Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by using the built-in utility esentutl.exe
Detects the Koi Stealer macOS variant, an infostealer targeting cryptocurrency wallets and sensitive user data. This malware is linked to North Korean threat actors.
This rule detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy using PowerShell, specifically looking for the `Win32_ShadowCopy` WMI class and the `.Create()` method with the `ClientAccessible` parameter. Adversaries often use Volume Shadow Copies to access or copy the Active Directory domain database (NTDS.dit) to steal credential information, or other sensitive data from the local system.
This detection identifies access to sensitive system and configuration files on an ESXi host, including authentication data, service configurations, and VMware-specific management settings. Interaction with these files may indicate adversary reconnaissance, credential harvesting, or preparation for privilege escalation, lateral movement, or persistence.
NTLM Relay Attempt
YARA-L
Detects NTLM successful network logons where the source and destination workstations are the same, excluding loopback addresses. This behavior can be indicative of NTLM relay attacks where an attacker relays authentication from a victim to the victim's own machine, or other forms of NTLM abuse.
Detects potential LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning by identifying a single host responding to a high number of distinct client IPs on UDP ports 137 (NBT-NS) or 5355 (LLMNR). This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to spoof name resolution to redirect traffic.
This rule detects processes that are taking an unusually high number of screenshots within a defined timeframe. It identifies screenshot activity by looking for specific action types like "ScreenshotTaken", file creations with common image extensions (.png, .jpg, .jpeg, .bmp, .gif, .tiff), and process command lines containing common Windows API calls related to screen capturing (e.g., BitBlt, GetDC, PrintWindow, CopyFromScreen). The rule aggregates these events per device and triggers an alert if the total number of screenshots exceeds a configurable threshold.
This rule detects attempts by scripting language interpreters (Node.js, Python, PowerShell) to access sensitive browser credential files such as 'Login Data', 'Web Data', and 'Cookies' from Chrome and Brave browser user data directories. It also includes specific file paths that might be associated with known browser extensions or malware that target these files. This activity is indicative of credential dumping or information stealing.
Vidar is a sophisticated infostealer operating as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS). Written in C++, it’s designed to harvest a wide range of sensitive data from infected systems and exfiltrate it to attacker controlled infrastructure.
🧬 Script Inception: PowerShell scripts nested within PowerShell scripts, layered with 2–3 rounds of Base64 encoding.
📦 RAR Payloads: Password protected RAR files downloaded via direct-to-IP HTTP requests over TCP port 80. Passwords are embedded in encoded scripts and passed via command line to a downloaded copy of "unrar.exe".
🧬 Script Inception: PowerShell scripts nested within PowerShell scripts, layered with 2–3 rounds of Base64 encoding.
📦 RAR Payloads: Password protected RAR files downloaded via direct-to-IP HTTP requests over TCP port 80. Passwords are embedded in encoded scripts and passed via command line to a downloaded copy of "unrar.exe".
Detects when a process loads UIAutomationCore.dll, which may indicate abuse of Microsoft's UI Automation framework. This technique has been observed in Coyote malware for credential theft from banking applications and cryptocurrency exchanges. The rule monitors for processes that load the UI Automation Core library, which enables automated interaction with UI elements.
This rule detects suspicious activity where scripting interpreters (node.exe, python.exe, pwsh.exe, powershell.exe) are observed accessing a large number of potentially sensitive files (e.g., .env, secret, wallet, keypair, credential, recovery files, or common document/data file types like .pdf, .docx, .csv, .json, .txt) and subsequently exfiltrating a significant amount of data over the network. It correlates file access events with network outbound traffic from the same process within a 10-minute window, flagging instances where more than 20 distinct sensitive files are accessed and over 500KB of data is sent out.
Detects AsyncRAT variants and their forks (DcRat, VenomRAT, etc.) based on process behavior, known IOCs, and security tool evasion techniques.
Indicates suspicious rules such as an inbox rule that forwards a copy of all emails to an external address
Detects potential Raven Stealer activity by identifying known artifacts such as specific file paths, created filenames, command-line arguments, network connections, and file hashes.
This detection identifies when a one-on-one Microsoft Teams chat is initiated with an external domain that has not been observed in previous Teams chats (past 90 days) or recent email communications (past 15 days). This may indicate a new, potentially unsolicited or suspicious contact attempting to engage with an internal user, which could represent a social engineering attempt or early-stage reconnaissance.
Detects components of the KimJongRAT PE variant, including the orchestrator (NetworkService.dll), loader (sys.dll/baby.dll), and stealer (dwm.dll), based on unique strings, PDB paths, and network communication artifacts.
Detects clipboard manipulation from browser processes, often used in ClickFix attacks where malicious content is copied to the clipboard for users to paste into terminals.
This rule detects the execution of common command and scripting interpreters (cmd.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, powershell_ise.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe) when their parent process is either w3wp.exe or svchost.exe, and the command arguments contain keywords related to SharePoint. This behavior can indicate suspicious activity within a SharePoint environment, potentially related to web shell execution, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration.
Detects RDP configuration files (.rdp) that enable malicious RemoteApp features and extensive resource redirection, commonly abused in 'Rogue RDP' campaigns for espionage and data exfiltration.
This rule detects the creation of a suspicious file named 'spinstall0.aspx' or similar in a specific SharePoint template directory, which is indicative of a potential compromise related to CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, or CVE-2025-53770. Additionally, it identifies network connections to known malicious IP addresses associated with these vulnerabilities.
Detects known samples of the Katz Stealer infostealer based on their SHA1 file hashes.
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