Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
32 detections
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This rule correlates endpoint-based alerts related to credential theft or infostealer malware with subsequent successful cloud identity authentication events. It identifies situations where a user, who has recently triggered a credential theft alert on an endpoint, logs into a cloud environment from a country or IP address that has not been historically associated with that user within a 24-hour window.
Detects successful self-service password reset (SSPR) activities within Azure Active Directory. This event signifies that a user has successfully changed or reset their password using the self-service mechanism.
This rule monitors for high or medium-risk user events and sign-in activities within Azure Active Directory. It correlates data from both the AADUserRiskEvents and SigninLogs tables to identify potentially compromised user accounts.
Detects presence of persona-fabrication and identity-fraud enablement software (Wavebox, MEmu, eSIM Plus, Blacktel, insertFace, TrustID Card) via process, network, or file-system artifacts on an endpoint, consistent with PurpleDelta identity-fraud tradecraft.
This rule detects a potential account takeover attempt via a credential stuffing attack. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to a URI containing 'login' (case-insensitive) from a single destination IP address, with a high frequency (50 requests within 60 seconds). This pattern suggests an automated attempt to try multiple credentials against a login endpoint.
Sublime Threat Intelligence and Research (STIR) identified a phishing campaign using a recently published open-source Javascript virtual machine and obfuscation tool called KrakVM. The initial KrakVM-encoded HTML file arrives as an attachment in phishing emails. These emails are short, often not even including a body, with subjects and HTML attachment filenames suggesting the target has a new voicemail, a vendor credit, or unpaid invoices
This rule identifies "impossible travel" scenarios where a user logs in from two geographically distant locations within a short period (less than 2 hours). This can indicate a compromised account being used by an attacker, potentially leveraging VPNs or other proxy services to obscure their true location.
This rule detects attempts by an unauthorized user to trigger a full data export from Bitbucket. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to collect sensitive information, such as source code or credentials, from the code repository.
Detects unauthorized access attempts to a resource.
Detects when full data export is attempted an unauthorized user.
Detects M365 Copilot users exhibiting suspicious application usage patterns including multi-location access, abnormally high activity volumes, or access to multiple Copilot applications that may indicate account compromise or automated abuse. The detection aggregates M365 Copilot Graph API events per user, calculating metrics like distinct cities/countries accessed, unique IP addresses, number of different Copilot apps used, and average events per day over the observation period. Users are flagged when they access Copilot from multiple cities (cities_count > 1), generate excessive daily activity (events_per_day > 100), or use more than two different Copilot applications (app_count > 2), which are anomalous patterns suggesting credential compromise or bot-driven abuse.
This rule detects suspicious bulk file downloads from SharePoint by correlating successful sign-in events with subsequent file download activities. It specifically looks for sign-ins that are not from registered devices, followed by multiple file downloads (at least 3) within a short time window (up to 10 minutes) from the same IP address. The rule flags scenarios where a user downloads a significant number of unique files (at least 2) or has a high download count (5 or more), or a combination of moderate downloads (3 or more) within a very short duration (1 minute). This pattern can indicate data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects when a user is added to an administrative or management role in Azure Active Directory outside of defined business hours. It specifically looks for 'Add member to role completed' or 'Add app role assignment grant to user' operations where the target role contains 'admin' or 'Manage', and the event occurs outside of the configured business hours (7 AM to 6 PM local time, Monday to Friday).
KQL Query
KQL Query from file: Malicious FIDO2 Registration Threat Detection
KQL Query from file: Entra Cross-Tenant Activity Monitoring
KQL Query from file: Hunting Malicious Copilot Agent
KQL Query
'This query identifies attackers trying to enumerate the Storage keys as well as updating roles using AzureActivity,SigninLogs
and AuditLogs'
and AuditLogs'
'Detects when there is a Service Principal login attempt from a country that has not seen a successful login in the previous 14 days.
Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
'Detects successful signins using single factor authentication where the device, location, and ASN are abnormal.
Single factor authentications pose an opportunity to access compromised accounts, investigate these for anomalous occurrencess.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
Single factor authentications pose an opportunity to access compromised accounts, investigate these for anomalous occurrencess.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in'
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