Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
711 detections
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This rule detects instances where a process that is not a recognized web browser attempts to access sensitive files associated with browser credential stores, such as Login Data, Cookies, and web browser state files. Such activity is commonly associated with infostealer malware, which attempts to exfiltrate saved passwords, session cookies, and autofill information.
Detects Abyssos RECOVERY and RECOVERY_GECKO modules used to harvest Chrome/Firefox credentials, requiring an unsigned executable freshly dropped in the Windows temp folder using the rcv/rvg naming pattern that references browser credential stores (Chrome Login Data, Firefox key4.db) alongside the module's hardcoded XOR decryption key
This rule detects macOS infostealer activity, such as AMOS, MacSync, or SHub, by identifying suspicious, correlated access to sensitive credential stores including the macOS Keychain, web browser credential databases (Chrome), SSH keys, and cryptocurrency wallet configuration files. It uses a combination of path/command-line strings and generic indicators of credential harvesting behavior.
This rule detects PowerShell execution patterns indicative of fileless information stealer activity. It searches for specific command-line flags often associated with obfuscated or hidden script execution (e.g., -EncodedCommand, -nop -w hidden, IEX) combined with attempts to access or target sensitive files and tokens (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, msal.cache, AAD.BrokerPlugin) common in Microsoft 365 and browser-based credential theft.
This rule detects potential credential theft activity where a process spawning a command-line interpreter (bash, sh, zsh) using 'curl' simultaneously accesses sensitive browser configuration or credential directories on MacOS, such as Chrome, Firefox, or Safari application support paths. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate browser-stored secrets.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
This rule detects unauthorized access to the Google Chrome LevelDB sync data files. These files contain sensitive information, including synced passwords, and are often targeted by credential-stealing malware. The rule excludes known legitimate Chrome processes to minimize noise, alerting when an unknown or suspicious process interacts with this specific directory structure.
This rule detects PowerShell execution patterns indicative of fileless information stealer activity. It searches for specific command-line flags often associated with obfuscated or hidden script execution (e.g., -EncodedCommand, -nop -w hidden, IEX) combined with attempts to access or target sensitive files and tokens (e.g., Cookies, Login Data, msal.cache, AAD.BrokerPlugin) common in Microsoft 365 and browser-based credential theft.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory access or memory-dump activity targeting chrome.exe, consistent with extraction of the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key or wrapped identity/UV private keys used to decrypt synced passkey credentials (Golden Pass-ta-key attack). Excludes known legitimate crash-dump and diagnostic tooling (WerFault, crashpad_handler, procdump, Chrome itself).
This rule detects unauthorized access to the Google Chrome LevelDB sync data files. These files contain sensitive information, including synced passwords, and are often targeted by credential-stealing malware. The rule excludes known legitimate Chrome processes to minimize noise, alerting when an unknown or suspicious process interacts with this specific directory structure.
Detects non-browser, non-password-manager processes accessing browser process memory (potential in-memory cookie theft), copying browser credential/cookie database files (Login Data, Cookies, Local State, key4.db, logins.json), or enumerating stored Wi-Fi profile keys via netsh wlan show profile key=clear - behaviors associated with CornFlake RAT credential theft and Wi-Fi credential harvesting used in the CaptiveCrunch campaign.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
Detects the second-stage payload of the ChainDrop/Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, specifically targeting GitHub Actions runner environments. The rule identifies obfuscated Bun-bundled CommonJS credential-stealing scripts (math_init.js) designed to harvest secrets from the Runner.Worker process memory and communicate with C2 infrastructure via EtherHiding Ethereum contract interaction.
Detects a non-Chrome, unsigned process reading Chrome's Sync Data LevelDB store, where encrypted WebauthnCredentialSpecifics passkey records are persisted, consistent with the collection stage of a Pass-ta-key credential-theft chain. Excludes Chrome itself, known backup/sync clients, the Windows Search indexer, and signed security/EDR tooling.
Detects deletion, modification, or renaming of the Chrome 'passkey_enclave_state' file by a process other than Chrome. This file contains sensitive wrapped identity, User Verification (UV) private keys, and security domain secrets. Unauthorized access or deletion of this file is indicative of an attempt to force Chrome to re-onboard the device, which may expose key material during the re-registration flow.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory access or memory-dump activity targeting chrome.exe, consistent with extraction of the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key or wrapped identity/UV private keys used to decrypt synced passkey credentials (Golden Pass-ta-key attack). Excludes known legitimate crash-dump and diagnostic tooling (WerFault, crashpad_handler, procdump, Chrome itself).
Detects a non-Chrome, unsigned process reading Chrome's Sync Data LevelDB store, where encrypted WebauthnCredentialSpecifics passkey records are persisted, consistent with the collection stage of a Pass-ta-key credential-theft chain. Excludes Chrome itself, known backup/sync clients, the Windows Search indexer, and signed security/EDR tooling.
No description available.
Detects a non-browser process (unsigned, or not matching the legitimate Chrome/Edge install path and signature) invoking Windows CNG NCrypt APIs against the TPM-backed platform crypto provider, consistent with an attacker mimicking Chrome's passkey identity/UV key signing flow to forge authentication (Pass-ta-key). Excludes correctly signed Chrome and Edge processes running from their standard install locations.
Detects automated or scripted access to Chrome's internal chrome://device-log/FIDO diagnostics page, or command-line evidence of 'security domain secret'/keys/wrap content, which can unintentionally expose the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key. Scoped to headless/automation-flagged or script-launched Chrome processes to reduce noise from manual developer/support troubleshooting.
Detects automated or scripted access to Chrome's internal chrome://device-log/FIDO diagnostics page, or command-line evidence of 'security domain secret'/keys/wrap content, which can unintentionally expose the Security Domain Secret (SDS) master key. Scoped to headless/automation-flagged or script-launched Chrome processes to reduce noise from manual developer/support troubleshooting.
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