Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
640 detections
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Detects the execution of the rclone.exe utility with copy, sync, move, or copyto command-line arguments, correlated with outbound network connections to Wasabi S3 or MEGA cloud storage domains.
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
Exposure-assessment hunt for endpoints running OpenCode and contacting OpenCode Console or AI provider APIs, to prioritise API key rotation after the October 2026 OpenCode breach.
Detects a sequence where a device runs a staging/archiving utility (such as WinRAR, 7-Zip, or a copy script) followed within 4 hours by a file transfer or synchronization tool (such as rclone or FileZilla), which is indicative of data staging prior to exfiltration.
Box Shield Anomalous Download
Cortex XDR
Surfaces Box Shield anomalous download alerts with full context extraction, including download delta, historical baseline vs anomaly period comparison, and source IPs.
Detects a sequence where a device exhibits Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool execution followed by high-volume outbound network connections to consumer cloud storage services (such as OneDrive or Google Drive) from the same device, potentially indicating data exfiltration via RMM.
Detects a process with no prior AI API activity in the past 14 days suddenly generating a high volume (200+ calls) of network connections to public AI inference endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Grok, OpenRouter). This behavior is consistent with stolen API keys being used to drain resources or exfiltrate data from a newly compromised host.
Detects non-browser processes contacting multiple distinct cloud storage APIs within a one-hour timeframe, a pattern indicative of potential multi-service command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects a data loss prevention violation. DLP telemetry is widely collected and
almost never written against as detection content — it is usually treated as a
compliance report rather than a security signal, which means repeated violations by
one user often go unexamined.
The file hash and process are both recorded, so a violation can be pivoted into
endpoint telemetry directly.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, file, hash, process, threat, srcip
almost never written against as detection content — it is usually treated as a
compliance report rather than a security signal, which means repeated violations by
one user often go unexamined.
The file hash and process are both recorded, so a violation can be pivoted into
endpoint telemetry directly.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby user, file, hash, process, threat, srcip
Detects files transferred with a visibility or ownership change on the MFT platform.
Widening who can retrieve a file is the quietest possible exfiltration route: the
data never leaves the platform in a way the network would notice, it simply becomes
reachable by someone new.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT'
| groupby user, targetuser, file, filetype, visibility, owner
Widening who can retrieve a file is the quietest possible exfiltration route: the
data never leaves the platform in a way the network would notice, it simply becomes
reachable by someone new.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT'
| groupby user, targetuser, file, filetype, visibility, owner
Detects potential data staging and exfiltration where sensitive or investigation-related files are compressed using archive utilities or PowerShell, followed closely by upload activities to Backblaze B2 cloud storage via CLI tools, rclone, or direct API connections.
Detects repository creation or addition to an organisation. Attackers use new
repositories as staging ground for exfiltrated data, as hosting for second-stage
payloads under a trusted domain, or as a place to park stolen source.
Pair with the creating identity: a repository created by an account that has never
created one before is the interesting case.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB'
and action in ('REPOSITORY_CREATED', 'REPOSITORY_ADDED')
| groupby target, repositoryid, newrepositoryadded, organisationid
repositories as staging ground for exfiltrated data, as hosting for second-stage
payloads under a trusted domain, or as a place to park stolen source.
Pair with the creating identity: a repository created by an account that has never
created one before is the interesting case.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB'
and action in ('REPOSITORY_CREATED', 'REPOSITORY_ADDED')
| groupby target, repositoryid, newrepositoryadded, organisationid
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects potential data exfiltration to popular public paste-sites and code-sharing services (such as Pastebin, Paste.ee, Hastebin, Ghostbin, ControlC, Dpaste, Rentry.co, Privatebin) using HTTP POST or PUT requests based on upload frequency and volume thresholds.
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects processes that make outbound API calls to known Large Language Model (LLM) domains while simultaneously performing high-volume network connection attempts or scanning-like fan-out activity across multiple public IP addresses.
Detects one user triggering DLP repeatedly in a short window. A single violation is
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
usually a mistake; a pattern is either someone systematically working around the
control or an attacker testing which channels are permitted before using the one
that is.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-DLP is ingested via Syslog (XML) (Bloo extractor 805).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TRELLIX-DLP'
and action in ('THREAT_DETECTED', 'THREAT_BLOCKED')
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
Detects a burst of uploads to Box from a single account. Where mass download suggests
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
theft from the platform, a mass upload suggests the platform is being used as the
staging point — data collected elsewhere in the estate being moved into cloud storage
the attacker controls or can reach from outside.
Onboarding: BOX is ingested via Box native connector (Bloo extractor 711).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/box-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=documents where sourcename='BOX' and action='UPLOADED'
| duration 1h
| groupby user, srcip
| select user, srcip, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 40
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