Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
140 detections
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Detects potential debugger detection evasion attempts via command line arguments associated with debugging checks or process execution of debugging utilities, as well as persistence configuration using Image File Execution Options (IFEO) or AeDebug registry keys targeting debuggers.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
Detects artifacts associated with the JWR phishing framework client engine, specifically focusing on the presence of self-referential .toString().search() anti-debugging checks, decoy variable naming conventions, and WebSocket communication components (JWRCID/JWRCVV, ws-worker.js) used for session establishment.
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects the execution of 'userscreen.exe' (a renamed pythonw.exe used by NarwhalRAT) loading 'user32.dll'. This behavior is associated with the use of ctypes in Python to perform window enumeration via EnumWindows, specifically used by the malware to identify and monitor KakaoTalk application windows.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects the NeedyMantis first-stage loader (e.g., WinSparkle.dll variants) which employs anti-debug techniques such as NtQueryInformationProcess and ThreadHideFromDebugger, alongside stack-based string deobfuscation, to prepare for the extraction and execution of a secondary payload (e.g., encryptbase64.ps1).
Detects HTTP responses containing script content indicative of anti-analysis or anti-debugging techniques, such as timing checks, debugger detection, and proof-of-work challenges commonly used on adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing landing pages.
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects a specific concealment behavior attributed to the 'com.corp.mdm' Android implant. The rule monitors for a sequence of events where the application disables its own launcher (main activity) to hide from the app drawer, immediately followed by the initiation of a foreground service that masquerades as a system notification ('Android System' title with 'System service running.' text).
Detects the use of tasklist.exe combined with process filtering (findstr) to identify common debugger names such as 'dbg.exe', 'x64dbg.exe', 'windbg.exe', or 'ollydbg.exe'. This technique is a known evasion tactic employed by the Kimsuky threat group (and others) to check for the presence of analysis tools before continuing execution of malicious batch scripts.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
Detects rapid termination of specific mobile messenger applications (Max) within seconds of starting, while indicators of the Frida dynamic instrumentation tool are concurrently detected on the device. This pattern suggests the application is identifying the presence of a hooking/instrumentation environment and self-terminating as a defense mechanism. The detection is further correlated with failed connection attempts to the application's backend.
Detects the execution of a RevStealer native PE payload by an Electron-based loader (XabivSystem.exe). The rule identifies when the loader spawns an unsigned, detached process from a hidden, randomly-named subdirectory within the user's AppData folder. This process creation is a precursor to the malware's environment checks, anti-VM/sandbox gating, and CAPTCHA verification routines.
Detects the execution of processes that contain command-line arguments indicative of debugger evasion techniques, such as checking for the presence of a debugger using functions like 'IsDebuggerPresent' or 'CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent'. This is commonly associated with malware attempting to evade dynamic analysis in sandboxes or by security researchers.
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