Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious NTLM network logon events (Logon Type 3) involving privileged accounts that do not have corresponding Kerberos authentication events (4768/4769) in the preceding hour. The detection specifically triggers when a single account logs into two or more distinct hosts within a 15-minute window, which is indicative of lateral movement using compromised credentials or Pass-the-Hash techniques.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring for NTLM network logons (Logon Type 3) that are associated with a blank WorkstationName, often indicating spoofing. This pattern is correlated with the assignment of special privileges (EventID 4672) to capture scenarios where stolen NTLM hashes are replayed for lateral movement into a system.
This rule identifies potential lateral movement or account compromise by detecting accounts that have performed NTLM network logons or authentication (Events 4624/4776) without corresponding Kerberos pre-authentication or interactive logon events within a 15-minute window. This pattern often indicates the use of stolen credentials (e.g., Pass-the-Hash) to access network resources rather than standard interactive user activity.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash lateral movement by identifying NTLM network/remote-interactive logons from a single user account across three or more distinct destination hosts within a 15-minute window, correlated with the usage of common credential-dumping tools or commands on the source host.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a single user account authenticates via NTLM (LogonType 3, network logon) to three or more distinct hosts within a 30-minute window, without a preceding interactive logon (LogonType 2). This pattern is a strong indicator of an adversary using captured NTLM hashes to move laterally across a Windows environment.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior characterized by an account performing multiple NTLM authentication events (Logon Type 3) across distinct hosts within a short time window, specifically where Kerberos pre-authentication is absent. This pattern is frequently observed in Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks where attackers utilize stolen NTLM hashes to move laterally.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity where a single user account performs NTLM Type 3 (network) authentications to three or more unique destination hosts within a 10-minute window, excluding service account activity (trailing $). This pattern is consistent with an adversary moving laterally across a network using harvested NTLM hashes.
Detects the use of Mimikatz 'sekurlsa::pth' command for credential manipulation, or the occurrence of SMB/Windows administrative share access (ADMIN$, C$) potentially indicating lateral movement activities.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring for NTLM network logons (Logon Type 3) that are associated with a blank WorkstationName, often indicating spoofing. This pattern is correlated with the assignment of special privileges (EventID 4672) to capture scenarios where stolen NTLM hashes are replayed for lateral movement into a system.
Detects anomalous SMB network logon events (Logon Type 3) that are characteristic of NTLM relay attacks. This includes logons involving NTLM V1, anonymous logins, or logons lacking workstation information, which are often indicative of tools like Responder or other relaying utilities.
Detects potential pass-the-hash activity through NTLM network logons (Type 3). The rule identifies anomalies such as mismatched workstation names relative to the source computer or NTLM authentication using zero key length material, which is often indicative of automated lateral movement attempts bypassing standard authentication processes.
Detects NTLM authentication attempts targeting administrative network shares (ADMIN$ or C$) over the SMB protocol. This behavior is a common indicator of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash, where an adversary uses captured NTLM hashes to authenticate to remote systems.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior by monitoring Windows Event 4624 (Logon Type 3) using NTLM authentication. The rule triggers when a single user account authenticates to five or more distinct hosts within a five-minute window, a pattern frequently associated with Pass-the-Hash attacks where captured credentials are used to spread across a network.
This rule identifies potential lateral movement or account compromise by detecting accounts that have performed NTLM network logons or authentication (Events 4624/4776) without corresponding Kerberos pre-authentication or interactive logon events within a 15-minute window. This pattern often indicates the use of stolen credentials (e.g., Pass-the-Hash) to access network resources rather than standard interactive user activity.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
This rule detects potential Pass-the-Hash lateral movement by identifying NTLM network logons (Event ID 4624, LogonType 3) on a host that lack a preceding interactive (LogonType 2, 10) or Kerberos-authenticated logon, coupled with subsequent access to sensitive administrative shares (Event ID 5140) by the same user account.
Detects anomalous NTLM network logons (Logon Type 3) where the same user account authenticates to multiple distinct hosts within a short time window. This behavior is correlated with NTLM validation (4776) events to identify potential Pass-the-Hash activity used for lateral movement.
Detects anomalous lateral movement behavior where a single user account authenticates via NTLM to three or more distinct target hosts within a short time window (10 minutes). This pattern of rapid, broad authentication is a strong indicator of a Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attack.
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