Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
310 detections
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Detects notification mail sent by ePO, including its recipients. Redirecting or
suppressing ePO notifications means endpoint security alerts stop reaching the team
that would act on them — the alerts still fire, nobody reads them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='EMAIL_SENT'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
suppressing ePO notifications means endpoint security alerts stop reaching the team
that would act on them — the alerts still fire, nobody reads them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='EMAIL_SENT'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
Detects configuration changes on the Zimbra server. Mail server configuration
controls routing, authentication and logging; a change can create a delivery path,
weaken authentication, or stop the server recording what happens next.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
controls routing, authentication and logging; a change can create a delivery path,
weaken authentication, or stop the server recording what happens next.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
Detects configuration changes on the FortiWeb WAF. Disabling a signature, adding an
exclusion or switching a policy to monitor-only removes protection from the
application behind it — and because the application keeps working normally, nothing
else signals that the control has gone.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='FORTIWEB'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
exclusion or switching a policy to monitor-only removes protection from the
application behind it — and because the application keeps working normally, nothing
else signals that the control has gone.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='FORTIWEB'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
Detects a web request bypassing SafeSquid filtering policy. The extractor exposes
BYPASSED as a distinct action, which is unusual and valuable — most gateways record
only allow or block, so a bypass is normally indistinguishable from an allow.
A bypass means policy was deliberately not applied to that request, and the question
is who arranged that.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='BYPASSED'
| groupby srcip, user, domain, url, category
BYPASSED as a distinct action, which is unusual and valuable — most gateways record
only allow or block, so a bypass is normally indistinguishable from an allow.
A bypass means policy was deliberately not applied to that request, and the question
is who arranged that.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webfilter where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG' and action='BYPASSED'
| groupby srcip, user, domain, url, category
Detects policy changes in Trellix ePolicy Orchestrator. ePO governs endpoint
protection across the estate, so weakening a policy there disables defences on many
machines at once — far more efficient for an attacker than tampering with hosts
individually, and visible only in ePO's own audit trail.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='POLICY_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
protection across the estate, so weakening a policy there disables defences on many
machines at once — far more efficient for an attacker than tampering with hosts
individually, and visible only in ePO's own audit trail.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='POLICY_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role
Detects configuration changes to DLP policy. Weakening the policy — excluding a
channel, removing a classification, allowing a destination — opens an exfiltration
route for everyone it covers, and unlike most controls, DLP changes rarely trigger
any operational complaint to reveal them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user
channel, removing a classification, allowing a destination — opens an exfiltration
route for everyone it covers, and unlike most controls, DLP changes rarely trigger
any operational complaint to reveal them.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user
Detects configuration changes on the SafeSquid gateway. Adding a bypass or relaxing
a category opens an egress route for the whole organisation, and because browsing
continues to work normally nobody reports anything.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user
a category opens an egress route for the whole organisation, and because browsing
continues to work normally nobody reports anything.
Onboarding: SAFESQUID-SWG is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 812).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='SAFESQUID-SWG'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user
Detects configuration changes on the MFT platform. Configuration governs who may
transfer what, to where, and whether it is logged — so a change can open an
exfiltration path or silence the record of one, and it persists until somebody
reviews the configuration again.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
transfer what, to where, and whether it is logged — so a change can open an
exfiltration path or silence the record of one, and it persists until somebody
reviews the configuration again.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
Detects configuration changes on the Mimecast gateway. Mail gateway policy decides
what reaches the organisation; weakening it — disabling attachment protection,
adding a bypass for a sender, relaxing URL rewriting — opens a delivery path for
everyone at once and persists until someone notices.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='MIMECAST'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, srcip, reason
what reaches the organisation; weakening it — disabling attachment protection,
adding a bypass for a sender, relaxing URL rewriting — opens a delivery path for
everyone at once and persists until someone notices.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='MIMECAST'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, srcip, reason
Detects quarantined messages being released at volume. Release overrides the
gateway's own verdict, so a burst of releases either reflects a false positive wave
or an attacker with administrative access letting their own delivery through the
control that stopped it.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='EMAIL_QUARANTINED'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender, recipient, direction
gateway's own verdict, so a burst of releases either reflects a false positive wave
or an attacker with administrative access letting their own delivery through the
