Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
461 detections
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Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
This rule monitors for OAuth device-code authentication flow completions initiated from devices flagged as non-compliant or unmanaged in Azure AD. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft via vishing or SMS-based phishing lures (consistent with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 TTPs), where an adversary tricks a user into completing a device authorization grant to facilitate MFA bypass and persistence.
Detects login events to the 'My Sign-Ins' portal (mysignins.microsoft.com) by users. This portal is a high-value target for adversaries who have gained access to a session via token theft or session hijacking, as it allows them to modify or add authentication methods (such as MFA devices) to establish long-term persistence in the victim's account.
This rule identifies successful user sign-ins (ResultType 0) originating from specific Autonomous System Numbers (197540, 216154) where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was not required or not recorded, and where Conditional Access policies either did not apply or succeeded without enforcing MFA.
Detects sign-in activity using pre-existing durable session tokens (e.g., PRT, broker-based tokens) that occur shortly after a password reset, suggesting that the adversary has maintained persistent access despite the credential change.
Detects OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant requests utilizing the Microsoft Authentication Broker application ID (29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e) with sensitive scopes like 'https://graph.microsoft.com/.default'. This specific application ID is frequently impersonated by phishing kits (e.g., GhostCode) to facilitate token theft via device code flow abuse, where adversaries trick users into authenticating to a legitimate-looking but attacker-controlled flow.
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
Detects potential cross-application SSO session or token reuse by identifying users transitioning from a low-trust application (forum) to a high-trust application (ChatGPT/Codex) within a short window (15 minutes), especially when the sign-in is non-interactive (lacking MFA) or occurs from a different IP address or user agent, suggesting a possible token replay attack.
Detects successful API requests to sensitive administrative endpoints on WSO2 systems that lack a corresponding legitimate authentication event (session) from the same SourceIP and user pair, which may indicate the use of forged JWTs or authentication bypass exploitation (e.g., CVE-2026-5430).
Detects successful API requests to sensitive administrative endpoints on WSO2 systems that lack a corresponding legitimate authentication event (session) from the same SourceIP and user pair, which may indicate the use of forged JWTs or authentication bypass exploitation (e.g., CVE-2026-5430).
Detects anomalous access to WSO2 API Manager Store and Publisher endpoints involving the retrieval of sensitive information like consumer keys and secrets. The rule specifically targets requests authenticated with JWTs that exhibit headers indicative of 'alg=none' or other unsupported/forged algorithm patterns, often associated with CVE-2026-5430 exploitation attempts. The rule uses statistical baseline monitoring to identify volume spikes in requests to these sensitive paths.
Detects anomalous access to WSO2 API Manager Store and Publisher endpoints involving the retrieval of sensitive information like consumer keys and secrets. The rule specifically targets requests authenticated with JWTs that exhibit headers indicative of 'alg=none' or other unsupported/forged algorithm patterns, often associated with CVE-2026-5430 exploitation attempts. The rule uses statistical baseline monitoring to identify volume spikes in requests to these sensitive paths.
Detects anomalous access to WSO2 API Manager Store and Publisher endpoints involving the retrieval of sensitive information like consumer keys and secrets. The rule specifically targets requests authenticated with JWTs that exhibit headers indicative of 'alg=none' or other unsupported/forged algorithm patterns, often associated with CVE-2026-5430 exploitation attempts. The rule uses statistical baseline monitoring to identify volume spikes in requests to these sensitive paths.
Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
Detects GitHub OAuth authorization, repository cloning, or ZIP downloads from source IP addresses that have not been observed for the specific actor within the past 30 days. This rule helps identify potential account compromise or token theft where an attacker attempts to access repository data from a new location, while specifically excluding bot/service accounts known for rotating CI infrastructure IPs.
This rule detects unauthorized GitHub repository access or OAuth activity performed by a user account identified as terminated in the organization's HR system. It uses a watchlist to cross-reference GitHub audit logs against terminated employee records, applying a 2-hour grace period to account for potential log synchronization delays or final offboarding tasks.
This rule detects unauthorized GitHub repository access or OAuth activity performed by a user account identified as terminated in the organization's HR system. It uses a watchlist to cross-reference GitHub audit logs against terminated employee records, applying a 2-hour grace period to account for potential log synchronization delays or final offboarding tasks.
Detects a sequence of activity where an anonymous AWS token is requested via a specific API path, followed within 15 minutes by a token minting call from the same source IP. This behavior is indicative of a token-theft or privilege escalation chain.
Detects high-frequency creation and revocation of service principal credentials, indicating potential malicious credential cycling, or unusual bursts of service account JWT/refresh token rotation across multiple IP addresses, which may indicate an attempt to evade detection or maintain persistence.
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