Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
461 detections
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Detects Microsoft 365 token replay from the Huntress token spray and replay campaign. Alerts on sign-ins from an IP new to the account (not seen on 3 or more distinct days in the 14d baseline) that match one of three behaviors: a scripted client (node or bare Mozilla/5.0 user agent with Office or Authentication Broker client IDs), Device Registration Service access (Medium-High only when corroborated by a campaign IP, scripted user agent or session IP hop, otherwise Low), or one session moving across IPs within 60 minutes. Rows are raised to High when the same new IP hits 3 or more baseline accounts in the window (token spray pattern) or matches a campaign IOC. Low Signal rows are dropped when AlertOnly = true. Does not cover MFA changes, device registration events or inbox rules.
Detects sign-in events to Entra ID via service principals where the application is marked as external and enabled, and the user agent string indicates the use of a Python client.
Detects successful Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) sign-ins using the device code flow where the originating device is neither registered nor trusted (managed or compliant), which may indicate suspicious authentication attempts or token abuse.
Detects instances where an OAuth token is used from a new IP address and a new country within 24 hours of a successful device-code sign-in for the same user, potentially indicating token theft or abuse.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user performs an unusual device-code authentication (potentially indicative of device code phishing) followed shortly by an OAuth application consent or permission grant event. It flags potential compromise if the sign-in is new for the user or occurs in a short timeframe, with optional indicators associated with the 'maillive.sbs' phishing infrastructure.
This rule detects potentially malicious reuse of an existing Entra ID (Azure AD) refresh or session token (via UniqueTokenIdentifier) across multiple, distinct device IDs, IP addresses, or user-agent strings within a short period (default 4 hours). It specifically flags instances where the authentication was completed via a non-interactive token claim, suggesting the adversary is bypassing MFA by hijacking an active session.
Detects anomalous GCP IAM Service Account Credential API calls where a principal impersonates multiple distinct service accounts within a short time window. This behavior often indicates a credential delegation chain or a multi-stage privilege escalation attempt within a GCP environment.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user performs an unusual device-code authentication (potentially indicative of device code phishing) followed shortly by an OAuth application consent or permission grant event. It flags potential compromise if the sign-in is new for the user or occurs in a short timeframe, with optional indicators associated with the 'maillive.sbs' phishing infrastructure.
This rule detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking by monitoring non-interactive sign-in events. It identifies when a refresh token is redeemed from a device identifier that does not exist in the user's recent interactive sign-in history and from a geographical location different from the user's last known interactive session.
Detects the creation or modification of federated identity credentials within Azure Active Directory (Entra ID). This technique allows external services like GitHub Actions, Kubernetes, or other identity providers to authenticate as an application without stored secrets, bypassing traditional secret-rotation and credential-scanning security controls. The rule identifies potential unauthorized persistence by highlighting external or unrecognized issuers.
This rule detects anomalous sign-in behavior for Azure Service Principals by comparing current activity against a 14-day baseline. It alerts on sign-ins from new ASNs or countries, significant spikes in sign-in volume, or unauthorized access to sensitive resources such as Microsoft Graph, Exchange Online, or Azure Key Vault, while filtering out known cloud egress ranges.
Detects the creation of a new application secret or credential in a cloud environment followed by an immediate authentication attempt using that credential from an IP address that has not been observed performing successful authentication within the specified lookback window. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized persistence or the use of compromised credentials by an adversary.
This rule identifies potential account compromise through the detection of non-interactive Azure AD sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations within a short, travel-implausible timeframe. Such activity is highly indicative of the theft and export of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) from a legitimate endpoint, which is subsequently replayed by an adversary from external infrastructure to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application consent to high-risk scopes (such as mail reading, file access, or directory reading) without administrator oversight. This behavior is a common indicator of OAuth abuse where an attacker lures a user into granting excessive permissions to a malicious application, providing the attacker persistent access to the user's data.
Detects Azure AD / M365 audit log events associated with OAuth2 permission grants or application consent
where a high-privilege delegated scope (e.g. Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, offline_access)
is granted to an application. This technique has been publicly attributed to APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)
for maintaining persistent access to M365 mailboxes and directory data via malicious or unverified OAuth
applications, consistent with MITRE ATT&CK T1098.001 (Additional Cloud Credentials) and T1550.001 (Use Alternate
Authentication Material: Application Access Token).
where a high-privilege delegated scope (e.g. Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, offline_access)
is granted to an application. This technique has been publicly attributed to APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)
for maintaining persistent access to M365 mailboxes and directory data via malicious or unverified OAuth
applications, consistent with MITRE ATT&CK T1098.001 (Additional Cloud Credentials) and T1550.001 (Use Alternate
Authentication Material: Application Access Token).
Detects instances where a user account consents to an OAuth application requesting high-privilege or sensitive scopes such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, or offline_access. This behavior is a common indicator of consent phishing attacks, where adversaries trick users into granting persistent access to their cloud resources via malicious OAuth applications.
Detects instances where an IAM user or role attempts to assume a role in a different AWS account (Cross-Account) without providing a valid ExternalID. This often indicates unauthorized attempts to access or abuse cross-account trust relationships, which is a common technique for lateral movement or privilege escalation in cloud environments.
Detects successful sign-in events in Entra ID where MFA is marked as satisfied, but no interactive MFA challenge (e.g., Push, FIDO2, SMS) was recorded as completed in the authentication details. This behavior, when correlated with a new IP, device, or user-agent relative to a 30-day baseline, is highly indicative of session token replay or AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) attacks attempting to bypass MFA requirements.
Detects AWS CloudTrail events where an actor performs identity or session token manipulation, specifically through the use of sts:GetFederationToken or sts:AssumeRole, or by modifying MFA configurations such as DeactivateMFADevice or CreateVirtualMFADevice on privileged accounts. This activity may indicate an attempt to gain persistent access, bypass security controls, or masquerade as a legitimate principal.
Detects the addition of a new client secret or certificate to an application or service principal by a user account. This activity is correlated with recent high-risk or suspicious sign-in events. Adversaries often perform this action following account takeover to establish durable, MFA-immune persistence in the cloud tenant.
Detects successful authentication attempts by the same user account from two different geographic locations within a timeframe that is physically impossible to travel between. This detection often highlights compromised accounts or session token theft, including scenarios where MFA mechanisms have been bypassed.
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