Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
146 detections
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Detects ADNotificationManager.exe (Adobe Notification Manager) running from an unusual or unknown directory, which may be indicative of DLL Side-Loading. This binary has been observed being abused by multiple threat actors including GOLD BLADE to sideload malicious DLLs and deliver C2 payloads such as Havoc.
Detects DLL files written to common Windows user directories, including Desktop, Downloads, Pictures, Videos, Documents, Music, and other user profile folders. These files may be written by archive extraction utilities such as Windows Explorer, 7-Zip, or WinRAR, web browsers during downloads, or other applications.
User-accessible directories are common staging locations for files involved in cyberattacks. Attackers may distribute ZIP archives through phishing emails containing a legitimate-looking executable alongside a malicious DLL. After the user extracts the archive and executes the executable, it may load the malicious DLL from the same directory, enabling DLL side-loading and potentially allowing malicious code to execute within a trusted process. Similar activity may occur when DLLs are downloaded or placed directly into other user profile folders.
This detection groups events by endpoint and file path, providing DLL file names, vendor information, SHA256 hashes, the associated process or file context, and the first-seen timestamp to support investigation and triage.
As this is a single-signal detection, it may also identify legitimate software installations, portable applications, development tools, and other benign file operations. Validate the DLL's hash, vendor information, associated process, file location, and source archive or download before escalating the alert.
User-accessible directories are common staging locations for files involved in cyberattacks. Attackers may distribute ZIP archives through phishing emails containing a legitimate-looking executable alongside a malicious DLL. After the user extracts the archive and executes the executable, it may load the malicious DLL from the same directory, enabling DLL side-loading and potentially allowing malicious code to execute within a trusted process. Similar activity may occur when DLLs are downloaded or placed directly into other user profile folders.
This detection groups events by endpoint and file path, providing DLL file names, vendor information, SHA256 hashes, the associated process or file context, and the first-seen timestamp to support investigation and triage.
As this is a single-signal detection, it may also identify legitimate software installations, portable applications, development tools, and other benign file operations. Validate the DLL's hash, vendor information, associated process, file location, and source archive or download before escalating the alert.
Detects modifications or creations of the SCNotification.exe.config configuration file associated with the Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM/ConfigMgr) client by processes other than approved system tools such as ccmsetup.exe, msiexec.exe, or CcmExec.exe.
This rule detects the use of 'docker cp' or 'sbx cp' commands which are susceptible to the CVE-2026-17106 (CopyEscape) vulnerability. This vulnerability allows a compromised container to perform arbitrary file writes or overwrites on the host system during archive extraction, potentially leading to container escape and privilege escalation by replacing critical system binaries like runc.
This rule detects the use of 'docker cp' or 'sbx cp' commands which are susceptible to the CVE-2026-17106 (CopyEscape) vulnerability. This vulnerability allows a compromised container to perform arbitrary file writes or overwrites on the host system during archive extraction, potentially leading to container escape and privilege escalation by replacing critical system binaries like runc.
Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
This rule detects the suspicious sequential loading of 'tdwp.dll' and 'rnp.dll' by processes related to key management or encryption (e.g., 'rnpkeys.exe' or processes from a 'keyroll' folder). The detection correlates these events within a 2-minute window and highlights if the 'tdwp.dll' has a known malicious hash.
Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects potential persistence attempts via registry modifications involving rundll32.exe. The rule monitors for two patterns: registry keys associated with shell commands for specific file types triggering rundll32.exe, and registry 'Run' keys using a 'Locked' value name with a custom URI handler, often indicative of malware or suspicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain involving communication with known malicious infrastructure ('mnoskemp.beer'), staging and extraction of password-protected archives using '7za.exe' in temporary directories, installation of a spoofed OBS Studio MSI package, and subsequent DLL side-loading of malicious libraries (e.g., 'obs.dll', 'WSql-2.dll') by the 'obs64.exe' process when initiated from outside legitimate installation paths.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain involving communication with known malicious infrastructure ('mnoskemp.beer'), staging and extraction of password-protected archives using '7za.exe' in temporary directories, installation of a spoofed OBS Studio MSI package, and subsequent DLL side-loading of malicious libraries (e.g., 'obs.dll', 'WSql-2.dll') by the 'obs64.exe' process when initiated from outside legitimate installation paths.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain involving communication with known malicious infrastructure ('mnoskemp.beer'), staging and extraction of password-protected archives using '7za.exe' in temporary directories, installation of a spoofed OBS Studio MSI package, and subsequent DLL side-loading of malicious libraries (e.g., 'obs.dll', 'WSql-2.dll') by the 'obs64.exe' process when initiated from outside legitimate installation paths.
Detects instances where the Greenshot.exe application loads DLLs (log4net.dll, GreenshotPlugin.dll, LinqBridge.dll) from locations outside of the expected installation directory ('\Program Files\Greenshot' or '\Program Files (x86)\Greenshot'). The rule also tracks the creation of configuration or updater files ('greenshot-defaults.ini', 'updater.bat') which may be indicative of unauthorized modification, persistence, or potential DLL side-loading attempts.
Detects the ClosedQuorum 'unhook' evasion technique where a process patches ntdll's EtwEventWrite to suppress ETW telemetry, occurring within a 5-minute window of the same process initiating outbound network connections to known LLM C2 provider APIs or Discord webhooks used for AI-arbitrated decision cycles.
Detects execution of code using indirect syscalls or ntdll unhooking techniques, often associated with the PIVOTPIPE loader/RAT. The rule monitors for EDR indicators of evasion such as syscall stub execution, direct/indirect Nt* system call invocation, or call stacks originating outside of ntdll.dll, intended to bypass userland security hooks.
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