Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
33 detections
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Detects the installation of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) feature via dism.exe or wsl.exe, or the execution of wsl.exe for non-standard administrative tasks. This activity is often a precursor to running Linux-based tools or malware on a Windows host.
Detects instances where a successful login occurs on an ESXi/vCenter hypervisor, followed by the creation or power-on of a virtual machine on that same host within a two-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker establishing access to a hypervisor environment to spin up rogue, unmonitored virtual machines to evade detection tools and facilitate further malicious activity.
Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection
Detects the execution of common shell utilities, interpreters, or configuration commands initiated by QEMU or KVM processes. This often indicates the use of virtualized environments to execute payloads, bypass security controls, or hide artifacts within a host system, especially when correlated with process crashes related to hypervisor components.
Detects the execution of common shell utilities, interpreters, or configuration commands initiated by QEMU or KVM processes. This often indicates the use of virtualized environments to execute payloads, bypass security controls, or hide artifacts within a host system, especially when correlated with process crashes related to hypervisor components.
Detects instances where the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) processes (wsl.exe or wslhost.exe) are spawned by suspicious parent processes, which may indicate an attempt to use WSL for payload execution or persistence on hosts where its usage is restricted or not authorized.
Detects the execution of QEMU binary processes with command-line arguments targeting database or virtual disk files (e.g., .qcow2, .db) or matching known malicious file hashes. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized use of virtualization tools to execute payloads, conduct forensics, or manipulate virtual disk images in an environment.
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land (LotL) binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, certutil.exe, mshta.exe) where the parent or initiating process is the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) wsl.exe binary. This pattern indicates potential abuse of WSL2 interop features to execute Windows-native binaries from a Linux environment, often used to bypass traditional host-based monitoring or security controls.
Detects outbound network connections originating from the 'vmmem' process, which is the Windows host process managing the WSL2 virtual machine. Since WSL2 operates with its own network stack, connections from this process to non-local (non-RFC-1918) IP addresses can bypass traditional Windows host-based network telemetry, potentially indicating command-and-control (C2) activity or payload staging occurring within the WSL2 container environment.
Detects adversary activity associated with Payouts King and Black Basta affiliates utilizing QEMU for malicious activity. The rule monitors for the creation of virtual machine disk image files in non-standard directories, the execution of QEMU using disk images with misleading file extensions such as .db or .dll, and outbound SSH connections originating from the QEMU process to tunnel traffic through a guest VM.
Detects the execution of QEMU binary variants (qemu-system-x86_64.exe, qemu-system-i386.exe, or qemu.exe) when invoked with arguments indicative of guest networking or disk usage (e.g., -netdev, -drive). The rule further filters by identifying suspicious execution paths (e.g., Temp, AppData) or lack of legitimate hypervisor parent processes to identify potentially unauthorized virtualization or sandbox evasion activity.
Detects instances where DllHost.exe creates executable or script files within sensitive Windows directories (e.g., Public, Temp, ProgramData). This behavior is often indicative of WSL2 filesystem proxying, where a Linux process initiates a file write to the Windows filesystem via /mnt/c/, causing the DllHost.exe process to proxy the write operation and obscuring the original Linux process origin.
Detects instances where DllHost.exe (COM Surrogate) creates executable or script files in high-risk, user-writable directories. This activity is indicative of potential exploitation of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) filesystem proxy, where a Linux process running within WSL2 writes files to the Windows host filesystem (/mnt/c/), resulting in the file creation event being attributed to the DllHost.exe COM surrogate on the Windows side.
Detects instances where the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL2) wsl.exe process is used to execute curl or wget from the Windows host. This technique is often used to stage payloads or download tools from the internet, effectively bypassing Windows-based EDR network monitoring as the network connection occurs within the isolated WSL2 environment.
Detects creation of virtual file system containers for hiding malware
This rule detects the execution of QEMU binaries from non-standard locations on Windows endpoints, or the use of port-forwarding command-line flags. Adversaries, including Payouts King and BlackBasta affiliates, leverage QEMU to establish hidden virtual machines for persistent access, credential theft, and to create covert reverse SSH tunnels to bypass network security controls.
Detects patching of network device system images for persistent backdoors
Detects instances where the Windows COM surrogate (DllHost.exe) writes executable files or scripts to user-writable/temp directories. This proxy file-write behavior indicates potential WSL2 payload staging that bypasses network telemetry.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the host header or URI contains keywords associated with virtual machine software (virtualbox, vmware, qemu) and the URI also contains the word "create". This combination suggests the potential creation or interaction with virtual machines, which could be used for defense evasion by adversaries to hide malicious activity.
Adversaries can carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. This rule is built to detect the registration of the Virtualbox driver or start of a Virtualbox VM.
Detects the execution of QEMU where a .dll file is specified as a hard disk image. This is a known TTP associated with the "Bring Your Own Hypervisor" (BYOH) technique, where attackers hide malicious activity within a virtualized environment using non-standard disk image formats.
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