Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a sequence of events where a user performs a risky or anomalous login to Azure AD, such as from an anonymous network or an non-compliant device, followed shortly after by the registration of a new MFA method or security information. This behavior is indicative of an attacker who has compromised credentials and is attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls by enrolling their own MFA device.
Detects a successful self-service password reset followed shortly by an authentication method change on the same account -- the exact SSPR-then-MFA-reregistration sequence used by Storm-3068 and Storm-2949 for persistence.
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Single-source Sigma proxy for the authentication-persistence stage of the multi-stage device-code-phishing-to-Graph-collection chain (see the companion KQL correlation rule "Passkey Persistence: Device-Code Phishing to MFA Takeover and Graph Collection" for the full, threshold-gated, cross-table detection). Sigma has no join, temporal-windowing, or aggregation support, so this rule fires on the authentication-persistence event alone and does NOT enforce the device-code sign-in precursor or the subsequent Graph-activity burst - both required by the full correlation. Scoped to the two highest-signal operations only (new security-info registration, and any admin-initiated registration on another user's account) to cut noise from routine self-service profile edits.
Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
Detects instances where a privileged account (such as an administrator or helpdesk user) removes MFA security information or resets a password for a target account, followed shortly (within 4 hours) by a sign-in attempt from that same target account exhibiting risk characteristics such as impossible travel or unfamiliar features. This pattern is often associated with social engineering attacks, such as those attributed to Scattered Spider, where an attacker coerces support staff to disable MFA protections for an account.
Detects the registration or modification of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information in Entra ID or Okta that occurs within 15 minutes of a sign-in event flagged as risky. This behavioral pattern is a common indicator of persistence being established by an attacker after performing an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack, where they leverage a stolen session to register their own MFA factors to maintain long-term access.
Detects high-privilege user accounts (e.g., executives, administrators) undergoing a credential or MFA reset, followed by an atypical sign-in event within a two-hour window. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover or identity-compromise scenarios, often associated with help-desk vishing attacks where an attacker induces a user or administrator to reset credentials or MFA methods.
Single-source Sigma proxy for the authentication-persistence stage of the multi-stage device-code-phishing-to-Graph-collection chain (see the companion KQL correlation rule "Passkey Persistence: Device-Code Phishing to MFA Takeover and Graph Collection" for the full, threshold-gated, cross-table detection). Sigma has no join, temporal-windowing, or aggregation support, so this rule fires on the authentication-persistence event alone and does NOT enforce the device-code sign-in precursor or the subsequent Graph-activity burst - both required by the full correlation. Scoped to the two highest-signal operations only (new security-info registration, and any admin-initiated registration on another user's account) to cut noise from routine self-service profile edits.
Single-source Sigma proxy for the authentication-persistence stage of the multi-stage device-code-phishing-to-Graph-collection chain (see the companion KQL correlation rule "Passkey Persistence: Device-Code Phishing to MFA Takeover and Graph Collection" for the full, threshold-gated, cross-table detection). Sigma has no join, temporal-windowing, or aggregation support, so this rule fires on the authentication-persistence event alone and does NOT enforce the device-code sign-in precursor or the subsequent Graph-activity burst - both required by the full correlation. Scoped to the two highest-signal operations only (new security-info registration, and any admin-initiated registration on another user's account) to cut noise from routine self-service profile edits.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) Conditional Access Policies. This includes deleting a policy, disabling an enabled policy, narrowing the scope of users or groups targeted by a policy, or removing MFA requirements from existing policies.
Detects modifications to Microsoft 365 tenant configurations that weaken security posture, specifically the disabling of Security Defaults or the re-enabling of legacy/basic authentication methods (e.g., POP, IMAP, ActiveSync).
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling policies, switching them to report-only mode, removing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or grant control requirements, or expanding exclusion lists to exempt users, groups, or locations from security controls. Such modifications are often indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects instances where a user account that has been flagged as risky (e.g., unfamiliar features, impossible travel, or malicious IP activity) performs a modification or registration of multi-factor authentication (MFA) security information within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or bypass authentication controls after a credential compromise.
Detects instances where a user account performs non-interactive or legacy authentication (e.g., IMAP, POP3, SMTP, ActiveSync) shortly after an endpoint associated with that same user is flagged for malware or infostealer activity. This pattern is indicative of an adversary using exfiltrated credentials to maintain access to cloud services while bypassing MFA policies.
Detects the reuse of session tokens from distinct network locations, devices, or user agents shortly after a successful MFA-protected login. This behavioral pattern is a primary indicator of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing, where attackers capture session tokens via reverse proxy to bypass authentication controls.
Flags MFA method deletions performed by an actor other than the account owner, especially when followed by registration of a new authenticator — the signature of a helpdesk agent socially engineered into swapping a victim's MFA factor.
Flags FIDO2/passkey registrations initiated or facilitated by a helpdesk/support identity for another user's account, matching Okta's advisory on threat actor O-UNC-066 ('Pink' leak site) and the ShinyHunters O-UNC-037 campaign that mimicked Microsoft's passkey enrollment flow to register attacker-controlled passkeys.
Flags Global Administrator / Privileged Role Administrator role grants occurring within one hour of a password/MFA reset or TAP issuance on the same account — the terminal step of a completed helpdesk-vishing takeover.
Detects when a user adds a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method such as a phone number, authenticator app, or FIDO2 key in Entra ID (Azure AD). Attackers often register their own MFA devices to maintain persistent access to a compromised account, particularly following a successful password reset or social engineering event.
This rule detects potential social engineering attacks where an external or federated user impersonates an IT or helpdesk entity within Microsoft Teams (via chats, messages, or calls) followed shortly by an MFA registration or password reset event for the targeted user. This sequence is indicative of a vishing or phishing attack aimed at account takeover.
Detects potential vishing or account takeover precursor activity where an external or guest Microsoft Teams user, impersonating IT or Help Desk support, communicates with a user who subsequently modifies their credentials or MFA configuration within the same 24-hour period.
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