Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue or push bombing attacks against Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) accounts by identifying a high volume of MFA failures followed by suspicious or fraudulent report actions, or successful authentications shortly after repeated failures.
The following analytic identifies the provisioning of a new MFA device shortly after a password reset. It detects this activity by correlating Windows Event Log events for password changes
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
(EventID 4723, 4724) with PingID logs indicating device pairing. This behavior is significant as it may indicate a social engineering attack where a threat actor impersonates a valid user
to reset credentials and add a new MFA device. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to gain persistent access to the compromised account, bypassing traditional security measures.
Azure AD Device Code Flow Token Phishing
Cortex XDR
Detects potential device code phishing attacks by identifying OAuth token requests associated with the device code flow that originate from unmanaged or non-compliant devices. The rule specifically monitors for suspicious Cmsi (Client Managed Service Identity) activity or the use of unbound sign-in tokens within the device code flow for targeted Microsoft productivity and management applications.
Detects sign-in activity originating from a known suspicious VPN/proxy IP range targeting critical Microsoft 365 applications. The rule specifically monitors for instances where multi-factor authentication (MFA) enforcement appears to be absent or failed, suggesting a potential account compromise and subsequent data access attempt via a proxy/VPN.
Detects successful authentication events to Snowflake cloud data warehouse platforms where no secondary authentication factor (MFA) was registered or triggered. This pattern is indicative of potential credential stuffing or reuse attacks, particularly those involving stolen credentials from infostealer malware, where MFA was not configured or successfully bypassed.
Detects MFA-fatigue style attacks (push-bombing) against Microsoft 365 accounts. The rule identifies a pattern where a user experiences a high frequency of MFA challenges or denials (at least 5 within a 10-minute window) immediately followed by a successful sign-in from a previously unseen IP and device, excluding phishing-resistant authentication methods and break-glass accounts.
Detects MFA fatigue attacks (MFA prompt-bombing) characterized by repeated denied MFA attempts for a single user, or successful MFA logins that occur under high-risk sign-in conditions, which are characteristic of activity associated with Lapsus$ (DEV-0537/Strawberry Tempest).
Detects instances where a user account registers a new MFA security method shortly after an initial successful sign-in from an unfamiliar device or network (Autonomous System Number). This behavioral pattern is characteristic of attackers, such as ShinyHunters vishing operators, who gain initial access via compromised credentials and subsequently enroll their own MFA devices to establish persistent access.
Detects potential MFA push fatigue (bombing) attacks by identifying users who receive an abnormal frequency of MFA push notification denials or interruptions within a short window, followed immediately by a successful authentication on a previously unseen device fingerprint. This pattern is characteristic of attackers attempting to wear down users into approving unauthorized login requests.
This rule detects potential Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) push-bombing, also known as MFA fatigue, where an adversary floods a user with push requests in hopes that the user eventually approves one. The rule flags instances where a successful MFA push approval is preceded by five or more failed, denied, or timed-out MFA push notifications within a 15-minute rolling window for the same user.
Detects MFA push-bombing or authentication fatigue attacks where an adversary repeatedly triggers MFA challenge requests for a user in a short period, potentially from multiple IP addresses, culminating in a successful authentication event. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to coerce a user into approving an MFA request.
Detects a suspected Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue attack, characterized by a user denying three or more consecutive MFA authentication requests in a short period (10 minutes) followed by a successful authentication approval. This behavior often indicates an adversary bombarding a user with push notifications to eventually solicit an accidental or coerced approval.
Detects MFA-fatigue style attacks (push-bombing) against Microsoft 365 accounts. The rule identifies a pattern where a user experiences a high frequency of MFA challenges or denials (at least 5 within a 10-minute window) immediately followed by a successful sign-in from a previously unseen IP and device, excluding phishing-resistant authentication methods and break-glass accounts.
This rule monitors Azure AD sign-in logs for patterns indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks. It triggers when a successful authentication includes MFA and exhibits specific flags associated with proxy-based session hijacking, such as unfamiliar risk details or clear evidence of proxy-based token issuance.
Detects instances where a user account experiences a high volume of failed MFA attempts (MFA push fatigue) within a short window, which is subsequently followed by a successful authentication. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to wear down a user into approving an MFA request for an unauthorized access attempt.
Detects MFA-fatigue style attacks (push-bombing) against Microsoft 365 accounts. The rule identifies a pattern where a user experiences a high frequency of MFA challenges or denials (at least 5 within a 10-minute window) immediately followed by a successful sign-in from a previously unseen IP and device, excluding phishing-resistant authentication methods and break-glass accounts.
Detects MFA-fatigue style attacks (push-bombing) against Microsoft 365 accounts. The rule identifies a pattern where a user experiences a high frequency of MFA challenges or denials (at least 5 within a 10-minute window) immediately followed by a successful sign-in from a previously unseen IP and device, excluding phishing-resistant authentication methods and break-glass accounts.
Detects instances where a privileged account (such as an administrator or helpdesk user) removes MFA security information or resets a password for a target account, followed shortly (within 4 hours) by a sign-in attempt from that same target account exhibiting risk characteristics such as impossible travel or unfamiliar features. This pattern is often associated with social engineering attacks, such as those attributed to Scattered Spider, where an attacker coerces support staff to disable MFA protections for an account.
Detects high-frequency authentication attempts originating from user agents associated with automation frameworks (Selenium, Playwright, Puppeteer, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of automated credential stuffing, brute force attacks, or CAPTCHA/2FA bypass attempts orchestrated by headless browsers.
Detects MFA-fatigue style attacks (push-bombing) against Microsoft 365 accounts. The rule identifies a pattern where a user experiences a high frequency of MFA challenges or denials (at least 5 within a 10-minute window) immediately followed by a successful sign-in from a previously unseen IP and device, excluding phishing-resistant authentication methods and break-glass accounts.
Detects MFA request abuse (T1621) by identifying a user receiving 5 or more MFA push, SMS, or call denials/timeouts within a 10-minute window across Entra ID, Okta, or Duo authentication logs. This behavior is indicative of an MFA fatigue attack, where an adversary continuously triggers MFA prompts until the user eventually approves the request out of frustration or confusion.
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