Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a non-cloud client process issuing API-style requests associated with object listing, content upload, or content download to a cloud storage service. The rule specifically targets processes with names matching patterns like 'bird', 'rok', 'game', or 'update' followed by '.exe', and command lines containing API-related keywords ('files/list', 'files/upload', 'files/download', 'oauth', 'bearer', 'api') in conjunction with cloud storage service names ('dropbox', 'pcloud', 'cloud'). This behavior is indicative of malware using legitimate cloud services for command and control or data exfiltration.
This rule identifies suspicious outbound network traffic potentially related to data exfiltration or command-and-control (C2) communication. It monitors for connections to the Telegram Bot API utilizing 'sendMessage' methods, often used by malware for exfiltrating credentials or sensitive data, as well as connections to known 'Bluekit' PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) operator domains.
Targets mailbox export naming and immediate use of cloud transfer tools such as rclone, WinSCP, Dropbox, or OneDrive. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
Detects browser connections to the Bing Search by Image endpoint, which can be exploited as a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) proxy to bypass Content Security Policies (CSP) and exfiltrate data, as seen in the SearchLeak attack. The rule specifically looks for connections to 'bing.com/images/searchbyimage' that also include the 'imgurl=' or 'imgurl%3d' parameter, indicating an attempt to use the server-side fetch functionality.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving interaction with the 'perplexity-ai.online' domain and the creation of specific browser extension files, which may indicate browser-based data exfiltration or credential theft. The rule correlates file creation events, DNS queries, and network connections, assigning a higher risk score when multiple indicators are present, particularly when evidence suggests exfiltration of keystroke or search data via web requests.
Detects artifacts and behaviors associated with a malicious Chromium extension identified as 'Search for perplexity ai' (extension ID: flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd). The rule monitors for unauthorized extension installation, registry modifications to the browser's default search provider settings pointing to a suspicious domain (perplexity-ai.online), and outbound browser network traffic or DNS queries directed toward the same domain for potential data exfiltration.
Identifies successful device code authentication followed by a high volume of file downloads within a short timeframe, which could indicate data exfiltration after an adversary has gained access through a device code phishing campaign.
Detects HTTPS POST requests to known attacker-controlled infrastructure associated with the BadBlocker campaign (e.g., Unistream SDK, adblock-for-youtube domains). These requests often originate from browser extensions via injected scripts, facilitating the potential exfiltration of sensitive browser session data or credentials.
Detects behavior indicative of the 'Adblock for YouTube' browser extension (or associated malicious variants) fetching rule configuration files from 'api.adblock-for-youtube.com', followed by suspicious outbound network traffic to non-Google/YouTube domains. This pattern suggests the extension is performing unauthorized data exfiltration, such as harvesting session cookies or credentials via injected scripts.
Detects outbound web requests to Bing's 'Search by Image' endpoint where the embedded image URL points to a non-Microsoft domain. This mechanism is used in the SearchLeak attack (CVE-2026-42824) to bypass CSP and exfiltrate data from Microsoft 365 Copilot.
Detects network events where a device communicates with the 'urlzzz.php' endpoint, specifically when this communication is correlated with file events involving 'Login Data' or 'Cookies'. This indicates potential exfiltration of browser credentials or session information by the UnregStealer malware.
Detects browser connections to the Bing Search by Image endpoint, which can be exploited as an SSRF proxy to bypass Content Security Policies (CSP) and exfiltrate data, as seen in the SearchLeak attack.
Identifies Node.js initiating exfiltration connections to the C2 with parameters indicating disabled TLS certificate validation.
This rule detects the execution of cloud transfer tools such as rclone, WinSCP, Dropbox, OneDrive, or curl.exe when their command line arguments indicate the transfer of mailbox-related files (PST, OST, or temporary files with 'ts_' prefix) and include keywords like 'copy', 'sync', 'put', 'upload', or 'transfer'. The rule focuses on the causality chain to identify the actor and processes involved in such activities, which could indicate data exfiltration.
This rule looks for sensitive-looking values appearing in a publicly visible Claude workflow summary on GitHub. Public summaries can be indexed and copied quickly. Revoke any exposed credentials and restrict summary visibility. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
Detects an administrative forwarding, redirect, BCC, or content compliance rule change when Defender for Cloud Apps identifies attributes that are uncommon for the account. UNC6508 replayed harvested credentials to access an administrator account before creating its covert exfiltration rule. The anomaly requirement increases confidence while preserving coverage for infrastructure that is not recognised as a proxy.
Targets mailbox export naming and immediate use of cloud transfer tools such as rclone, WinSCP, Dropbox, or OneDrive. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
Detects curl commands transmitting harvested GitHub tokens (ghp_ prefix) in the request body, representing the final exfiltration stage of gh-token-monitor.
This rule detects processes making three or more successful outbound network connections within an hour to known code or text sharing sites like Pastebin, GitHub, or Gist. This activity can be indicative of data exfiltration, command and control (C2) communication, or staging of malicious code.
Udm Mail Raw Ip Https
YARA-L
This rule detects network connections made by processes commonly associated with mail collection, archiving, or data export (e.g., mail, archive, collector, export, rclone, winscp, curl executables). The detection specifically looks for these processes making HTTPS connections where the command line contains keywords related to email data files (.pst, .ost) or email processing (aspose.email, mailbox). The rule aims to identify potential exfiltration or collection of email data over HTTPS.
This rule detects the creation of the 'class-wc-subscription-diagnostics.php' backdoor file followed by a network connection to the command and control (C2) domain 'generate.2faplugin.org' within a 30-minute window on the same device. This correlation indicates a potential supply chain compromise targeting ShapedPlugin, where backdoored pro plugins are distributed via official channels, leading to 2FA exfiltration.
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