Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
66 detections
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Detects the deployment or creation of containers (via Docker, Podman, Nerdctl, Crictl, or Kubectl) with elevated risk flags such as privileged mode, host namespace sharing, root mounts, docker socket access, or initiated from web application parent processes.
This rule detects potential container escape and privilege escalation attempts within a Kubernetes environment by monitoring for the creation of privileged pods, dangerous host mounts (such as /var/run/docker.sock or hostPath root mounts), and the use of escape-oriented utilities like nsenter or chroot, or access to the host's filesystem via /proc/1/root.
Detects container runtime processes (e.g., docker, podman, crictl) launching containers with elevated privilege flags (such as --privileged, --net=host, or mounting the host root directory) or pulling images from non-standard IP-based registries. These activities are indicative of potential container escapes, persistence mechanisms, or the use of untrusted/malicious container images.
Detects high-risk administrative actions within a Kubernetes environment, specifically: users executing or attaching to running pods (potential container access), the creation of privileged pods (potential container escape), or modifications to Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) objects such as roles and role bindings which could lead to privilege escalation.
Detects unauthorized attempts to interact with the Docker API to create containers or pull images, specifically looking for patterns associated with the CARBONATO worm which utilizes the /containers/create endpoint with 'net-setup' parameters.
Detects incoming HTTP POST requests to the Docker API endpoint '/containers/create' containing 'Privileged: true' and a bind mount to the host filesystem ('/:/host'). This pattern is indicative of an attempt to deploy a privileged container with host access, which can be leveraged for container breakout or host system compromise.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to create privileged containers via the Docker API, specifically identifying the use of the 'net-setup' string often associated with the CARBONATO worm. Such activity indicates potential propagation or lateral movement within a containerized environment by attempting to deploy containers with elevated permissions.
Detects exploitation attempts by the CARBONATO botnet targeting exposed Docker daemons. The rule monitors for container escape techniques using 'nsenter' to access host namespaces, the execution of specific malicious entrypoint scripts, the use of known malicious container image references, and the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, which are indicative of host filesystem and network compromise.
Detects host-side indicators of potential container escapes and unauthorized access, including mounting sensitive container runtime sockets, executing containers with privileged flags, host namespace sharing, and the use of nsenter to break out of a container context.
Detects the presence of the i-Realm companion tool associated with the AnonyMousKIT PhaaS platform, which is designed to bypass iOS Activation Lock features.
Detects malicious interactions with an unauthenticated Docker daemon API, specifically identifying the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, the deployment of containers with specific naming conventions for network reconnaissance (netns-probe/net-setup), subsequent container start events, and the use of the Docker exec API to perform host namespace escapes via nsenter.
Detects the execution of the CARBONATO malware watchdog process (.docker-network-monitor) which performs container redeployment operations, indicating an active backdoor and persistent threat attempting to restore its presence within a Docker environment after initial cleanup.
Detects anomalous activity associated with the CARBONATO worm, specifically monitoring for unauthorized creation of 'net-setup' containers or pulling 'system/resolved' images via the Docker API port 2375. Additionally, the rule identifies rapid, sequential network scanning behavior targeting the Docker API port across internal IP ranges.
Detects the presence of the i-Realm companion tool associated with the AnonyMousKIT PhaaS platform, which is designed to bypass iOS Activation Lock features.
Detects reconnaissance and lateral movement activity via kubectl. The rule monitors for the enumeration of Kubernetes secrets or configmaps, and the deployment or application of privileged workloads featuring flags such as hostPath mounts, privileged execution, hostNetwork, or hostPID.
Detects reconnaissance and lateral movement activity via kubectl. The rule monitors for the enumeration of Kubernetes secrets or configmaps, and the deployment or application of privileged workloads featuring flags such as hostPath mounts, privileged execution, hostNetwork, or hostPID.
Detects exploitation attempts by the CARBONATO botnet targeting exposed Docker daemons. The rule monitors for container escape techniques using 'nsenter' to access host namespaces, the execution of specific malicious entrypoint scripts, the use of known malicious container image references, and the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, which are indicative of host filesystem and network compromise.
Detects exploitation attempts by the CARBONATO botnet targeting exposed Docker daemons. The rule monitors for container escape techniques using 'nsenter' to access host namespaces, the execution of specific malicious entrypoint scripts, the use of known malicious container image references, and the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, which are indicative of host filesystem and network compromise.
Detects exploitation attempts by the CARBONATO botnet targeting exposed Docker daemons. The rule monitors for container escape techniques using 'nsenter' to access host namespaces, the execution of specific malicious entrypoint scripts, the use of known malicious container image references, and the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, which are indicative of host filesystem and network compromise.
Detects exploitation attempts by the CARBONATO botnet targeting exposed Docker daemons. The rule monitors for container escape techniques using 'nsenter' to access host namespaces, the execution of specific malicious entrypoint scripts, the use of known malicious container image references, and the creation of privileged containers with host bind mounts, which are indicative of host filesystem and network compromise.
Detects command-line activity indicating an attempt to interact with or abuse the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) for container escape. Such activity is often observed in post-compromise scenarios, such as ransomware attacks where an adversary attempts to break out of a containerized application to gain control of the underlying host.
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