control that stopped it.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='EMAIL_QUARANTINED'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender, recipient, direction
Detects deletion of a Jira issue security scheme. These schemes restrict who can see
sensitive issues — security findings, HR matters, incident records. Removing one can
expose restricted issues to the whole project at a stroke, and it is a quiet way to
gain access to material that was deliberately walled off.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=jira-project where sourcename='ATLASSIAN'
and action='SECURITY_SCHEME_DELETED'
| groupby user, project, issuesecurityscheme, permissionscheme
sensitive issues — security findings, HR matters, incident records. Removing one can
expose restricted issues to the whole project at a stroke, and it is a quiet way to
gain access to material that was deliberately walled off.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=jira-project where sourcename='ATLASSIAN'
and action='SECURITY_SCHEME_DELETED'
| groupby user, project, issuesecurityscheme, permissionscheme
Detects configuration changes on the email inspector. Weakening sandbox analysis —
reducing detonation scope, excluding file types, disabling URL inspection — opens a
delivery path for everyone the gateway protects, and the change itself is the only
evidence until something gets through.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
reducing detonation scope, excluding file types, disabling URL inspection — opens a
delivery path for everyone the gateway protects, and the change itself is the only
evidence until something gets through.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config
Detects a successful network admission following repeated posture compliance
failures for the same endpoint. The expected outcome of failing posture is
remediation then access; failures followed by success without remediation suggests
the check was bypassed, disabled, or satisfied by spoofed posture data.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy, reason, srcip
failures for the same endpoint. The expected outcome of failing posture is
remediation then access; failures followed by success without remediation suggests
the check was bypassed, disabled, or satisfied by spoofed posture data.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, policy, reason, srcip
Detects configuration changes to Oracle Audit Vault. The Vault is the integrity
control for database auditing, so altering its configuration can stop collection,
narrow what is recorded, or redirect the audit trail — removing the evidence of
whatever follows.
Treat any change here as affecting the reliability of all database audit data for
the period concerned.
Onboarding: ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 310).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip
control for database auditing, so altering its configuration can stop collection,
narrow what is recorded, or redirect the audit trail — removing the evidence of
whatever follows.
Treat any change here as affecting the reliability of all database audit data for
the period concerned.
Onboarding: ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 310).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='ORACLE-AUDIT-VAULT'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip
Detects an endpoint repeatedly failing compliance evaluation. Persistent failure
means either a device nobody is maintaining, or one where a control is being actively
disabled and re-detected — security software stopped, patches removed, agent
tampered with.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 24h
| groupby user, policy, reason
means either a device nobody is maintaining, or one where a control is being actively
disabled and re-detected — security software stopped, patches removed, agent
tampered with.
Onboarding: FORESCOUT is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 247).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=compliance where sourcename='FORESCOUT' and action='COMPLIANCE_CHECK'
| duration 24h
| groupby user, policy, reason
Detects a rise in dropped or suppressed mail. Transport rules that silently discard
messages can be used to hide security alerts, suppress notifications of account
changes, or conceal an ongoing compromise from the people who would otherwise notice
it.
Mail that never arrives generates no complaint for some time, which is precisely why
this is worth watching.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action in ('EMAIL_DROPPED', 'EMAIL_SUPPRESSED')
| duration 1h
| groupby recipient, sender, direction
messages can be used to hide security alerts, suppress notifications of account
changes, or conceal an ongoing compromise from the people who would otherwise notice
it.
Mail that never arrives generates no complaint for some time, which is precisely why
this is worth watching.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action in ('EMAIL_DROPPED', 'EMAIL_SUPPRESSED')
| duration 1h
| groupby recipient, sender, direction
Detects attempts to disable or modify Microsoft Defender Antivirus security settings through PowerShell commands (Set-MpPreference/Add-MpPreference) or by modifying Windows Registry keys related to Defender exclusions. Attackers often use these techniques to bypass security controls and prevent detection of malicious files or processes.
Detects the use of the schtasks utility to modify and disable scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Windows Defender, specifically the scheduled scan, cache maintenance, and verification tasks. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to impair security defenses on a Windows host.
Detects various methods of disabling or tampering with Windows Defender protections, including modifying preferences via PowerShell (Set-MpPreference), stopping the WinDefend service via sc.exe, terminating the antivirus process via taskkill, or modifying Registry keys associated with Defender policies.
This rule detects when a single process modifies or creates three or more YAML files ('.yaml' or '.yml' extensions) within folders containing 'config' or 'pipeline' in their path, within a one-hour window. This behavior could indicate an attacker modifying configuration or deployment files, potentially for persistence, defense evasion, or impact.
Detects the execution of commands to disable Microsoft Defender (specifically Set-MpPreference or stopping the WinDefend service) within 10 minutes of the first interactive user login on a host. This behavior is indicative of threat actors, such as Akira ransomware affiliates, performing anti-forensics and disabling security controls on newly provisioned or compromised systems.
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