Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
81 detections
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Detects the presence of known malicious or suspicious OAuth application IDs as well as specific third-party applications like SkyKick or ConnectWise within OAuth application metadata over a 30-day window.
Detects sign-in events to Entra ID via service principals where the application is marked as external and enabled, and the user agent string indicates the use of a Python client.
Detects OAuth application consent events where an application is granted a combination of 'offline_access' (allowing refresh token issuance) and email-read permissions. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistent, long-term access to user mailboxes for data exfiltration or Business Email Compromise (BEC) activities, surviving password changes until the consent is explicitly revoked.
This rule correlates a risky or compromised sign-in event in Entra ID (Azure AD) with a subsequent OAuth consent grant by the same user within 60 minutes. It specifically looks for grants that request sensitive permissions such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, or offline_access, which are commonly associated with consent phishing and persistence tactics.
Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations in Azure AD, characterized by the modification of authentication methods policies followed by rapid application or service principal registration, consent granting, or role assignments by the same actor within a 10-minute window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges via malicious OAuth applications or service principals after weakening security posture.
Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations in Azure AD, characterized by the modification of authentication methods policies followed by rapid application or service principal registration, consent granting, or role assignments by the same actor within a 10-minute window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges via malicious OAuth applications or service principals after weakening security posture.
Detects evidence of account persistence and potential mailbox manipulation following an anomalous sign-in event in Google Workspace. The rule identifies suspicious post-compromise activity such as the addition of new MFA methods, new OAuth application grants, or mailbox forwarding/inbox rules, which are consistent with the reuse of captured authenticated sessions.
Detects evidence of account persistence and potential mailbox manipulation following an anomalous sign-in event in Google Workspace. The rule identifies suspicious post-compromise activity such as the addition of new MFA methods, new OAuth application grants, or mailbox forwarding/inbox rules, which are consistent with the reuse of captured authenticated sessions.
Detects OAuth application consent events where an application is granted a combination of 'offline_access' (allowing refresh token issuance) and email-read permissions. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistent, long-term access to user mailboxes for data exfiltration or Business Email Compromise (BEC) activities, surviving password changes until the consent is explicitly revoked.
Detects the addition of a new client secret or certificate to an existing Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) application or service principal. This behavior is often used by adversaries to establish persistence following the compromise of an existing identity with administrative permissions, allowing continued access even if the original compromised credentials are revoked.
Detects instances where a user grants consent to an Azure AD application with highly sensitive permissions (such as ReadWrite access to Directory, Roles, or Applications). This pattern is commonly used in OAuth consent phishing attacks to maintain persistence or escalate privileges by authorizing a malicious application to act on behalf of the user or the entire directory.
Detects OAuth application consent grants where the application requests both 'offline_access' (enabling refresh tokens for long-term access) and sensitive mailbox permission scopes (such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, or IMAP.AccessAsUser.All). This combination is indicative of consent phishing attacks designed to establish persistent, silent access to user email accounts, bypassing password resets and multi-factor authentication.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
Detects OAuth application consent grants where the application requests both 'offline_access' (enabling refresh tokens for long-term access) and sensitive mailbox permission scopes (such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, or IMAP.AccessAsUser.All). This combination is indicative of consent phishing attacks designed to establish persistent, silent access to user email accounts, bypassing password resets and multi-factor authentication.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
This rule detects the granting of sensitive, high-privilege Microsoft Graph API delegated or application permissions to an application or service principal in an Entra ID environment. Such permissions, including directory and user management or full application access, are frequently used by adversaries for persistence and privilege escalation within cloud environments.
This rule correlates a risky or compromised sign-in event in Entra ID (Azure AD) with a subsequent OAuth consent grant by the same user within 60 minutes. It specifically looks for grants that request sensitive permissions such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, or offline_access, which are commonly associated with consent phishing and persistence tactics.
Detects high-privilege OAuth application consent grants (such as Mail.Read or Files.ReadWrite.All) occurring within four hours of a risky or anomalous user sign-in. This sequence indicates a potential compromise where an attacker uses a compromised account to authorize a malicious OAuth application for persistent access and data exfiltration.
This rule detects potential illicit consent grants to OAuth applications within Azure AD. It identifies applications requesting high-risk scopes (such as Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, etc.) that are not verified by a publisher, are granted by non-admin users, and subsequently exhibit high volumes of graph API calls (suggestive of unauthorized data access or exfiltration).
Detects instances where a user grants consent to an unverified OAuth application with high-privilege scopes (e.g., Mail.Read, Directory.Read.All), followed by an authentication event using that same application ID from a different IP address within 24 hours. This behavior is indicative of potential consent phishing or OAuth token abuse, where an adversary harvests tokens to maintain persistent, remote access to email or directory services.
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