Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

34 detections

Detects connections from internal hosts to the ARTEX-linked actor host 38.244.50.120, including requests for the exposed .claude/CLAUDE.md file and its open-directory port 18899.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
20 days ago
009
Detects connections from internal hosts to the ARTEX-linked actor host 38.244.50.120, including requests for the exposed .claude/CLAUDE.md file and its open-directory port 18899.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
20 days ago
007
Detects HTTP responses and requests involving exposed Claude Code open directories (.claude/CLAUDE.md) tied to ARTEX operator infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
20 days ago
006
Detects connections from internal hosts to the ARTEX-linked actor host 38.244.50.120, including requests for the exposed .claude/CLAUDE.md file and its open-directory port 18899.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
20 days ago
005
Detects HTTP responses and requests involving exposed Claude Code open directories (.claude/CLAUDE.md) tied to ARTEX operator infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
20 days ago
004
Detects HTTP responses and requests involving exposed Claude Code open directories (.claude/CLAUDE.md) tied to ARTEX operator infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
20 days ago
003
Detects connections from internal hosts to the ARTEX-linked actor host 38.244.50.120, including requests for the exposed .claude/CLAUDE.md file and its open-directory port 18899.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
20 days ago
002
Detects HTTP responses and requests involving exposed Claude Code open directories (.claude/CLAUDE.md) tied to ARTEX operator infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
20 days ago
002
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known IP addresses associated with Exvicy Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) Command and Control (C2) or hosting infrastructure. This rule acts as an indicator of compromise (IOC) match to identify potential infected hosts communicating with malicious external servers.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
Detects DNS queries to known malicious subdomains and direct TCP connections to an IP address associated with the SilkParasite, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT malware infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for communication with identified C2 infrastructure hosts and legacy domain registration points.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
104
Detects network communication to identified SpiceRAT Command and Control (C2) infrastructure over TCP port 443. This includes monitoring for standard TCP connections and TLS sessions to known malicious IP addresses.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects network communication associated with the SilkParasite campaign. This includes detection of TLS traffic using self-signed LokiDev certificates (CN=localhost, O=LokiDev), direct connections to known malicious C2 IP addresses, and DNS queries for the domain normativ.dushanbeidc.org, which is linked to the LokiDev infrastructure.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects network communication associated with the SilkParasite campaign, specifically identifying TLS traffic using fraudulent certificates impersonating the Uzbekistan railway authority (azure.uzrailwaystax.com) and connections to identified malicious infrastructure using specific JA4X TLS fingerprinting.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects network communication associated with the SilkParasite campaign, specifically targeting TLS connections that use spoofed certificates impersonating azure.uzrailwaystax.com or communication with known SpiceRAT command-and-control server IP addresses.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects network communications between internal hosts and known malicious infrastructure associated with SpiceRAT, including TLS-based command channels and HTTP requests for decoy pages.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects network traffic (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) targeting the domain 'expresshost.cloud', which is identified as hosting VPS infrastructure commonly used for scanning and malicious activities.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects network activity associated with SilkParasite infrastructure, including the use of specific self-signed TLS certificates (swarm ca, proxy.local, 127.0.0.1) and connections to known malicious pivot domains such as socket.ayakliborsa.net or certificate subjects like *.scalefast.ninja.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
000
This rule detects network traffic (DNS, TLS, HTTP, and TCP) originating from internal assets to known infrastructure associated with the QTFY proxy botnet/C2 framework. It identifies communication with specific C2 domains, proxy management systems, and associated malicious IP ranges.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
003
This rule detects network traffic (DNS, TLS, HTTP, and TCP) originating from internal assets to known infrastructure associated with the QTFY proxy botnet/C2 framework. It identifies communication with specific C2 domains, proxy management systems, and associated malicious IP ranges.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
102
This rule detects network traffic (DNS, TLS, HTTP, and TCP) originating from internal assets to known infrastructure associated with the QTFY proxy botnet/C2 framework. It identifies communication with specific C2 domains, proxy management systems, and associated malicious IP ranges.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
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