to deploy malicious packages remotely and escalate privileges within the environment.
Detects a sequence of events on a single device involving a remote MSI installation followed by PowerShell-based process elevation and administrative checks using fltmc.exe. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to deploy malicious packages remotely and escalate privileges within the environment.
Page 1 of 24