Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network requests to Microsoft Graph API endpoints related to MFA method configuration. This pattern often indicates an adversary attempting to add, modify, or register new MFA authentication methods (such as phone-based methods) for an account to facilitate persistence or bypass security controls.
Detects successful sign-ins to Microsoft Graph where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was expected but not applied or not enabled, and the authentication method used was not MFA or passwordlessMFA. This could indicate an MFA bypass or misconfiguration, allowing access to sensitive resources without the required second factor.
This rule detects network events where the 'AdditionalFields' contain keywords commonly associated with Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) such as 'otp', 'verify', '2fa', or 'mfa', and the 'RemoteIP' is a valid IPv4 address. This could indicate attempts to interact with, or potentially bypass, MFA mechanisms.
Detects users who modify their MFA settings (registration/update/delete) and subsequently perform privileged actions (such as adding role members or service principal credentials) within a short timeframe, while simultaneously observed active in communication applications like Teams, Zoom, or Webex. This behavior is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary modifies authentication methods to gain persistent access, followed by privilege escalation.
Detects a sequence of events within a 30-minute window for a single user, specifically capturing MFA configuration changes (reset/enrollment), authentication, and device registration, occurring outside of typical business hours (20:00 - 06:00). This behavioral pattern is often indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or account takeover after gaining access to a valid account.
Detects successful sign-ins to specific Azure AD applications known to bypass Conditional Access policies, where Conditional Access was not applied. This could indicate an attempt to circumvent security controls.
Detects MFA factor activation, device enrollment, and password resets originating from residential/commercial proxy infrastructure, often associated with threat groups like BlackFile/UNC6671/Cordial Spider.
Detects MFA factor activation, device enrollment, and password resets originating from residential/commercial proxy infrastructure, often associated with threat groups like BlackFile/UNC6671/Cordial Spider.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates from a mobile device (Android or iPhone) that exhibits a geographic mismatch (geo_country vs registered_country), and subsequently performs a sensitive credential or MFA-related action (enrollment or reset) from a different device within one hour. This pattern is indicative of a potential session hijacking or credential compromise where an attacker attempts to establish persistence by enrolling their own MFA device.
Detects registration of new MFA devices potentially for authentication bypass
Detects successful sign-ins to specific Azure AD applications known to bypass Conditional Access policies, where Conditional Access was not applied. This could indicate an attempt to circumvent security controls.
Detects a new phone, authenticator application, FIDO key, or passkey registered after account recovery activity, which can establish attacker-controlled multifactor authentication.
Detects IMAP, POP, SMTP AUTH, or other legacy authentication activity soon after the same account completes modern MFA. This could indicate an adversary bypassing MFA by using legacy protocols after successfully authenticating with modern MFA.
Detects a new phone, authenticator application, FIDO key, or passkey registered after account recovery activity, which can establish attacker-controlled multifactor authentication.
Detects Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) activity followed by the deletion of authentication methods within a 1-hour window. This sequence of events can indicate an attacker attempting to maintain access or bypass multi-factor authentication after gaining initial access to an account, potentially executed by threat groups like Storm-2949.
This rule detects the creation of Okta API tokens with broad administrative scopes (okta.users.manage, okta.factors.manage, or okta.apps.manage) by the same user multiple times within a one-hour window. This behavior can indicate an attempt to establish persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects an SSPR (Self-Service Password Reset) event immediately followed by the registration of a new Microsoft Authenticator method for the same user. This sequence of events can indicate an attacker has compromised an identity, performed a password reset, and is attempting to establish a new MFA method for persistent access.
Detects anomalous access to Privileged Access Management (PAM) platforms (e.g., CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Delinea, HashiCorp Vault, Thycotic, ARCON PAM). The rule identifies successful sign-ins occurring outside typical business hours (7 AM to 7 PM) that also exhibit either a high volume of sign-ins (more than 5 per hour per user/app) or access from multiple new IP addresses (more than 2 unique IPs per hour per user/app). This behavior is indicative of potential abuse of privileged accounts, possibly by threat actors like Silk Typhoon (HAFNIUM).
This rule detects suspicious authentication behavior where a user logs in with multiple unique devices and multiple MFA methods within a short timeframe (5 minutes). This could indicate an attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication or account compromise.
This rule detects potential multi-factor authentication (MFA) bypass attempts for privileged accounts. It identifies instances where an administrative user attempts 10 or more sign-ins from 3 or more unique devices within a 5-minute window, specifically when the authentication method is 'Push notification to app' and the result type is '0' (success). This behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to bypass MFA for a privileged account.
This rule detects suspicious authentication behavior where a user logs in with multiple unique devices and multiple MFA methods within a short timeframe (5 minutes). This could indicate an attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication or account compromise.
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