Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
461 detections
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Detects instances where a user account registers a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method (such as TOTP or Authenticator app) shortly (within 30 minutes) after a high-risk or potentially anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where an attacker captures an authenticated session and uses it to enroll a secondary, attacker-controlled MFA device for persistent account access.
Detects the modification or creation of Azure AD applications that include specific malicious redirect URIs associated with 'TrustSink' style attacks, which abuse external authentication callback mechanisms to intercept tokens and bypass MFA.
Detects potential abuse of the Microsoft Graph API by correlating device-code authentication events with subsequent high-volume activity, such as mail or file enumeration, from the same account within a short window. This pattern is indicative of ARToken-style token proxying, where an attacker intercepts an OAuth device-code token to gain unauthorized access to an user's resources.
Detects anomalous, automated non-interactive sign-in activity in Microsoft 365 where a session token is replayed from a new source IP address approximately every 8 hours. This pattern is characteristic of automated token-refresh tooling, such as that associated with Storm-2755, utilizing specific user-agents (Firefox 131.0/151.0 or python-requests) that deviate from the user's typical browser fingerprint.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in activity consistent with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) token theft. The rule identifies successful sign-ins with multi-factor authentication, immediately followed by a new session attempt for the same user within 30 minutes from a different device, IP address, or location.
Detects suspicious non-interactive Entra ID sign-in events using the 'python-requests' User-Agent against sensitive Microsoft resources such as Microsoft Graph, Device Registration, or Intune. This activity is indicative of automated token abuse, particularly in the context of device-code phishing kits (e.g., GhostCode), where an attacker uses stolen session information to interact with Microsoft APIs.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects the creation of an application registered with a specific Microsoft external authentication provider URI, immediately followed by the configuration of its service principal with reply URLs pointing to external tunneling services like ngrok. This sequence is indicative of an attacker attempting to register a rogue MFA provider to intercept authentication requests.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID service principal (app-only) sign-in events where an application accesses a resource or tenant that has not been observed in the previous 30 days. This is often an indicator of cross-tenant impersonation abuse or credential misuse, particularly related to Actor Tokens.
Flags anomalous volume of Entra ID sign-ins using the device-code authorization grant, matching the Kali365 phishing-as-a-service technique (sold on Telegram, ~$250/month per FBI PSA) that captures Microsoft 365 OAuth tokens through the legitimate device-code flow.
Detects sign-in events in Entra ID where the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant (device code) flow is utilized. This flow is a common vector for phishing attacks designed to steal tokens by tricking users into authenticating on a secondary device, potentially bypassing MFA.
Detects Azure sign-in events claiming successful hardware-key or FIDO2 authentication where the authentication issuer is not part of a known-good allow-list. This behavior is indicative of a rogue MFA provider, such as the TrustSink attack, which issues forged tokens claiming MFA requirements were satisfied.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the TrustSink rogue MFA provider, specifically tracking the domain 'trident-sip-filter.ngrok-free.dev' and its associated OIDC discovery path. It aggregates signals from sign-in logs, audit logs, DNS queries, and network proxy traffic to identify attempts to interact with this malicious infrastructure.
Detects instances where a user grants consent to an unverified OAuth application requesting high-privilege scopes (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All). This behavior is characteristic of consent phishing attacks aimed at obtaining persistent access to sensitive data and mailbox contents.
Detects instances where a user account registers a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method (such as TOTP or Authenticator app) shortly (within 30 minutes) after a high-risk or potentially anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where an attacker captures an authenticated session and uses it to enroll a secondary, attacker-controlled MFA device for persistent account access.
Detects instances where a user account registers a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method (such as TOTP or Authenticator app) shortly (within 30 minutes) after a high-risk or potentially anomalous sign-in event. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where an attacker captures an authenticated session and uses it to enroll a secondary, attacker-controlled MFA device for persistent account access.
This rule identifies sign-in events using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that occur within the 2-day cache window immediately following a certificate or key credential update for an application or service principal in Entra ID. This detection highlights a timeframe where an attacker potentially possessing a compromised old signing key could use it to forge tokens before the Entra cache refreshes.
This rule detects potential account hijacking via OAuth device-code authorization flow, specifically identifying patterns associated with phishing kits (e.g., EvilTokens, ARToken). It monitors sign-in events where the device code flow is utilized, specifically flagging successful grants that potentially bypass standard interactive credential prompts.
Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a device-code authentication followed rapidly by a device enrollment, and subsequently continues to access cloud services (Microsoft Graph, Exchange Online, Intune) shortly after their account password has been reset. This pattern is indicative of persistent access maintained via a registered device or OAuth token that survives credential remediation.
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