Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
726 detections
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IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects inbound mail carrying an attachment from a sending server not previously
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
Detects a threat identified by Deep Discovery Email Inspector. DDEI detonates
attachments and inspects URLs in a sandbox, so its verdicts carry behavioural
evidence rather than signature matches — which makes them a strong input for
detections that most estates never ingest.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, threattype, srcip
attachments and inspects URLs in a sandbox, so its verdicts carry behavioural
evidence rather than signature matches — which makes them a strong input for
detections that most estates never ingest.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, threattype, srcip
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
Detects HTTP GET requests for files with a .hta extension, utilizing a legacy Internet Explorer User-Agent string. This pattern is commonly associated with SideCopy threat group activities where mshta.exe is used to proxy the execution of remotely hosted malicious HTA files, often as part of an initial infection chain.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with RedFlick, involving the delivery of VHDX files or PDF attachments. The rule correlates malicious activities such as SSH-based tool download (using PermitLocalCommand), PowerShell-based PDF decoding/extraction, PowerShell VHDX disk mounting, and silent MSI installation from remote URLs. It monitors for these activities within user-writable directories like Downloads or Temp.
Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
Detects the download of a masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer to the Downloads folder. The rule identifies files matching specific naming conventions, including generated GUIDs, or known malicious hashes, originating from common cloud storage providers often abused by threat actors.
Detects a multi-stage phishing pattern attributed to Star Blizzard (also known as Callisto Group or COLDRIVER). The attack involves an initial email containing no attachments to establish trust or initiate a thread, followed by a subsequent reply-thread email containing both an archive file (ZIP/RAR) and an image file. This technique is designed to bypass email security scanners by hiding the archive password within the image attachment or obscuring the malicious payload context.
Detects instances where Microsoft Office applications or Windows Explorer (via LNK file execution) spawn suspicious child processes, such as script interpreters or known LOLBins, within a short timeframe. This is a common pattern for initial access via spearphishing attachments where a malicious document or shortcut executes a payload.
Detects spoofed emails carrying a .patch attachment sent to a GitLab incoming-email merge-request address. Requires Microsoft's composite authentication verdict (CompAuth: fail) -- a lower-noise spoofing signal than raw SPF/DKIM/DMARC -- and excludes sender/recipient pairs already seen corresponding with that token address in the prior 30 days to suppress recurring legitimate contributors.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
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