Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of the klist.exe utility with suspicious subcommands ('sessions', '-li', 'get', 'purge') to inspect, retrieve, or clear cached Kerberos tickets, which is indicative of credential discovery or post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects potential Golden Ticket attacks by looking for multiple successful Kerberos authentication events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 3 (network logon) and a specific TicketEncryptionType (0x17), originating from the same IP address and targeting the same user, within a short timeframe and with a long ticket lifetime. A Golden Ticket attack involves an adversary forging Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to gain unauthorized access to resources.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting attacks by identifying a high number of Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) requests (EventID 4769) for Service Principal Names (SPNs) that are encrypted with RC4 (indicated by TicketOptions containing '0x40810000'). A threshold of 15 or more TGS requests from a single IP address for a target user is used to flag suspicious activity.
This rule detects potential Golden Ticket attacks by looking for multiple successful Kerberos authentication events (EventID 4624) with LogonType 3 (network logon) and a specific TicketEncryptionType (0x17), originating from the same IP address and targeting the same user, within a short timeframe and with a long ticket lifetime. A Golden Ticket attack involves an adversary forging Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to gain unauthorized access to resources.
This rule detects potential Kerberos Constrained Delegation attacks by monitoring Security Event ID 4769 (A Kerberos service ticket was requested) for tickets with the '0x80000000' option, which indicates a forwardable ticket. The rule then aggregates these events by target username, client address, and IP address, flagging instances where 8 or more such tickets are requested, which could indicate an attempt to abuse constrained delegation.
Detects Golden Ticket attack using forged Kerberos TGT with krbtgt hash
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting attacks by identifying a high number of Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) requests (EventID 4769) for Service Principal Names (SPNs) that are encrypted with RC4 (indicated by TicketOptions containing '0x40810000'). A threshold of 15 or more TGS requests from a single IP address for a target user is used to flag suspicious activity.
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
This rule detects potential Kerberos Golden Ticket attacks by identifying Kerberos authentication service (AS) request events (EventID 4768) where the ticket encryption type is 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) and the difference between the event generation time and the ticket's start time is greater than one day. This large time difference can indicate a forged ticket with an invalid timestamp, a common characteristic of Golden Tickets. The rule then summarizes these events by target username and computer, flagging instances where three or more such events occur.
This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting attacks by monitoring for Kerberos TGT requests (Event ID 4768) where Kerberos pre-authentication is disabled (PreAuthType == 0) and the ticket encryption type uses weak algorithms (RC4-HMAC or AES128). This behavior allows an attacker to request a ticket for an account and perform offline password cracking.
Detects Kerberos Authentication Service Requests (AS-REQ) resulting in a ticket granting ticket (TGT) where the TicketOptions field is set to '0x40810010'. This specific combination is often associated with the behavior of tools performing Kerberoasting or specific types of ticket-based attacks, as it indicates a TGT request that may bypass standard pre-authentication or follow non-standard flow patterns.
Detects Kerberos Authentication Service Requests (AS-REQ) resulting in a ticket granting ticket (TGT) where the TicketOptions field is set to '0x40810010'. This specific combination is often associated with the behavior of tools performing Kerberoasting or specific types of ticket-based attacks, as it indicates a TGT request that may bypass standard pre-authentication or follow non-standard flow patterns.
This rule detects the configuration of 'Trusted for Delegation' on a computer or user account, followed by a modification to the Active Directory nTDSDSA object on the same host. This combination is a classic indicator of setting up an account for Kerberos delegation attacks, often related to the creation of rogue domain controllers or setting up pivot points for lateral movement.
Detects Kerberos AS-REQ (Event 4768) using certificate-based pre-authentication (PKINIT / PA-PK-AS-REQ) with AES256 encryption. This represents the second stage of a Shadow Credentials attack, where an adversary authenticates using a rogue key credential they previously wrote to msDS-KeyCredentialLink. The rule filters out legitimate PKI-issued certificates from specified CAs and computer accounts.
This rule detects potential AS-REP Roasting attacks by monitoring for Kerberos TGT requests (Event ID 4768) where Kerberos pre-authentication is disabled (PreAuthType == 0) and the ticket encryption type uses weak algorithms (RC4-HMAC or AES128). This behavior allows an attacker to request a ticket for an account and perform offline password cracking.
This rule detects the configuration of 'Trusted for Delegation' on a computer or user account, followed by a modification to the Active Directory nTDSDSA object on the same host. This combination is a classic indicator of setting up an account for Kerberos delegation attacks, often related to the creation of rogue domain controllers or setting up pivot points for lateral movement.
Detects AS-REP Roasting targeting accounts without Kerberos pre-auth
Detects theft of Kerberos ccache files containing valid session credentials
Detects Kerberos realm trust discovery queries
Detects exploitation of Kerberos protocol for credential theft
Detects Silver Ticket attack using forged Kerberos service tickets
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