Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the mounting of VHDX files via disk imaging tools or PowerShell, followed shortly (within 15 minutes) by the execution of a shell process with hidden window flags. This behavioral pattern is associated with the delivery of malicious payloads, such as those observed in Star Blizzard's RedFlick delivery chain for CosmicPulse.
This rule detects the use of 'mshta.exe' to execute HTML (.html, .htm) or MHTML (.mhtml, .mht) files. This behavior is often associated with bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) protections, as attackers may use container formats to deliver files that do not properly inherit MotW markings when extracted, allowing them to be opened by 'mshta.exe' without restrictive security policies.
Detects the use of PowerShell to remove the 'Zone.Identifier' NTFS Alternate Data Stream from a file, effectively bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security protections. This behavior is often associated with the 'Unblock-File' cmdlet and is used by adversaries to execute downloaded malicious files without security warnings.
Detects the exploitation of WinRAR CVE-2023-38831, where a maliciously crafted archive triggers WinRAR to execute a secondary payload (such as a script, LNK, or binary) from its temporary extraction directories (Rar$EXa, Rar$DIa, Rar$SR). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using WinRAR as an initial access vector to bypass security controls.
This rule detects the execution of a file with an .exe extension from the user's Downloads directory that has been previously tagged with the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) Zone.Identifier. It correlates file creation events, the application of the MOTW alternate data stream, and subsequent process execution to identify potentially malicious downloaded executables.
This rule detects the execution of a file with an .exe extension from the user's Downloads directory that has been previously tagged with the Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) Zone.Identifier. It correlates file creation events, the application of the MOTW alternate data stream, and subsequent process execution to identify potentially malicious downloaded executables.
Detects the creation or writing of disk image files (.iso, .img, .vhd, .vhdx) followed by the execution of suspicious file types (.lnk, .exe, .js, .vbs, .cmd, .bat, .scr) by explorer.exe within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using container files to bypass security controls or execute malicious payloads from mounted images.
Detects the execution of programs directly from the root of a removable or virtual drive (e.g., ISO, IMG, VHD) via explorer.exe. This activity is a hallmark of phishing attacks that leverage container mounting to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security protections, as files extracted from or executed within mounted containers often fail to inherit MOTW metadata.
Because FileFix commands are typed/pasted directly into the Explorer address bar rather than downloaded, executed content never receives a Mark-of-the-Web tag, sidestepping SmartScreen-style controls.
Detects the use of PowerShell to remove the 'Zone.Identifier' NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) from files. This stream is responsible for the 'Mark-of-the-Web' (MOTW) which triggers security warnings in Windows, including SmartScreen and Protected View. Adversaries use this technique to evade security controls on downloaded malicious files.
Detects a suspicious sequence where the 'chrome_cleanup.exe' binary is written to disk, its Mark of the Web (MOTW) identifier is removed, and it is subsequently launched by an unusual process (e.g., explorer, svchost, dllhost, or rundll32) without command-line arguments. This behavior is indicative of a COM-based shell launch, a technique often used by post-exploitation tools to bypass security controls and execute binaries stealthily.
Detects the mounting of Virtual Hard Disk (VHD) files using system processes such as explorer.exe or vds.exe. This activity is a known technique for bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security protections, as files within the mounted container may not inherit the MOTW attribute. This behavior was observed in Operation QUICSILVER, where actors used VHD files disguised with benign extensions to deliver malicious LNK payloads to targets.
Detects the initialization of the SEE_MASK_NOZONECHECKS environment variable within a PowerShell process command line. Setting this variable to '1' is a known technique used to suppress Windows zone-based security prompts (Mark-of-the-Web) for downloaded files, facilitating the execution of potentially malicious payloads.
Detects the installation of MSIX/AppX packages with full trust privileges which run with elevated privileges outside normal AppX container restrictions
Remove the Zone.Identifier alternate data stream which identifies the file as downloaded from the internet.
Detects attempts to install unsigned MSIX/AppX packages using the -AllowUnsigned parameter via AppXDeployment-Server events
Detects a PowerShell-driven sequence where a file is downloaded, has its Mark-of-the-Web removed via Unlock-File, then is executed through msiexec /i on the same file path within a 10-minute window, mirroring the SMOKE#SCREEN ScreenConnect delivery chain.
Detects the deletion of the 'Zone.Identifier' alternate data stream from a downloaded .msi file, followed closely by the execution of that file using 'msiexec.exe'. This pattern is a known technique for bypassing Windows Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) protections, which normally trigger SmartScreen warnings or Restricted View protections for internet-downloaded files.
Detects the legacy SourTrade Mark-of-the-Web spoofing variant, where a downloaded file's Zone.Identifier data or an observed network request references the jimmywarting.github.io/StreamSaver.js helper path with an embedded attacker domain, date, and installer.exe filename — used to disguise the true download provenance of browser-assembled malware.
Detects process creation consistent with CVE-2025-33053 exploitation, where a crafted Internet Shortcut (.url) file sets its target to iediagcmd.exe with a WorkingDirectory pointing to a WebDAV DavWWWRoot UNC path, causing iediagcmd.exe to resolve and launch LOLBins (route.exe, ipconfig.exe, netsh.exe, ping.exe) from the attacker-controlled WebDAV share instead of the legitimate System32 directory.
Detects process creation consistent with CVE-2025-33053 exploitation, where a crafted Internet Shortcut (.url) file sets its target to iediagcmd.exe with a WorkingDirectory pointing to a WebDAV DavWWWRoot UNC path, causing iediagcmd.exe to resolve and launch LOLBins (route.exe, ipconfig.exe, netsh.exe, ping.exe) from the attacker-controlled WebDAV share instead of the legitimate System32 directory.
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