Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
8,410 detections
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Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the creating process has a Process ID (PID) of 0 or its parent process has a PID of 0. This is an unusual and suspicious behavior, as PID 0 is typically reserved for the System Idle Process or the System process itself, which should not be directly creating services. This could indicate a highly privileged process or kernel-level activity attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects PowerShell writing shortcut (.lnk) files into the Windows startup directory. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence, ensuring their malicious code executes each time a user logs in. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) as the process creating these shortcut files in the 'Start Menu\Programs\Startup' path.
This rule detects when a file is written to the Windows startup directory. This activity is a common technique used by adversaries to establish persistence on a system, ensuring that their malicious code executes automatically when a user logs in or the system boots. The rule specifically looks for file creation events where the target filename contains the path to the 'Start Menu\Programs\StartUp' directory. It includes filters to reduce false positives from legitimate system processes like Windows Update and Microsoft OneNote.
Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors. These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers. This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.
Detects when an uncommon process modifies the Windows Terminal profile settings file, "settings.json". This activity can be indicative of persistence or privilege escalation attempts where an attacker modifies the terminal's startup behavior or injects malicious commands to be executed when the terminal is launched.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of Python DLL files (python39.dll, python310.dll, python311.dll, python312.dll) by monitoring image load events. The rule filters out legitimate loads from common Python installation paths, Visual Studio, Anaconda, CPython build paths, and PyInstaller bundled applications, as well as legitimately signed Python DLLs, to reduce false positives.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets from the 'Microsoft.PowerShell.LocalAccounts' module, which are used to manipulate local user accounts. This includes actions such as disabling, enabling, getting information about, setting properties of, creating, renaming, and removing local users. Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems, modify credentials, or change permission groups.
Detects the use of Meterpreter's or Cobalt Strike's 'getsystem' command by identifying specific command-line patterns associated with privilege escalation techniques. The rule looks for processes spawned by 'services.exe' that contain '/c', 'echo', and '\pipe\' (technique 1) or 'rundll32', '.dll,a', and '/p:' (technique 2), which are indicative of these tools attempting to elevate privileges.
Detects scheduled task creation using the 'schtasks' utility that incorporates suspicious or uncommon command-line patterns. This includes tasks scheduled to run frequently (e.g., every minute) or as the 'system' user, combined with common command interpreters ('cmd'), or containing keywords often associated with malicious activity like PowerShell download commands, obfuscation techniques, or execution from temporary/public user directories. It also flags the use of scripting engines (cscript, wscript) or curl within scheduled tasks.
Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value that is located in a suspicious location. This change might be an indication of a potential persistence attempt by adding a malicious Netsh helper.
Detects suspicious encoded payloads within WMI Event Consumers. This rule specifically looks for base64 encoded strings containing keywords commonly associated with process injection or executable characteristics, such as 'WriteProcessMemory', 'This program cannot be run in DOS mode', and 'This program must be run under Win32'. The presence of these strings in a WMI event consumer's destination property suggests an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious code via WMI.
This rule detects attempts to obfuscate the `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key path by inserting various special characters between the letters. This technique is often used by malware to establish persistence and evade detection.
Detects the execution of DLL side-loading malware used by the threat group Emissary Panda, also known as APT27. Specifically, it looks for `svchost.exe` being spawned by `sllauncher.exe` or `svchost.exe` being spawned from a user's `AppData\Roaming` directory with the `-k` command-line argument, which are indicators of this specific malware's behavior.
This rule detects a suspicious `explorer.exe` subprocess spawned by `RazerInstaller.exe` with elevated privileges (System integrity level). While `explorer.exe` can be legitimately invoked by the installer to select a different installation folder, this specific behavior with System integrity can indicate an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the RazerInstaller software for privilege escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM.
Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators
This rule detects the addition of a Security Identifier (SID) to an Active Directory object's SID History attribute. Attackers can manipulate the SID History to gain unauthorized privileges, often by adding SIDs of highly privileged accounts (like Domain Admins) to a compromised user or computer object. This allows the compromised account to impersonate the privileged account and bypass access controls. The rule specifically looks for Event IDs 4765 (SID History added to an account) or 4766 (SID History added to a group) or Event ID 4738 (User Account Changed) where the 'SidHistory' field is not null or '%%1793' (which indicates no SID History).
Detects the creation of new Windows services that exhibit characteristics commonly associated with Cobalt Strike beacon activity, specifically focusing on suspicious ImagePath values. This includes services created with paths pointing to ADMIN$ shares, PowerShell commands for execution, or encoded PowerShell commands often used for downloading and executing payloads.
Detects the installation of a new service by Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike's 'getsystem' command. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 7045 from the 'Service Control Manager' provider, combined with command-line patterns indicative of Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike's techniques for privilege escalation, such as using 'echo' to a named pipe, 'rundll32' with specific arguments, or creating a service from a local administrative share.
This rule detects the installation or start of services associated with various legitimate remote access tools. Threat actors commonly abuse these tools to maintain persistence, escalate privileges, or establish command and control over compromised systems. The rule specifically looks for Event IDs 7045 (Service Installation) and 7036 (Service Started) from the 'Service Control Manager' provider, where the service name contains keywords indicative of known remote access software such as AmmyyAdmin, TeamViewer, LogMeIn, and others.
This rule detects attempts to leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable for process scope hijacking. Adversaries may use COR_PROFILER to load a malicious DLL into .NET processes, enabling persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion. The detection specifically looks for PowerShell script block text that sets the COR_ENABLE_PROFILING, COR_PROFILER, and COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variables, which are indicative of this technique.
This rule detects PowerShell script block logging events that indicate an attempt to establish persistence using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscriptions. Specifically, it looks for the creation of WMI event filters (`__EventFilter`) and command-line event consumers (`CommandLineEventConsumer`) within the `root/subscription` namespace, which are common components of WMI persistence techniques.
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