Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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KQL Query from file: Entra Cross-Tenant Activity Monitoring
KQL Query from file: Detecting Copilot Studio Bot Creation
'Identifies an export of the ADFS DKM Master Key from Active Directory.
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html?1
To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this:
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339
'
References: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html?1
To understand further the details behind this detection, please review the details in the original PR and subequent PR update to this:
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1562#issue-551542469
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/1512#issue-543053339
'
The query looks for users or service principals that attached an uncommon credential type to application.
As part of the Nobelium campaign, the attacker added credentials to already existing applications and used the application permissions to extract users' mails.
See How to: Use the portal to create an Microsoft Entra ID application and service principal that can access resources.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/develop/howto-create-service-principal-portal
As part of the Nobelium campaign, the attacker added credentials to already existing applications and used the application permissions to extract users' mails.
See How to: Use the portal to create an Microsoft Entra ID application and service principal that can access resources.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/develop/howto-create-service-principal-portal
This query will find applications that have been granted Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions in which the corresponding user recently consented to. It can help identify applications that have been abused to gain access to user email.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
Credentials were added to an application by UserA, after the application was granted admin consent rights by UserB
The Nobelium activity group has been observed adding credentials (x509 keys or password credentials) for one or more legitimate OAuth Applications or Service Principals, usually with existing Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions, which grants the ability to read mail content from Exchange Online via Microsoft Graph or Outlook REST. Examples include mail archiving applications.
See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks for more on the Nobelium campaign (formerly known as Solorigate).
See Grant tenant-wide admin consent to an application for how to add admin consent to an application.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/manage-apps/grant-admin-consent
The Nobelium activity group has been observed adding credentials (x509 keys or password credentials) for one or more legitimate OAuth Applications or Service Principals, usually with existing Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions, which grants the ability to read mail content from Exchange Online via Microsoft Graph or Outlook REST. Examples include mail archiving applications.
See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks for more on the Nobelium campaign (formerly known as Solorigate).
See Grant tenant-wide admin consent to an application for how to add admin consent to an application.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/manage-apps/grant-admin-consent
As described in previous guidance, Nobelium may re-purpose legitimate existing OAuth Applications in the environment to their own ends. However, malicious activity patterns may be discernable from legitimate ones.
The following query returns OAuth Applications that access mail both directly and via Graph, allowing review of whether such dual access methods follow expected use patterns.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
The following query returns OAuth Applications that access mail both directly and via Graph, allowing review of whether such dual access methods follow expected use patterns.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
'Under specific circumstances, executing KQL queries can exfiltrate information like access tokens, regarding external data functions like adx().
This query tries to list executed KQL queries that used the adx() function and where an access token might have been exposed to.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/azure-monitor/logs/azure-monitor-data-explorer-proxy
Ref: https://securecloud.blog/2022/04/27/azure-monitor-malicious-kql-query/'
This query tries to list executed KQL queries that used the adx() function and where an access token might have been exposed to.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/azure-monitor/logs/azure-monitor-data-explorer-proxy
Ref: https://securecloud.blog/2022/04/27/azure-monitor-malicious-kql-query/'
'Detects a user's consent to an OAuth application being blocked due to it being too risky.
These events should be investigated to understand why the user attempted to consent to the applicaiton and what other applicaitons they may have consented to.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#end-user-stopped-due-to-risk-based-consent'
These events should be investigated to understand why the user attempted to consent to the applicaiton and what other applicaitons they may have consented to.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-applications#end-user-stopped-due-to-risk-based-consent'
This rule detects when an authorization token, initially observed in Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) activity logs, is subsequently used within a command line on an endpoint system. This behavior suggests that a GKE pod's credential may have been exfiltrated and is being reused on a different system, potentially indicating unauthorized access or credential theft.
This analytic identifies the use of `certutil.exe` with arguments indicating the manipulation or extraction of certificates. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because extracting certificates can allow attackers to sign new authentication tokens, particularly in federated environments like Windows ADFS. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to forge authentication tokens, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.
Alerts when an authorization token originating from GKE activity is subsequently used within a command line on an endpoint system, suggesting potential credential exfiltration and reuse.
This rule identifies attempts to use expired or revoked OAuth refresh tokens to sign in to Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). This could indicate an adversary attempting to use a previously compromised token that is no longer valid, or a legitimate user whose token has expired due to inactivity (90 days) or revocation. The rule specifically looks for login events from 'Azure Activity' with a 'BLOCK' action and an action detail code of '50173', which corresponds to an expired or invalid refresh token.
Identify Entra ID OAuth refresh tokens are attempted to be used but have expired. This could be because the token hasn't been used for 90 days or it has been revoked
This rule detects suspicious activity involving an initial successful authentication to Office 365, followed by a non-interactive sign-in to Azure Activity (Entra ID) from the same user and IP address, but with different session IDs, applications, and user agents. This pattern is indicative of token theft and reuse, potentially using tools like GraphRunner, where an adversary uses a stolen token to perform non-interactive actions. The rule specifically looks for a mismatch in session ID, application, and user agent between the initial interactive login and the subsequent non-interactive login, while the user and IP remain consistent. The user agent strings are specifically chosen to align with those used by the GraphRunner tool.
Logins to Azure AD PowerShell app can have legitimate purposes, but are also abused to gain access to user information. Programatic access to Azure AD should generally be through other apps
Detects authentication to O365 followed by a non-interactive sign-ins that aligns to suspicious activity.
This rule detects when an Entra ID application has a significant increase in the number of assigned permissions within a short timeframe (5 minutes). This could indicate a "greedy permission grab" by an attacker attempting to escalate privileges or gain broader access to resources. The rule specifically looks for an increase of more than 8 permissions compared to the previous state. It does not compare the specific permissions, only the count.
This rule detects when a permission on a pre-defined watchlist is applied to an Entra ID application. It specifically looks for 'Update application.' events in Office 365 logs where the 'NewValue_EntitlementId-' or 'OldValue_EntitlementId-' labels indicate a change in application permissions. The rule leverages a watchlist named 'msgraph_watchlist_permissions' to identify sensitive or suspicious permission changes.
Detects suspicious access to Microsoft Teams application's authentication tokens and local storage, which may contain sensitive credentials. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 4663 (Object Access) where the accessed object path contains '\Microsoft\Teams\Cookies' or '\Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb', and the accessing process is NOT the legitimate 'Teams.exe'. This indicates an attempt by an unauthorized process to steal Teams authentication tokens.
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