Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
Detects instances where a user account registers or modifies MFA authentication methods (such as phone numbers or apps) for a different user account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker with administrative privileges attempting to establish persistence on a target account by adding their own MFA device.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects a successful self-service password reset followed shortly by an authentication method change on the same account -- the exact SSPR-then-MFA-reregistration sequence used by Storm-3068 and Storm-2949 for persistence.
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID security configurations that lower the security posture, specifically the disabling of Security Defaults, per-user MFA requirements, or strong authentication enforcement. This is often a precursor to account takeover or persistence following unauthorized administrative access.
Correlates an Entra ID MFA/authenticator reset with a new device registration within 30 minutes for the same account. Models the Scattered Spider (UNC3944/Octo Tempest) and CrowdStrike-tracked 'Mutant Spider' helpdesk-vishing playbook, where Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 measured ~40 minutes from vished reset to domain admin.
Detects instances where an administrative, helpdesk, or support account registers or updates security info (such as MFA methods) for a user, specifically when this action is preceded by a password reset for that same user. This pattern is indicative of account takeover attempts, particularly those involving vishing-based social engineering of helpdesk staff to bypass MFA.
Detects when a user registers a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) method, such as an authenticator app, phone number, or FIDO key, within 30 minutes of a sign-in event flagged as anomalous (e.g., impossible travel, new ASN, or risky sign-in score). This pattern is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence by registering their own MFA device to maintain access to a compromised account after a session hijack.
Detects MFA or security information registration, updates, or deletions within Entra ID AuditLogs that occur within two hours of a sign-in event flagged as risky, impossible travel, or involving a new device. This sequence is a common indicator of post-compromise identity persistence.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of an account takeover (ATO) attack, starting with a help-desk initiated password reset, followed immediately by new MFA factor or device enrollment, and concluding with an application login from an unrecognized device or location.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token theft by monitoring for an initial interactive sign-in followed shortly by a non-interactive token refresh from a different IP address and browser fingerprint without a multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge. This behavior is indicative of an adversary replaying captured session cookies via reverse-proxy infrastructure.
Detects account modification activity (e.g., password resets or MFA registration changes) followed within 24 hours by a sign-in event for the same user account that is flagged as risky or exhibits anomalous device/location characteristics, indicative of social engineering campaigns like Scattered Spider.
Detects registration of a new actor-controlled MFA authentication method (phone, authenticator app, or software OTP token) via an Update user operation, matching the NO_DEVICE/NO_DEVICE_TOKEN/SoftwareTokenActivated pattern used to convert temporary compromise into durable identity persistence
Detects modifications to Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that disable security defaults, per-user MFA enforcement, or conditional access policies requiring MFA. Such actions remove tenant-wide MFA protection and are often precursors to account takeover, password spraying, or ransomware attacks.
Detects instances where a user performs high-risk sign-in activities (such as impossible travel or triggered risk events) followed by the registration of new security information, MFA methods, or rogue OAuth devices within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker establishing persistence on a compromised account by bypassing or hardening MFA requirements.
Detects potential account takeover by monitoring identity providers (Azure AD or Okta) for MFA method resets or deletions immediately followed by new MFA method registrations for the same user. This behavior is highly characteristic of Scattered Spider's (Octo Tempest) tactic of social-engineering help-desk staff to perform MFA resets, allowing the adversary to enroll their own device to bypass MFA and maintain persistence.
Detects the registration of a new authentication method (e.g., FIDO2 key, authenticator app) shortly after a user account experiences a risky sign-in event. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistent access and bypass MFA requirements, often following a successful AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing attack.
Detects the registration of a new MFA authentication method on an Entra ID account from an unrecognized IP or device, occurring in close temporal proximity to a password reset or a risky sign-in event. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence via self-service MFA registration after compromising user credentials.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling policies, switching them to report-only mode, removing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or grant control requirements, or expanding exclusion lists to exempt users, groups, or locations from security controls. Such modifications are often indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling policies, switching them to report-only mode, removing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or grant control requirements, or expanding exclusion lists to exempt users, groups, or locations from security controls. Such modifications are often indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects instances where a user account that has been flagged as risky (e.g., unfamiliar features, impossible travel, or malicious IP activity) performs a modification or registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls after a credential compromise.
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