Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
711 detections
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Detects access to Chrome or Chromium-based browser Local State files (which contain encrypted keys) by a non-browser process that correlates temporally with a PowerShell process exhibiting ClickFix-style staging characteristics (hidden window, bypass execution policy, and containing a URL).
Detects a single non-browser process accessing the 'Web Data' files of multiple different web browser families within a short timeframe, which is indicative of credential harvesting or browser stealer activity.
Detects the correlation between the loading of known stealer plugin DLLs outside of standard application paths and subsequent process activity accessing credential stores, sensitive files, or executing wireless key recovery commands.
Detects PowerShell launched hidden and non-interactive with an insecure execution policy and Base64 decode-and-execute, or a script combining Base64 decode-and-execute with browser history collection and WMI shadow copy enumeration, as seen in the Midnight Blizzard (GTG-20006) stager.
Detects the Shai-Hulud tensorlake payload pattern of fetching a platform-specific HackBrowserData binary and then executing it on the same host to dump browser-stored credentials. Anchored on tool behavior (download then execution on one host) rather than a single sample hash or the rotating C2 domain.
Detects the execution of known credential theft tools such as Mimikatz, SharpDecryptPwd, and WebBrowserPassView via EDR process creation telemetry.
Detects non-browser processes accessing multiple sensitive browser credential/cookie files or cryptocurrency wallet files within a 24-hour window, which is a common indicator of credential theft or information stealer activity.
The following analytic identifies processes with command-line parameters associated with web browser credential dumping tools, specifically targeting behaviors used by Remcos RAT malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and specific file paths. This activity is significant as it indicates potential credential theft, a common tactic in broader cyber-espionage campaigns. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive web credentials, leading to further system compromise and data breaches.
The following analytic detects non-Firefox processes accessing the Firefox profile directory, which contains sensitive user data such as login credentials, browsing history, and cookies. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to monitor access attempts. This activity is significant because it may indicate attempts by malware, such as RATs or trojans, to harvest user information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to data exfiltration, unauthorized access to user accounts, and further compromise of the affected system.
Detects unauthorized access to sensitive browser credential and session data files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, Local State, key4.db) by non-browser processes. This behavior is a common indicator of information-stealing malware attempting to extract saved credentials and session cookies to facilitate account takeover and bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects instances where a process that is not a recognized web browser (chrome, msedge, firefox, brave, opera, or explorer) accesses multiple unique browser cookie files. This is a common pattern for credential harvesting malware attempting to steal browser sessions.
Detects unauthorized access or modification attempts to common web browser credential storage files (such as 'Login Data' or 'key4.db') by processes other than standard, trusted web browsers (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox). This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting, where an adversary attempts to steal saved login information from browser data stores.
Detects unauthorized processes accessing sensitive credential storage files (e.g., 'Login Data', 'Cookies', 'Local State') from known Chromium-based browser profile directories. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting by infostealer malware attempting to exfiltrate browser data before performing decryption.
The following analytic identifies a possible non-common browser process accessing its browser user data profile.
This tactic/technique has been observed in various Trojan Stealers, such as SnakeKeylogger, which attempt to gather sensitive browser information and credentials as part of their exfiltration strategy.
Detecting this anomaly can serve as a valuable pivot for identifying processes that access lists of browser user data profiles unexpectedly.
This detection uses a lookup file `browser_app_list` that maintains a list of well known browser applications and the browser paths that are allowed to access the browser user data profiles.
This tactic/technique has been observed in various Trojan Stealers, such as SnakeKeylogger, which attempt to gather sensitive browser information and credentials as part of their exfiltration strategy.
Detecting this anomaly can serve as a valuable pivot for identifying processes that access lists of browser user data profiles unexpectedly.
This detection uses a lookup file `browser_app_list` that maintains a list of well known browser applications and the browser paths that are allowed to access the browser user data profiles.
Detects unauthorized access to DPAPI master key files located in the Windows user profile (%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\). This activity is commonly associated with infostealers attempting to decrypt browser-stored credentials (cookies, passwords) by manually accessing the master key files after exfiltrating encrypted data stores.
Detects the execution of known browser credential harvesting tools (WebBrowserPassView, WebBrowserBookmarksView, or WS_Password variants) from ScreenConnect temporary directories. This behavior often indicates post-compromise activity where an adversary uses an existing Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) session to extract credentials from browsers.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or create sensitive browser credential files ('Login Data', 'Web Data', 'Cookies', 'logins.json', 'key4.db'). This activity is commonly associated with information-stealing malware (such as Lumma, StealC, Vidar, RedLine, and Amadey) that targets browser databases to extract stored secrets, often bypassing standard browser process access.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain where a device shows signs of credential theft (accessing browser credential stores or cookies) followed closely by a successful cloud authentication from that same user using a device identifier not previously observed in the last 30 days.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read sensitive wallet extension storage files or desktop application wallet data folders, a behavior characteristic of the Psychedelic Stealer malware designed to harvest cryptocurrency credentials prior to exfiltration.
Detects Node.js or ProfileQuickHost processes performing file operations (read, write, rename) on sensitive browser directories, such as 'Local Extension Settings' or wallet-related folders. This pattern is commonly observed in credential-stealing malware attempting to extract browser-stored secrets or cryptocurrency wallet data.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read or create sensitive browser credential files ('Login Data', 'Web Data', 'Cookies', 'logins.json', 'key4.db'). This activity is commonly associated with information-stealing malware (such as Lumma, StealC, Vidar, RedLine, and Amadey) that targets browser databases to extract stored secrets, often bypassing standard browser process access.
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