Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when a user registers a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) method from an Autonomous System Number (ASN) that the user has not used for authentication in the previous 30 days. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover or an adversary setting up persistent MFA access from a new location.
Detects abuse of Google Cloud Authenticator device-management API calls associated with the Pass-ta-key attack, where an attacker-controlled key is introduced or a device is de-registered without a legitimate biometric/attestation ceremony. Covers device/register with keys/genpair, device/add_uv_key, and device/forget commands observed in cloud authenticator device-management event logs. To reduce false positives, device/add_uv_key and device/forget calls only alert when they lack an associated preceding hardware attestation or biometric ceremony event, and legitimate user-initiated new-device enrollment (following a known legitimate sign-in with a prior MFA/biometric ceremony on the requesting device) and legitimate account-recovery flows are excluded.
Detects successful passkey/WebAuthn authentication or signing events where the User Verification (UV) flag is unset/false or no UV assertion accompanies a device-key signature, scoped to relying parties/credentials where UV is policy-required, or corroborated by a missing biometric/user-presence event or a static (unchanged) signature counter. This reduces noise from relying parties or lower-risk contexts that legitimately do not require UV on every assertion.
Detects successful passkey/WebAuthn authentication or signing events where the User Verification (UV) flag is unset/false or no UV assertion accompanies a device-key signature, scoped to relying parties/credentials where UV is policy-required, or corroborated by a missing biometric/user-presence event or a static (unchanged) signature counter. This reduces noise from relying parties or lower-risk contexts that legitimately do not require UV on every assertion.
Detects anomalous, automated data exfiltration cycles in Microsoft 365 environments consistent with the Helix threat group. The rule identifies a pattern of successful sign-ins followed within 6 hours by new MFA registration, suspicious SharePoint enumeration, and a high-frequency, non-human-paced burst of file downloads.
Detects a near-simultaneous correlation between a user registering a new FIDO2 authentication method and a login session from an unmanaged or non-compliant device. This behavioral pattern is often associated with adversary-in-the-middle or vishing attacks where an attacker tricks a user into registering an attacker-controlled security key to maintain persistent MFA access.
Detects the registration of a new FIDO2 security key or passkey in Entra ID that is associated with a sign-in from an unmanaged or non-compliant device shortly before or after the registration. This behavior often suggests a vishing or social engineering scenario where an attacker guides a user through an authentication method registration process while impersonating IT support.
Detects successful non-interactive sign-ins to Azure CLI using the Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) flow where Conditional Access policies failed to enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA). This typically indicates misconfigured Conditional Access policies, such as exclusions for non-interactive authentication methods or service accounts, which could be exploited by adversaries to bypass MFA.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins to Microsoft 365 using the OAuth Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) flow via the Azure CLI. This legacy authentication method enables attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by submitting credentials directly to the authentication endpoint, a technique observed in password spraying campaigns.
Detects high-frequency MFA factor updates, resets, activations, deactivations, or deletions for a single user within a 30-minute window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to compromise or take control of account authentication mechanisms after gaining initial access.
Detects high-frequency MFA factor updates, resets, activations, deactivations, or deletions for a single user within a 30-minute window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to compromise or take control of account authentication mechanisms after gaining initial access.
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-48558 in SimpleHelp RMM software. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass OIDC identity token signature verification, leading to unauthorized creation of a privileged Technician account and MFA bypass, as observed in the Sua Sponte / SHADOW#REACTOR campaigns.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates from a mobile device (Android or iPhone) that exhibits a geographic mismatch (geo_country vs registered_country), and subsequently performs a sensitive credential or MFA-related action (enrollment or reset) from a different device within one hour. This pattern is indicative of a potential session hijacking or credential compromise where an attacker attempts to establish persistence by enrolling their own MFA device.
Detects network requests to Microsoft Graph API that appear to be modifying authentication methods, specifically targeting phone-based multi-factor authentication settings. This may indicate an adversary attempting to register their own MFA device to a compromised account to maintain persistence or bypass MFA.
Detects the exploitation of a vulnerability in the SimpleHelp OIDC authentication flow where an attacker can register a forged technician account and self-register MFA during the first login, effectively bypassing mandatory multi-factor authentication requirements. The detection looks for specific sequences in server logs involving OIDC attribute fetching and 'New Anon' technician registration tags.
This rule detects the exploitation of CVE-2026-48558 in SimpleHelp, where an OIDC authentication bypass allows unauthenticated attackers to forge identity tokens. The lack of cryptographic signature verification permits the registration of unauthorized, privileged Technician accounts, effectively bypassing MFA. The detection logic monitors for specific log patterns indicating OIDC response processing followed by technician account registration and configuration changes.
This rule detects network activity indicating a potential modification or interaction with Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) multifactor authentication (MFA) settings. Specifically, it looks for POST requests to the Microsoft Graph API targeting authentication methods (e.g., phoneAuthenticationMethod), which may be indicative of an attacker modifying MFA settings to bypass security controls or register rogue authentication devices.
Detects a sequence of events within a 30-minute window for a single user, specifically capturing MFA configuration changes (reset/enrollment), authentication, and device registration, occurring outside of typical business hours (20:00 - 06:00). This behavioral pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or account takeover after gaining access to a valid account.
Detects users who modify their MFA settings (registration/update/delete) and subsequently perform privileged actions (such as adding role members or service principal credentials) within a short timeframe, while simultaneously observed active in communication applications like Teams, Zoom, or Webex. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary modifies authentication methods to gain persistent access, followed by privilege escalation.
Detects automated post-compromise activity associated with Bluekit Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) attacks. The rule identifies a pattern of a successful user login followed rapidly (within 10 minutes) by a password change and new passkey enrollment, indicating an adversary is securing their persistence after initial session hijacking.
Detects MFA factor activation, device enrollment, and password resets originating from residential/commercial proxy infrastructure, specifically targeting behaviors associated with threat groups like BlackFile and Cordial Spider. The rule identifies these activities by filtering Okta SSO raw logs for specific event types related to MFA and device management, and then correlating them with known proxy ASN organizations or Okta's internal proxy flags.
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