Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a high volume of web requests (20 or more within 5 minutes from a single IP address) containing keywords commonly associated with denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, performance testing, or reconnaissance activities against web applications. Keywords include 'sleep', 'benchmark', and 'loadtest' in the URI query string.
This rule detects an unusually high number of web search queries (identified by 'search' or 'query' in the URI) originating from a single IP address within a one-hour window. A threshold of 100 or more queries triggers the alert. This behavior could indicate automated activity such as web scraping, reconnaissance, or a denial-of-service attempt against the search functionality.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Detects attempts to delete volume shadow copies using 'vssadmin' or 'wmic shadowcopy' commands. Adversaries often delete shadow copies to prevent system recovery and hinder forensic analysis, especially during ransomware attacks or data destruction efforts.
This rule detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempts by identifying emails where the sender's address contains keywords like 'ceo', 'finance', or 'hr', and the subject contains keywords like 'wire', 'payment', or 'invoice', but the sender's domain does not match the internal company domain. This pattern suggests an attempt to impersonate a high-ranking individual or department to trick recipients into making unauthorized financial transactions.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by identifying rapid bulk file modifications or renames that result in files adopting extensions commonly associated with ransomware encryption. It looks for a high volume of file events (creation, modification, rename) within a short timeframe (1 hour) where the new file extensions match a predefined list of ransomware-specific extensions.
This rule detects an unusual number of successful encryption-related operations performed by a single caller within a one-hour window in Azure Activity logs. This could indicate legitimate bulk administrative tasks or potentially malicious activity such as data encryption for impact (e.g., ransomware) or preparation for exfiltration by an attacker.
This rule detects a potential SMS Pumping Attack, specifically targeting bulk One-Time Password (OTP) requests. It triggers when a single source IP address makes more than 50 HTTP POST requests to a URI containing "send_sms" within a 60-second window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exploit SMS delivery systems by repeatedly requesting OTPs, potentially leading to financial costs for the service provider or overwhelming users with messages.
This rule detects cryptomining activity by identifying the Stratum protocol's 'mining.subscribe' message over TCP port 3333. The Stratum protocol is commonly used by cryptocurrency miners to communicate with mining pools. Detection of this specific message indicates an attempt to initiate or participate in cryptomining operations, potentially on a compromised system.
This rule detects attempts to modify web server files, specifically 'index.html' within a 'wwwroot' directory, over the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. The detection is based on the presence of these strings in network traffic directed to port 445 (SMB) on the internal network. This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to deface a web server or inject malicious code.
This rule detects a high volume of TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) directed to the home network, specifically looking for the SMB protocol signature. The threshold of 500 connections within 30 seconds from a single source IP suggests an attempt at mass file deletion or disk wiping activity on network shares, often associated with ransomware or destructive malware.
This rule detects multiple HTTP requests to 'iam.amazonaws.com' with the URI containing 'DeleteAccessKey'. This activity, especially when occurring frequently (5 times in 30 seconds from the same source), could indicate an attempt to revoke cloud account access keys, potentially as part of a lockout impact attack.
This rule detects attempts to execute a system reboot command via a web shell. It specifically looks for the case-insensitive string "reboot" within the HTTP URI of established client-to-server HTTP traffic. This activity is indicative of an attacker who has gained control over a web server and is using a web shell to issue system-level commands, potentially to disrupt services or cover tracks.
This rule detects a TCP connection flood, specifically looking for a high rate of TCP SYN packets (indicated by the 'flags:S' keyword) directed towards a single destination IP address within a short timeframe. A threshold of 500 SYN packets within 5 seconds to the same destination triggers the alert. This behavior is characteristic of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, aiming to exhaust the target's resources by overwhelming it with connection requests.
This rule detects potential banking web inject form overlays by looking for specific keywords in HTTP response data. It triggers when an HTTP response contains 'account_number', 'routing_number', and 'XMLHttpRequest' (all case-insensitive). This combination of keywords suggests an attempt to inject malicious forms into a legitimate banking website to steal credentials or financial information.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests that are likely associated with financial transaction hijacking by banking Trojans. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests where the host header or URI contains keywords related to banking or payment services (bank, paypal, stripe, wise, transferwise) and the URI also contains the word 'transfer'. Additionally, the request body size must be greater than 200 bytes, indicating a substantial data transfer, which is common in financial transactions.
This rule detects the delivery of a potential ransomware MBR (Master Boot Record) wiper payload via HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP responses containing file data that starts with the byte sequence '55 AA' (which often indicates a boot sector or MBR) and also contains 'MZ' (the DOS executable signature), with a file size greater than 10,000 bytes. This combination suggests a malicious executable designed to overwrite the MBR, a common tactic used by certain types of ransomware or disk wipers.
Detects termination of cloud instances to destroy forensic evidence
This rule flags a large number of files receiving a '.lalia' extension at once, indicating potential Lalia ransomware activity. Bulk extension changes are a common initial indicator of ransomware infection. The rule looks for at least 20 file events (renamed, created, or modified) where the file name ends with '.lalia' within a 30-day window.
This rule watches for creation of ransom notes associated with the Lalia family. Notes often appear in multiple folders once encryption finishes. Identify patient zero and check offline backups. Ask the person who used the computer whether they installed new software or clicked a link, and involve your security team if the answer is unclear.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
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