Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
34 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
12
11
6
4
1
Contributors
13
6
5
3
2
Categories
14
12
8
7
5
Platforms
18
17
8
6
5
Products / Services
12
10
6
6
3
MITRE Techniques
18,114
15,633
12,576
8,388
6,214
CVEs
1
IDS Classtypes
6
IDS Protocols
4
2
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
IOC sweep for ARTEX campaign indicators: C2 host, nine proxy IPs, xcai.pro and its subdomains, and the CLAUDE.md URL across Defender, CEF/firewall, DNS and Entra sign-in telemetry. Domains match on exact host or subdomain only, connection types are limited to real connection events, and sign-ins are limited to successes and credential failures.
Detects the presence of the 'SOUL.md' configuration file associated with the Hermes Agent AI framework. This file contains a specific 'GH0ST' persona prompt designed to bypass ethical restrictions (jailbreak) and configure the agent for automated post-exploitation tasks, such as loot collection and Telegram-based command and control.
Detects coordinated activity patterns across multiple distinct tenant environments within a one-hour window. The rule looks for shared infrastructure (C2 domains), malicious tool hashes, or specific agentic-CLI command line signatures (e.g., related to orchestration, reconnaissance, or exfiltration) that suggest an AI-orchestrated actor or automated attack campaign affecting multiple organizations simultaneously.
Detects network traffic involving TLS certificates or Server Name Indication (SNI) values that attempt to impersonate the Uzbekistan state railway authority (azure.uzrailwaystax.com). The rules also flag connections associated with certificates issued by 'TLC DV TLS CA' and known C2 infrastructure using the spoofed railway certificate.
Detects coordinated activity patterns across multiple distinct tenant environments within a one-hour window. The rule looks for shared infrastructure (C2 domains), malicious tool hashes, or specific agentic-CLI command line signatures (e.g., related to orchestration, reconnaissance, or exfiltration) that suggest an AI-orchestrated actor or automated attack campaign affecting multiple organizations simultaneously.
Detects coordinated activity patterns across multiple distinct tenant environments within a one-hour window. The rule looks for shared infrastructure (C2 domains), malicious tool hashes, or specific agentic-CLI command line signatures (e.g., related to orchestration, reconnaissance, or exfiltration) that suggest an AI-orchestrated actor or automated attack campaign affecting multiple organizations simultaneously.
Detects network traffic involving TLS certificates or Server Name Indication (SNI) values that attempt to impersonate the Uzbekistan state railway authority (azure.uzrailwaystax.com). The rules also flag connections associated with certificates issued by 'TLC DV TLS CA' and known C2 infrastructure using the spoofed railway certificate.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with identified ClickFix CPaaS payload domains and associated API endpoints. The rule monitors for specific malicious domain contact (comicstar.lat, babybon.cfd, merkantalolol.asia) and the use of the '/api/index.php?a=init' endpoint, which is indicative of the ClickFix payload delivery mechanism.
Detects network activity associated with the SilverFox multi-tier relay infrastructure, specifically identifying HTTP requests to known relay domains and dispatcher endpoints used for command-and-control (C2) communication.
Detects authentication events associated with known actor infrastructure (AnonyMousKIT/Cluster B/UKT) and identifies anomalous crossover patterns where a single source IP authenticates into multiple distinct accounts within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of a shared backend infrastructure across multiple accounts or storefronts.
Detects DNS queries or network connections to the itorrents.org domain, which has been identified as a compromised repository used in the MovieReaper supply-chain campaign to distribute malicious torrent files.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the 'itorrents.org' repository for files with the '.torrent' extension, which may indicate the retrieval of malicious payload components associated with the MovieReaper supply chain campaign.
Detects outbound TCP traffic destined for known Tor relay ports (9001 and 9030) originating from internal RFC 1918 address space. This behavior is indicative of compromised edge devices or IoT hardware attempting to establish command and control (C2) communication via the Tor network, a tactic commonly used by threat actors to obfuscate their infrastructure and C2 traffic.
Detects a potential S3 bucket hijacking attempt where a bucket is deleted by one AWS account and subsequently recreated by a different AWS account within a 30-minute window. This behavior could indicate an attempt to intercept cross-account replication or misdirected data flows.
Detects network activity associated with the ROOTBOY actor, specifically identifying internal devices communicating with known malicious command and control (C2) IP addresses and subsequently attempting to access specific suspicious domains or URLs linked to the actor's infrastructure.
Detects use of free hosting services for staging malicious content
Detects network activity associated with the ROOTBOY actor, specifically identifying internal devices communicating with known malicious command and control (C2) IP addresses and subsequently attempting to access specific suspicious domains or URLs linked to the actor's infrastructure.
Page 1 of 2