Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the wermgr.exe process creating an alternate stream in the temp directory. It leverages Sysmon EventID 15 to identify these actions.
This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate RoguePlanet malware, which creates an alternate stream in the temp directory to execute malicious code.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.
This activity is significant because wermgr.exe is typically associated with error reporting, not file creation. Such activity is significant as it may indicate RoguePlanet malware, which creates an alternate stream in the temp directory to execute malicious code.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to further malware infections, data exfiltration, or system compromise.
The following analytic detects the creation of an NTFS alternate data stream (ADS) accessed over a local administrative share targeting the loopback address (127.0.0.1).
It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity.
Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share.
This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32.
If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.
It leverages Windows Security Event Logs with EventCode 5145 to identify this activity.
Legitimate local processes access files directly rather than through a local SMB share.
This behavior is a hallmark of the ShieldBreak exploit, which abuses a symbolic link swap through a loopback share to redirect a privileged, Defender-driven write into an alternate data stream on a system-owned file, ultimately landing attacker content in C:\Windows\System32.
If confirmed malicious, this activity indicates an in-progress local privilege escalation attempt and should be investigated immediately.
Detects the use of PowerShell to remove the 'Zone.Identifier' NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) from files. This stream is responsible for the 'Mark-of-the-Web' (MOTW) which triggers security warnings in Windows, including SmartScreen and Protected View. Adversaries use this technique to evade security controls on downloaded malicious files.
Detects the creation of an NTFS Alternate Data Stream named ':changelist' on files with a .sys extension. This activity is indicative of potential malicious configuration staging or persistent storage, as seen in techniques involving BTR.sys or similar driver-based persistence mechanisms.
Detects a specific self-deletion technique used by the GRAYRABBIT loader, which utilizes NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). The malware uses SetFileInformationByHandle with FileRenameInfo to rename the file to an ADS (colon-delimited), followed by FileDispositionInfo to mark the file for deletion upon handle closure, effectively bypassing standard file deletion alerts. This rule is scoped to processes originating from common user-writable or temporary directories while excluding known legitimate software installers.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
Detects a specific self-deletion technique used by the GRAYRABBIT loader, which utilizes NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). The malware uses SetFileInformationByHandle with FileRenameInfo to rename the file to an ADS (colon-delimited), followed by FileDispositionInfo to mark the file for deletion upon handle closure, effectively bypassing standard file deletion alerts. This rule is scoped to processes originating from common user-writable or temporary directories while excluding known legitimate software installers.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of 'ntdll.dll' within a specific directory path matching the pattern 'ShieldCrash_{GUID}'. This pattern is indicative of potential malicious activity, such as the use of NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) for persistence or execution evasion. The rule explicitly excludes known legitimate system processes that may handle DLL files to minimize noise.
This rule detects potential file obfuscation attempts where a file is renamed to include a colon followed by a 6 to 10 character suffix, characteristic of an NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS). It monitors for a specific pattern where a file is renamed to this format and followed by a file deletion or another rename of the same file within a 300-second window, which may indicate an adversary trying to hide content or bypass security controls.
Detects a specific self-deletion technique used by the GRAYRABBIT loader, which utilizes NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). The malware uses SetFileInformationByHandle with FileRenameInfo to rename the file to an ADS (colon-delimited), followed by FileDispositionInfo to mark the file for deletion upon handle closure, effectively bypassing standard file deletion alerts. This rule is scoped to processes originating from common user-writable or temporary directories while excluding known legitimate software installers.
Detects a specific self-deletion technique used by the GRAYRABBIT loader, which utilizes NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). The malware uses SetFileInformationByHandle with FileRenameInfo to rename the file to an ADS (colon-delimited), followed by FileDispositionInfo to mark the file for deletion upon handle closure, effectively bypassing standard file deletion alerts. This rule is scoped to processes originating from common user-writable or temporary directories while excluding known legitimate software installers.
Detects a specific self-deletion technique used by the GRAYRABBIT loader, which utilizes NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS). The malware uses SetFileInformationByHandle with FileRenameInfo to rename the file to an ADS (colon-delimited), followed by FileDispositionInfo to mark the file for deletion upon handle closure, effectively bypassing standard file deletion alerts. This rule is scoped to processes originating from common user-writable or temporary directories while excluding known legitimate software installers.
Detects the execution of the LOLBIN PrintBrm.exe, which can be used to create or extract ZIP files. PrintBrm.exe should not be run on a normal workstation.
Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folders or files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" or "powershell.exe"
Detects creation of the ':changelist' configuration stream or a feedback (*.dat) stream written onto a .sys driver file itself, distinguishing the abuse pattern (feedback stream on the driver) from legitimate Defender remediation, which writes feedback to a standalone ProgramData path.
Detects the full technical staging sequence unique to the ShieldBreak CLFS time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) technique: cloud provider registration, WD_TARGET/WD_SHADOW object-manager directory creation, WD_SCAN object-link creation under the normal and CLFS namespaces, ntdll.dll copy into a BERLIN alternate data stream, the link-deletion/CLFS-log-lock race sequence, and the final phoneinfo.dll:stream lock confirming the file-overwrite primitive succeeded.
Detects the deletion of the 'Zone.Identifier' alternate data stream from a downloaded .msi file, followed closely by the execution of that file using 'msiexec.exe'. This pattern is a known technique for bypassing Windows Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) protections, which normally trigger SmartScreen warnings or Restricted View protections for internet-downloaded files.
Detects the execution of an executable file stored within an NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) on Windows systems. The rule correlates a process launch from a file path containing an ADS colon syntax with the creation of an anomalous file in the Windows Prefetch directory that masquerades as common image or text file types (png, jpg, jpeg, txt, dat). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries attempting to hide malicious binaries in ADS while interfering with or manipulating system forensic artifacts.
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