Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
119 detections
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Detects potential credential reuse attacks such as Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, or Overpass-the-Hash. The rule identifies a 'NewCredentials' logon (e.g., runas /netonly) followed by a network or remote interactive logon to a target system (such as a domain controller) by the same user, without an interactive logon session occurring between the events, which is indicative of using stolen credentials to move laterally.
Detects NTLM network logon events (Logon Type 3) using the NtLmSsp process where the key length is zero. This pattern is often indicative of Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks where the adversary uses a NTLM hash for authentication without knowing the original plaintext password.
This rule detects potential Pass-the-Hash lateral movement by identifying NTLM network logons (Event ID 4624, LogonType 3) on a host that lack a preceding interactive (LogonType 2, 10) or Kerberos-authenticated logon, coupled with subsequent access to sensitive administrative shares (Event ID 5140) by the same user account.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by monitoring successful network logons using NTLM authentication across multiple distinct destination hosts within a short time window. It calculates the frequency of connections to unique hosts to identify anomalous, rapid traversal through a network by a single user account, excluding known system accounts.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4624 (Logon). The rule specifically targets logon type 9 (NewCredentials) combined with specific process/package names indicative of tools like Mimikatz, or anomalous NTLM network logons (logon type 3) that are not anonymous.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4624 (Logon). The rule specifically targets logon type 9 (NewCredentials) combined with specific process/package names indicative of tools like Mimikatz, or anomalous NTLM network logons (logon type 3) that are not anonymous.
Detects network requests targeting Dahua devices that attempt to exploit CVE-2021-33044. The exploitation involves sending a crafted 'global.login' RPC call with specific parameters (clientType 'NetKeyboard', loginType 'Direct', authorityType 'Default') to bypass authentication and retrieve administrative session tokens.
Detects the use of the default, hardcoded 'sk-1234' secret key for HS256 JWT signing in LiteLLM proxy logs. This configuration is insecure and allows for the forgery of arbitrary user session tokens.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user account utilizes the same authentication session (LogonId) or material to authenticate across multiple distinct destination hosts in a short timeframe. This rule monitors for both NTLM (Type 3) and Kerberos (TGS/TGT) events, which are indicative of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket.
Detects the use of the default, hardcoded 'sk-1234' secret key for HS256 JWT signing in LiteLLM proxy logs. This configuration is insecure and allows for the forgery of arbitrary user session tokens.
This rule detects authentication events occurring from devices that have not been seen in the user's history over the previous 14 days and involve non-compliant, unmanaged, or non-Azure AD joined devices. The detection specifically looks for sign-ins that do not utilize interactive credential prompts (token-based), which may indicate an adversary using a stolen session token (e.g., a Primary Refresh Token) from an unrecognized or insecure source.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user account utilizes the same authentication session (LogonId) or material to authenticate across multiple distinct destination hosts in a short timeframe. This rule monitors for both NTLM (Type 3) and Kerberos (TGS/TGT) events, which are indicative of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user account utilizes the same authentication session (LogonId) or material to authenticate across multiple distinct destination hosts in a short timeframe. This rule monitors for both NTLM (Type 3) and Kerberos (TGS/TGT) events, which are indicative of lateral movement techniques such as Pass-the-Hash or Pass-the-Ticket.
Detects the use of the default, hardcoded 'sk-1234' secret key for HS256 JWT signing in LiteLLM proxy logs. This configuration is insecure and allows for the forgery of arbitrary user session tokens.
Detects the use of the default, hardcoded 'sk-1234' secret key for HS256 JWT signing in LiteLLM proxy logs. This configuration is insecure and allows for the forgery of arbitrary user session tokens.
Detects the use of the default, hardcoded 'sk-1234' secret key for HS256 JWT signing in LiteLLM proxy logs. This configuration is insecure and allows for the forgery of arbitrary user session tokens.
Detects network requests targeting Dahua devices that attempt to exploit CVE-2021-33044. The exploitation involves sending a crafted 'global.login' RPC call with specific parameters (clientType 'NetKeyboard', loginType 'Direct', authorityType 'Default') to bypass authentication and retrieve administrative session tokens.
Detects network requests targeting Dahua devices that attempt to exploit CVE-2021-33044. The exploitation involves sending a crafted 'global.login' RPC call with specific parameters (clientType 'NetKeyboard', loginType 'Direct', authorityType 'Default') to bypass authentication and retrieve administrative session tokens.
Detects Kerberos TGT requests (Event ID 4768) that utilize RC4 (PreAuthType 23) for pre-authentication. This is a common indicator of an Overpass-the-Hash attack, where an adversary uses a stolen NTLM hash to authenticate as a user and request a Kerberos ticket in environments that are typically configured for AES encryption.
Detects network requests targeting Dahua devices that attempt to exploit CVE-2021-33044. The exploitation involves sending a crafted 'global.login' RPC call with specific parameters (clientType 'NetKeyboard', loginType 'Direct', authorityType 'Default') to bypass authentication and retrieve administrative session tokens.
Detects network requests targeting Dahua devices that attempt to exploit CVE-2021-33044. The exploitation involves sending a crafted 'global.login' RPC call with specific parameters (clientType 'NetKeyboard', loginType 'Direct', authorityType 'Default') to bypass authentication and retrieve administrative session tokens.
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