Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
711 detections
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Detects file creation, modification, or rename activity targeting known directory paths and files used by the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) to stage exfiltrated credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and browser data. It identifies staging activity by looking for patterns associated with the stealer's data-collection routines.
Detects likely exfiltration of encrypted synced passkey (WebauthnCredentialSpecifics) blobs to external C2 infrastructure, correlated with a prior non-browser read of Chrome's Sync Data LevelDB store, consistent with the collection-and-exfiltration stage of a Pass-ta-key credential-theft chain. Excludes traffic destined to Google's own domains.
Detects a non-browser process (unsigned, or not matching the legitimate Chrome/Edge install path and signature) invoking Windows CNG NCrypt APIs against the TPM-backed platform crypto provider, consistent with an attacker mimicking Chrome's passkey identity/UV key signing flow to forge authentication (Pass-ta-key). Excludes correctly signed Chrome and Edge processes running from their standard install locations.
Detects the download, file creation, or execution of known NirSoft credential and browser harvesting utilities (ChromePass, WebBrowserBookmarksView, Network Password Recovery, LastActivityView) from non-standard directories or identified malicious actor infrastructure.
Detects multiple stages of the ChocoShell credential and token theft framework, including SYSTEM token impersonation for DPAPI key access, VSS shadow copy abuse to extract browser databases, malicious use of browser remote debugging ports (CDP) for cookie exfiltration, and unauthorized access to browser profile files or Token Broker cache (.tbres) files.
Detects connections to the local CDP WebSocket server on port 18907 tied to the chrome_remote/browser_remote backdoor family, used for session-cookie theft, password capture, browser API hooking, and MetaMask/dApp manipulation.
Detects suspicious processes that repeatedly enumerate installed software via registry Uninstall keys and access sensitive browser data (History, cookies, and web-data files) over a period of multiple days, while simultaneously generating consistent outbound network beaconing. This behavior is indicative of data-stealing malware, such as the Dolphin X 'AI Profiler', which profiles victims based on their application usage and browsing habits.
Detects instances where processes other than common Chromium-based web browsers attempt to access sensitive files within the browser's User Data directory, such as Login Data, Cookies, or Web Data. This behavior is often indicative of credential theft or session hijacking attempts by unauthorized software or adversaries.
Detects a process accessing browser credential-related files (Login Data, Cookies) across three or more distinct browser profiles within a 5-minute window, followed by the creation of a ZIP archive by the same process within 10 minutes. This behavior is indicative of credential theft activities where browser profiles are harvested and bundled for exfiltration, consistent with techniques used by infostealers like Dolphin X.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to access sensitive browser files containing credentials (e.g., 'Login Data', 'logins.json') and cookies (e.g., 'store.json.mozlz4', 'Browser_Cookies.json'). This behavior is commonly associated with credential harvesting malware such as TOKYOCORE, which seeks to steal stored browser secrets before they can be encrypted or for immediate use in session hijacking.
Detects an untrusted process accessing sensitive browser credential and cookie files across multiple browser families and profiles in a short period, followed immediately by the creation of a ZIP archive. This pattern is consistent with the behavior of credential-stealing malware like Dolphin X, which aggregates stolen browser data into an archive for exfiltration.
Detects instances where a process other than the legitimate Discord client or its updater accesses the Local Storage/leveldb directory. This path contains cached authentication tokens and session data, making it a frequent target for credential theft malware such as SectopRAT in the FakeAgent campaign.
Detects download or reference to the chrome-injector Chrome App-Bound Encryption decryption tool (github.com/xaitax/Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption), attempted by JadeProx operators for post-exploitation browser credential theft.
Detects connections to the local CDP WebSocket server on port 18907 tied to the chrome_remote/browser_remote backdoor family, used for session-cookie theft, password capture, browser API hooking, and MetaMask/dApp manipulation.
Detects a single unrecognized process combining two or more distinct PRO/ULTIMATE surveillance behaviors: webcam capture via Win32 Media Foundation, screenshot/screen-recorder file drops, and keystroke/clipboard dump file creation, within a short 15-minute window. Excludes known legitimate screen-recording, remote-support, and accessibility software.
Detects an unsigned process performing a specific behavioral sequence indicative of AI-assisted target profiling: high-volume software enumeration via registry keys, unauthorized access to browser data (history, cookies, bookmarks), and periodic C2-like network beaconing. The rule requires these actions to correlate within a tight 6-hour burst and exhibit persistent beaconing behavior over at least 3 days.
Detects regsvr32 loading chromelevator.ocx/mscom.ocx followed by the ChromEggscalator credential-extraction command sequence.
Detects unauthorized file access attempts targeting sensitive data directories such as Telegram tdata, web browser credential stores (Login Data, Cookies), cryptocurrency wallet configuration folders (Exodus, Electrum), and Foxmail data files. This rule filters out legitimate access by the corresponding applications themselves to reduce noise.
Detects unauthorized file access attempts targeting sensitive data directories such as Telegram tdata, web browser credential stores (Login Data, Cookies), cryptocurrency wallet configuration folders (Exodus, Electrum), and Foxmail data files. This rule filters out legitimate access by the corresponding applications themselves to reduce noise.
Detects suspicious processes (PowerShell, MSHTA, WScript, CScript, or CMD) attempting to read sensitive browser or wallet files (Login Data, Cookies, Local State, etc.). This behavior is frequently associated with information stealers attempting to extract credentials and sensitive information from local endpoints.
Detects attempts by non-browser processes to access sensitive Chromium-based browser files including Login Data, Cookies, and Web Data. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping or session cookie theft where unauthorized software attempts to extract browser-stored secrets.
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