Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
489 detections
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Detects the suspicious execution of ServiceModelReg.exe or command lines containing the 'Elevation:Administrator!new:' string, which is associated with bypasses of Windows User Account Control (UAC). The rule excludes trusted system processes like msiexec, TrustedInstaller, and svchost to reduce noise.
The following analytic detects duplicate-handle access to known UAC-bypass binaries from a non-standard source path.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10, converts GrantedAccess from hexadecimal, and checks for PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE.
Detects modifications to the Windows Registry subkeys associated with the 'ms-settings' URI scheme, which are targeted by the 'fodhelper.exe' UAC bypass technique. The rule correlates registry operations in HKCU with the execution of fodhelper.exe to identify attempts to elevate privileges without triggering a UAC prompt.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Matches known SHA-256 hashes of AvisLoader toolkit components recovered from an exposed staging server: the Windows loader client, UAC-bypass helper, and process-hiding DLL
Detects User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts where an adversary writes to specific registry keys under HKCU\Software\Classes to hijack COM handlers, followed shortly by the execution of auto-elevating Windows binaries like fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, or sdclt.exe. This activity facilitates silent privilege escalation.
Detects instances where PowerShell attempts to execute an external process with elevated privileges using 'Start-Process -Verb RunAs' combined with hidden window flags. The rule specifically looks for evidence that the targeted executable was recently initiated or exists in the context of the PowerShell operation, potentially indicating a UAC bypass attempt or malicious elevation of privileges.
KQL Query
Detects anomalous configuration of Android devices by identifying instances where an accessibility service is granted combined with the enabling of wireless ADB debugging or ADB pairing code extraction. This behavior is often associated with malicious applications seeking unauthorized control or remote access to the device.
Detects the MovieReaper Stage-3 module which masquerades as Microsoft Edge (msedge.exe) within the C:\ProgramData\Windows\Telemetry directory. The detection focuses on suspicious process execution from this directory and identifies instances where the process respawns itself, suggesting malicious activity post-UAC bypass.
Detects the execution of cmstp.exe with silent (/s) and auto-install (/au) flags pointing to an attacker-supplied INF file. This pattern is a documented technique for bypassing User Account Control (UAC) and performing signed-binary proxy execution to load malicious payloads.
This rule detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts involving the abuse of the COM object associated with 'sppextcomobj.exe'. The rule looks for scenarios where 'rundll32.exe' initiates 'sppextcomobj.exe', which in turn triggers 'slui.exe'. This behavioral chain is a known technique for achieving elevated privileges by exploiting how Windows handles COM auto-elevation.
Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe following parent process activity involving vsdbg.dll/vsdbg.exe, coupled with cross-process access indicators consistent with COM Elevation Moniker UAC bypass and potential process hollowing. This pattern is associated with the PUROSANGUE loader chain used to execute malicious code within a high-integrity process context.
Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe following parent process activity involving vsdbg.dll/vsdbg.exe, coupled with cross-process access indicators consistent with COM Elevation Moniker UAC bypass and potential process hollowing. This pattern is associated with the PUROSANGUE loader chain used to execute malicious code within a high-integrity process context.
Detects potential UAC bypass attempts using COM Elevation Monikers or the misuse of ServiceModelReg.exe, often associated with process hollowing techniques.
This rule detects attempts to bypass Windows User Account Control (UAC) by identifying processes that use specific command-line arguments (such as /Elevation:Administrator, /shell:RunAs, or /runas /savecred) combined with known binaries (such as vsdbg, rundll32, or cmstp) often abused to achieve elevated privileges or proxy execution of malicious code.
Detects unauthorized modification of the registry path 'HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command'. This registry key is commonly hijacked by the 'fodhelper.exe' UAC bypass technique, where an attacker writes a malicious command to be executed with elevated privileges when the OS triggers the ms-settings protocol handler.
Detects suspicious execution of ServiceModelReg.exe, either by referencing a specific known malicious file path ('purosangue.tx') or when launched by an unexpected parent process. This activity is indicative of potential COM elevation moniker abuse or process hollowing techniques often used in post-exploitation scenarios.
Detects the execution of a hidden PowerShell process that subsequently spawns a child process using the 'Start-Process' cmdlet with the '-Verb RunAs' argument within a short time window. This pattern is commonly associated with attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) or execute processes with elevated privileges silently.
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