Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
136 detections
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An ABAP program invoked a remote function call (RFC) using a destination resolved at runtime, which may indicate lateral movement or unauthorized internal communication within an SAP environment.
Detects Impacket-style lateral movement patterns where system processes such as services.exe or wmiprvse.exe spawn command shells to copy files from a network share (UNC path) and execute them. This rule specifically looks for evidence of staging binaries or DLLs from remote shares, which is a common behavior of post-compromise frameworks like Impacket when performing 'hands-on-keyboard' actions.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events characteristic of NeedyMantis's hands-on-keyboard activity. The rule identifies file staging (creation or modification of suspicious DLLs from network shares) followed by remote command execution (via Impacket-like service interaction) and subsequent execution of binaries vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
This rule detects the execution of known lateral movement tools, including Impacket suite components and NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec), by monitoring process command lines. It specifically flags tools such as psexec.py, wmiexec.py, and secretsdump.py, which are frequently used for remote execution and credential dumping. The rule also joins these process events with network events targeting SMB port 445 to correlate tool usage with potential lateral movement activity.
Detects lateral movement patterns associated with PsExec or its variants. The rule correlates SMB administrative share access (ADMIN$ or IPC$), the subsequent installation of a service (often named PSEXESVC or using a temporary executable path), and the immediate execution of a command or shell (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) by that service.
Detects lateral movement via PsExec (PSEXESVC) followed by mass file encryption/rename activities and the creation of ransom note files, characteristic of Wizard Spider's deployment of Conti ransomware.
Detects the creation or writing of executable binary files (e.g., .exe, .dll, .bat, .ps1, .vbs, .scr) to sensitive Windows administrative shares (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) via SMB. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement where an attacker attempts to stage tools or scripts on a remote system for subsequent execution.
Detects sequential suspicious SMB activity characteristic of PsExec lateral movement: connection to ADMIN$ or C$ administrative shares, followed by the upload of an executable or batch file to the share, and subsequently the usage of SVCCTL (CreateServiceW/StartServiceW) to execute the uploaded binary.
Detects lateral movement activities associated with The Gentlemen ransomware group. The rule monitors for the execution of PowerShell scripts named 'deploy_gpo.ps1' from the %TEMP% directory, PowerShell interactions with the NETLOGON share for malware distribution, creation of ScheduledTasks.xml via PowerShell (a common GPO manipulation technique), and the subsequent enforcement of policy changes using 'gpupdate /force' invoked by scripting engines.
Detects the creation of hidden administrative shares (ending in $) mapped to local directories (e.g., C:\Temp) with unrestricted 'Everyone' or 'ANONYMOUS LOGON' permissions. This technique is used by the Gentlemen ransomware to stage malicious binaries for lateral movement and subsequent encryption across the network. The rule monitors for 'net share' commands with specific permission grants, 'icacls' operations modifying access for anonymous users, and registry changes to 'NullSessionShares' configurations.
Detects lateral movement activities associated with The Gentlemen ransomware group. The rule monitors for the execution of PowerShell scripts named 'deploy_gpo.ps1' from the %TEMP% directory, PowerShell interactions with the NETLOGON share for malware distribution, creation of ScheduledTasks.xml via PowerShell (a common GPO manipulation technique), and the subsequent enforcement of policy changes using 'gpupdate /force' invoked by scripting engines.
This rule detects the execution of known lateral movement tools, including Impacket suite components and NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec), by monitoring process command lines. It specifically flags tools such as psexec.py, wmiexec.py, and secretsdump.py, which are frequently used for remote execution and credential dumping. The rule also joins these process events with network events targeting SMB port 445 to correlate tool usage with potential lateral movement activity.
This rule detects the execution of known lateral movement tools, including Impacket suite components and NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec), by monitoring process command lines. It specifically flags tools such as psexec.py, wmiexec.py, and secretsdump.py, which are frequently used for remote execution and credential dumping. The rule also joins these process events with network events targeting SMB port 445 to correlate tool usage with potential lateral movement activity.
This rule detects the execution of known lateral movement tools, including Impacket suite components and NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec), by monitoring process command lines. It specifically flags tools such as psexec.py, wmiexec.py, and secretsdump.py, which are frequently used for remote execution and credential dumping. The rule also joins these process events with network events targeting SMB port 445 to correlate tool usage with potential lateral movement activity.
Detects the creation of a remote service using 'sc.exe' where the executable was recently written to an administrative share (ADMIN$ or C$). This behavior often indicates lateral movement by threat actors deploying malicious binaries as services on remote systems.
Detects internal SMB traffic indicative of P2P beaconing using the IPC$ named pipe, which is often a sign of lateral movement or command-and-control communication between compromised hosts.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying executable or script files being written to administrative shares (C$ or ADMIN$) followed by the execution of a file with the same name on the destination device within 15 minutes. It includes logic to filter out known deployment/patch management service accounts and file names to reduce noise.
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