Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious process activity or file access patterns originating from within a container that indicate an attempt to escape to the host. This includes monitoring for the use of tools like nsenter, unshare, and mount, attempts to interact with the docker.sock, or attempts to access critical host paths like /proc/1/root or /host/etc, excluding events originating from authorized container management processes.
Detects incoming HTTP POST requests to the Docker API endpoint '/containers/create' containing 'Privileged: true' and a bind mount to the host filesystem ('/:/host'). This pattern is indicative of an attempt to deploy a privileged container with host access, which can be leveraged for container breakout or host system compromise.
Detects host-side indicators of potential container escapes and unauthorized access, including mounting sensitive container runtime sockets, executing containers with privileged flags, host namespace sharing, and the use of nsenter to break out of a container context.
Detects malicious interactions with an unauthenticated Docker daemon API, specifically identifying the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, the deployment of containers with specific naming conventions for network reconnaissance (netns-probe/net-setup), subsequent container start events, and the use of the Docker exec API to perform host namespace escapes via nsenter.
Detects anomalous activity associated with the CARBONATO worm, specifically monitoring for unauthorized creation of 'net-setup' containers or pulling 'system/resolved' images via the Docker API port 2375. Additionally, the rule identifies rapid, sequential network scanning behavior targeting the Docker API port across internal IP ranges.
Detects unauthorized attempts to manipulate cgroup files (e.g., cgroup.procs) within Kubernetes pods using kubectl exec/attach sessions. This technique is often associated with SPIRE attestation spoofing or container escape attempts where an attacker attempts to influence process management or isolation constraints from within the container via the Kubernetes API.
Detects unauthorized attempts to manipulate cgroup files (e.g., cgroup.procs) within Kubernetes pods using kubectl exec/attach sessions. This technique is often associated with SPIRE attestation spoofing or container escape attempts where an attacker attempts to influence process management or isolation constraints from within the container via the Kubernetes API.
Detects unauthorized attempts to manipulate cgroup files (e.g., cgroup.procs) within Kubernetes pods using kubectl exec/attach sessions. This technique is often associated with SPIRE attestation spoofing or container escape attempts where an attacker attempts to influence process management or isolation constraints from within the container via the Kubernetes API.
Detects unauthorized attempts to manipulate cgroup files (e.g., cgroup.procs) within Kubernetes pods using kubectl exec/attach sessions. This technique is often associated with SPIRE attestation spoofing or container escape attempts where an attacker attempts to influence process management or isolation constraints from within the container via the Kubernetes API.
Detects unauthorized attempts to manipulate cgroup files (e.g., cgroup.procs) within Kubernetes pods using kubectl exec/attach sessions. This technique is often associated with SPIRE attestation spoofing or container escape attempts where an attacker attempts to influence process management or isolation constraints from within the container via the Kubernetes API.
This rule detects potential container escape attempts by monitoring for path traversal attacks via 'docker cp', the execution of shells within privileged or volume-mounted containers, and unexpected file operations occurring outside the container root filesystem.
Detects instances where the Argo CD repo-server or kustomize processes spawn unexpected child processes, such as shells or network utilities. This behavior is indicative of potential command injection, specifically concerning the unauthenticated GenerateManifest gRPC service vulnerability (CVE-2024-31989), where an attacker could execute arbitrary code on the underlying host or container.
This rule detects potential container escape attempts by monitoring for malicious use of the 'docker cp' command with path traversal sequences (../) or the creation of suspicious files by the docker daemon outside of expected docker storage directories, which may indicate symlink injection attacks to modify files on the host filesystem.
Detects attempts to perform container escapes by abusing the 'docker cp' command. The rule identifies path traversal sequences in 'docker cp' arguments, as well as unauthorized shell or script execution spawned by container daemon processes (e.g., dockerd, containerd) following a file copy operation, and specific file creation patterns indicative of a container escape attempt.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
Detects components of the StrikeShark campaign, specifically the staging of SharkLoader payloads within specific AppData subdirectories (%APPDATA%\xwreg or %APPDATA%\xgdf) and the sideloading of a rogue SystemSettings.dll by the legitimate SystemSettings.exe process from an unauthorized location.
Detects potentially malicious container escape or privilege escalation attempts initiated by Gitea act runner processes. This includes the spawning of 'nsenter', the use of dangerous Docker flags that provide host-level access (such as host PID/IPC namespaces, all capabilities, or disabled security mechanisms), and the spawning of shells inside containers configured with namespace-entering commands.
Detects the suspicious combination of 'aa-exec' (commonly associated with AppArmor or specific container runtime wrappers) being followed by the execution of 'unshare' with flags used to manipulate kernel namespaces (user, network). This pattern is often indicative of container breakouts or privilege escalation attempts where an adversary leverages namespace isolation to gain higher privileges on the host.
This rule monitors process execution events for the 'aa-exec' utility, a tool often used in containerized environments (such as AppArmor) or specific runtime configurations, when invoked with specific command-line arguments (-p trinity, -p chrome, or -p flatpak). These patterns are indicative of specialized container or sandbox execution activities that may warrant investigation in specific enterprise environments.
Detects various techniques used by an attacker to escape a container environment or gain unauthorized access to host-level resources. This includes the execution of namespace manipulation tools (nsenter, unshare, chroot), unauthorized access to the docker.sock Unix socket, mounting of host filesystems from within a container, and direct attempts to access the host's /proc/1 namespace files.
This rule detects the creation of user namespaces on Linux systems by unprivileged users. The 'unshare' command with '--user' or '-U' flags allows a process to move into a new user namespace, which can be abused for privilege escalation or container escape. The rule specifically excludes common container runtimes and processes running as 'root' to reduce false positives.
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