Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
42 detections
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The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious C2 named pipes.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes, which is a technique often used by offensive tools.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by RMM tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by RMM tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious named pipes.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation,
persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by malicious or suspicious tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain privilege escalation,
persistence, c2 communications, or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to named pipes used by potentially unwanted applications (PUAs) like VPNs or utilities like PsExec.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
This rule detects potential Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) activity related to a threat dubbed 'Rogue Planet'. It monitors for the creation of temporary files in the local AppData directory with a 'RP_' prefix and the usage of a specific named pipe named 'RoguePlanet'. The rule further isolates suspicious behavior by identifying processes that are not the standard Windows Error Reporting Manager (wermgr.exe) executing from its legitimate path.
Detects the creation or connection of a named pipe with a name containing 'RoguePlanet'. Named pipes are a common inter-process communication mechanism that may be abused by malicious software for command and control, lateral movement, or execution, and identifying specific naming conventions associated with known threats is a common detection strategy.
Detects the initialization of the PromptSpy malware's custom 'IpcSocket' class, which establishes a TCP listener bound to the localhost (127.0.0.1) address. This mechanism is utilized for inter-process communication between various components of the PromptSpy malware to coordinate malicious activities on the Android platform.
This rule detects the creation of or connection to a specific named pipe '\RoguePlanet' using Windows Sysmon events 17 (Pipe Created) and 18 (Pipe Connected). It further highlights events where the integrity level of the process interacting with the pipe is 'low' or 'medium', which may indicate potential inter-process communication (IPC) abuse, process injection, or malicious persistence mechanisms often used by attackers to mask execution or communicate between processes.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns related to WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe and ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe, which can be abused for command execution or bypassing standard interaction via COM interfaces. This includes spawning the package manager server from unauthorized parent processes, the use of manual activation flags for COM abuse, and the spawning of shell or utility processes from the configuration remoting server.
Detects AnyDesk spawning suspicious child processes (cmd, powershell, etc.) indicative of local privilege escalation via the AnyDesk printer COM object impersonation vulnerability. This technique involves an attacker-controlled process communicating with the AnyDesk service's named pipe (adprinterpipe) to trigger code execution in the context of the LocalSystem AnyDesk service.
Detects instances where the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) initiates a network connection to the loopback address (127.0.0.1 or ::1), excluding standard SMB traffic (Port 445). Such behavior by LSASS is highly anomalous and may indicate exploitation attempts, such as memory dumping or credential harvesting techniques involving inter-process communication.
Detects anomalous child process execution spawned by the AnyDesk service, indicative of exploitation of the adprinterpipe named pipe. This vulnerability involves a low-privileged attacker supplying malicious IStream bytes to the service to trigger code execution in the SYSTEM context.
Detects local privilege escalation attempts targeting the SystemInformer PhSvc helper service. The technique involves abusing the trust check within the PhSvc service by using rundll32.exe to connect to the SiSvcApiPort ALPC port and invoke privileged helper APIs, such as PhSvcApiCreateProcessIgnoreIfeoDebugger, to spawn processes with elevated privileges.
Detects the spawning of DllHost.exe (a Windows COM surrogate process) by identified STOCKSTAY malware components or via suspicious msiexec installations targeting STOCKSTAY directories. This behavior is indicative of inter-process communication (IPC) used by Turla's STOCKSTAY malware suite.
Detects the spawning of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, PowerShell, node.exe, calc.exe) by the Lunar Client application. This behavior is indicative of an exploit targeting the Electron framework's preload IPC bridge, allowing a renderer process to execute commands or gain elevated privileges on the host system.
Detects evidence of AnyDesk exploiting an COM impersonation vulnerability via the adprinterpipe named pipe. The rule monitors for AnyDesk spawning SYSTEM-level child processes, interaction with the adprinterpipe, or modification of critical print-related registry keys.
Detects instances where the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) initiates a network connection to the loopback address (127.0.0.1 or ::1), excluding standard SMB traffic (Port 445). Such behavior by LSASS is highly anomalous and may indicate exploitation attempts, such as memory dumping or credential harvesting techniques involving inter-process communication.
Detects network communication with the Rokarolla trojan's command and control (C2) server ('beralisvc.info') and subsequent injection of base64-encoded HTML phishing overlays into legitimate banking application UIs. The rule identifies C2 contact via network events and the presence of specific HTML content indicators ('html_base64', 'PCFEt0NUWVBFIGh0bWw+', 'com.imaginbank.app') in HTTP responses, suggesting an overlay attack.
Detects exploitation of the SystemInformer phsvc service via ALPC port abuse and trusted-host bypass. The attack involves loading a malicious DLL into the Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe process to bypass trust checks, subsequently connecting to the '\BaseNamedObjects\SiSvcApiPort' to invoke privileged APIs for LPE.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by AnyDesk.exe or AnyDesk-runtime.exe that may indicate local privilege escalation. This rule specifically targets the abuse of the adprinterpipe named pipe and CoUnmarshalInterface to impersonate SYSTEM-level AnyDesk processes, allowing for the execution of unauthorized child processes.
Detects attempts to leverage PowerShell to register a loose-file AppX package from a UNC path. This technique can be used to trigger NTLM coercion via InstallService.exe or achieve SYSTEM DLL load, often associated with the 'UNCanny' coercion method. The rule looks for PowerShell command lines containing 'Add-AppxPackage', '-Register', and a UNC path (\\) along with 'AppxManifest.xml'. Additional suspicious indicators like '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', 'DiscCoerceProbe', 'poc.ps1', 'Invoke-InstallServiceCoerce.ps1', or '-AttackerHost' increase the suspicious score.
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