Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous, bulk file access activity targeting browser credential databases, cryptocurrency wallet data, and application-specific configuration stores, characteristic of the SectopRAT 'DeployBrowserKey' command.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access sensitive Veeam Backup and Replication credentials by querying the backend SQL database or directly accessing DPAPI Master Key files. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to decrypt backup credentials stored by the Veeam service.
Detects attempts to enumerate or access Windows Credential Manager and vault files, often used by adversaries to extract cached credentials. The rule monitors for execution of vaultcmd.exe, invocation of keymgr.dll via rundll32.exe, and unauthorized access to credential storage paths in AppData by non-system processes.
Detects non-browser processes accessing sensitive browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, Cookies) and cryptocurrency wallet files within a short time window. This pattern is characteristic of infostealer malware like Vidar, which grabs browser and wallet data for exfiltration.
Detects file access requests to the the Windows Data Protection API Master keys by an uncommon application.
This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::masterkey" function
This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::masterkey" function
Detects a single unrecognized process combining two or more distinct PRO/ULTIMATE surveillance behaviors: webcam capture via Win32 Media Foundation, screenshot/screen-recorder file drops, and keystroke/clipboard dump file creation, within a short 15-minute window. Excludes known legitimate screen-recording, remote-support, and accessibility software.
Detects the execution of cmdkey.exe with the /list flag, which is used to enumerate credentials stored in the Windows Credential Manager. This technique is often used by adversaries for post-compromise reconnaissance to identify stored credentials for lateral movement.
Detects potential credential harvesting attempts by monitoring for the usage of Windows credential management tools (cmdkey.exe and vaultcmd.exe) and the loading of sensitive DLLs (vaultcli.dll, dpapi.dll) by non-Microsoft signed processes, which is commonly used to access stored credentials in the Windows Vault or by DPAPI-protected stores.
This rule detects various methods used to extract credentials protected by the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI). It covers multiple vectors, including Mimikatz DPAPI module usage, unauthorized loading of the dpapi.dll library, suspicious access to browser or WiFi credential stores, and cross-process memory access to the LSASS process to extract DPAPI master keys.
Detects potential credential harvesting attempts by monitoring for the usage of Windows credential management tools (cmdkey.exe and vaultcmd.exe) and the loading of sensitive DLLs (vaultcli.dll, dpapi.dll) by non-Microsoft signed processes, which is commonly used to access stored credentials in the Windows Vault or by DPAPI-protected stores.
Detects credential harvesting behavior associated with the BQTLock (BaqiyatLock) malware, including the staging of password files in temporary directories, unauthorized access to browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, key4.db), and the use of system utilities like vaultcmd.exe to interact with the Windows Credential Manager. It also monitors the execution of PyInstaller-packed loaders (BQT.exe or start.exe) from temporary directories.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows Credential Manager files, TokenBroker OAuth cache files, or the loading of crypt32.dll from suspicious, user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads, Desktop) by non-Microsoft or non-system processes. This activity is indicative of credential theft, session hijacking, or attempts to abuse the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to decrypt sensitive local secrets.
Detects unauthorized attempts to enumerate stored Windows credentials using native command-line utilities such as vaultcmd.exe and cmdkey.exe, or by invoking CredEnumerate/Get-StoredCredential functions via PowerShell scripts. These methods are commonly used by attackers to gain access to cached passwords, tokens, or network credentials stored in the Windows Credential Manager.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access or list stored credentials via Windows Credential Manager using standard administrative tools (cmdkey.exe, vaultcmd.exe) or PowerShell, as well as direct unauthorized access to credential storage files within the AppData directory.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access or list stored credentials via Windows Credential Manager using standard administrative tools (cmdkey.exe, vaultcmd.exe) or PowerShell, as well as direct unauthorized access to credential storage files within the AppData directory.
Detects unauthorized access to Windows Credential Manager files, TokenBroker OAuth cache files, or the loading of crypt32.dll from suspicious, user-writable directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads, Desktop) by non-Microsoft or non-system processes. This activity is indicative of credential theft, session hijacking, or attempts to abuse the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to decrypt sensitive local secrets.
Detects unauthorized attempts to enumerate stored Windows credentials using native command-line utilities such as vaultcmd.exe and cmdkey.exe, or by invoking CredEnumerate/Get-StoredCredential functions via PowerShell scripts. These methods are commonly used by attackers to gain access to cached passwords, tokens, or network credentials stored in the Windows Credential Manager.
This rule detects the execution of 'vaultsvc.exe' or executables starting with 'WindowsVault' and ending with '.exe' from suspicious, non-standard directories such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp. It also flags execution from any non-system path if not in System32, SysWOW64, or Program Files. A known malicious hash for 'vaultsvc.exe' is specifically identified.
Detects adversary activity consistent with credential dumping tools like KuinaExtractor. The rule monitors for the enumeration of Windows Credential Manager stores using vaultcmd /list or cmdkey /list, and the direct instantiation of the Windows PasswordVault via PowerShell, excluding system accounts and known legitimate applications.
Detects adversary activity consistent with credential dumping tools like KuinaExtractor. The rule monitors for the enumeration of Windows Credential Manager stores using vaultcmd /list or cmdkey /list, and the direct instantiation of the Windows PasswordVault via PowerShell, excluding system accounts and known legitimate applications.
This rule detects various methods used to extract credentials protected by the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI). It covers multiple vectors, including Mimikatz DPAPI module usage, unauthorized loading of the dpapi.dll library, suspicious access to browser or WiFi credential stores, and cross-process memory access to the LSASS process to extract DPAPI master keys.
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