Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Qilin ransomware attack chain where DLL sideloading via msimg32.dll is followed by malicious driver installation on the same host
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
Detects mass service termination targeting backup, database, and virtualization services. The Gentlemen stop Veeam, SQL, Oracle, SAP, Acronis, BackupExec, PostgreSQL, Docker, and VMware services before encryption.
Detects Qilin ransomware attack chain where DLL sideloading via msimg32.dll is followed by malicious driver installation on the same host
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
Detects recovery inhibition commands used by The Gentlemen including Recycle Bin deletion, RDP log wiping, and Prefetch file removal to prevent forensic investigation and data recovery.
This rule detects attempts to delete shadow copies using built-in Windows utilities such as PowerShell, WMIC, or VSSAdmin. The detection specifically looks for command-line arguments containing 'shadow' and 'delete' when executed by these processes. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware or other destructive malware aiming to prevent system recovery.
This rule detects attempts to stop services or tamper with security tools (Windows Defender, EventLog) using 'sc stop', 'net stop', 'wevtutil cl', 'Add-MpPreference', or 'Set-MpPreference' commands, specifically when initiated by 'explorer.exe'. This could indicate an adversary attempting to impair defenses or achieve persistence.
This rule detects various indicators associated with the Shai-Hulud supply chain attack. It identifies known malicious hashes, suspicious file creations in GitHub workflows, destructive commands on Linux/macOS and Windows systems, initial execution via npm preinstall scripts, and the installation of specific vulnerable application names or applications from known vulnerable vendors.
Detects instances of the openssl command-line tool being used to encrypt data with AES-256-CBC and RSA OAEP padding. This specific sequence matches the credential encryption pattern observed in the Linux/macOS payload of the malicious telnyx PyPI package attributed to TeamPCP.
This detection will help to detect on mass device wipe events within Intune. This is based on the previous breach of Stryker. This will help to determine if a device wipe attack is taking place within your environment.
This rule detects various activities associated with the Charon ransomware, including DLL sideloading, ransomware deployment, payload reading, ransom note creation, shadow copy deletion, and service creation for persistence. It leverages specific filenames, process behaviors, and registry modifications to identify the threat.
Detects the specific OpenSSL command line arguments used by TeamPCP to encrypt stolen credentials before exfiltration. This rule looks for executions of 'openssl' with AES-256 encryption flags ('enc -aes-256-cbc' or 'enc -aes-256') and the use of a file to pass the encryption password ('-pass file:').
Detects suspicious payload execution or unexpected child processes spawning directly from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), which is a common indicator of web shell activity or exploit payload execution on vulnerable IIS instances.
This rule detects various stages of the Charon ransomware deployment and activity, including the writing of ransomware-related files to disk, malicious DLL side-loading, the deployment trigger, and the creation of ransom notes or service associated with Charon.
Detects Sinobi Ransomware (suspected Lynx rebrand) payloads based on specific command-line arguments, help menu strings, ransom note URLs, and references to Curve-25519 and AES-128-CTR encryption routines.
Detects mass device wipe, retire, or delete operations performed via Microsoft Intune, inspired by the Stryker/Handala attack. This rule combines five detection signals: static velocity threshold, bulk destructive actions from a single operator, first-time operator detection, UEBA anomaly correlation, and ML anomaly detection. Operations are categorized into Tier 1 (critical, zero baseline activity like wipe/retire) and Tier 2 (high, legitimate IT ops activity like device delete, subject to velocity and ML thresholds). Severity escalates based on the number of overlapping signals.
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
Detects a sudden spike in Windows RestartManager Event ID 10000. A proliferation of RestartManager events is a strong indicator of active file encryption by ransomware (like INC or Akira) attempting to kill processes that are locking target files.
Detects the execution of INC ransomware utilizing specific command-line arguments (--sup, --hide, --mode medium) typically staged from the C:\perflogs\ directory. This pattern indicates active ransomware execution during the impact phase of an attack.
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