Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects processes generating network connections to multiple known malicious ports (4444, 7211, 8000, 8001, 8002, 10000) within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of command and control (C2) beaconing, where a compromised system periodically communicates with a C2 server. The rule is designed to identify a pattern of C2 activity that might be used across different threat campaigns, leveraging ports commonly associated with various C2 frameworks or custom C2 implementations.
Detects a new mailbox rule that deletes, moves, redirects, or marks as read messages containing security, sign-in, MFA, alert, or administrator terms. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to hide their activities or prevent detection by preventing security notifications from reaching the user.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity related to Microsoft Exchange servers and potential DLL side-loading. It detects the creation of web shell files (.aspx, .ashx, .asmx) in Exchange-related directories, the execution of command shells (cmd, powershell) by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) within Exchange, and the side-loading of DLLs by specific signed binaries (dfsvc.exe, rasautou.exe) from non-standard directories.
Detects hard deletion of mailbox data to remove forensic email evidence
Detects Microsoft Teams spawning child processes (cmd, powershell, wscript, mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, certutil) after receiving external communications, a technique used by MuddyWater for initial access and execution.
Detects a high volume of outbound emails originating from an internal Exchange server to external addresses with spoofed headers, indicating an Open Relay exploit.
Detects inbound emails that are fully authenticated (SPF, DKIM, DMARC pass) and contain keywords related to 'code of conduct', 'employee handbook', 'policy acknowledgement', or 'compliance update' in the subject line, originating from a sender domain that has not been observed by the recipient organization within the last 24 hours. This rule aims to identify potential phishing attempts leveraging social engineering themes from newly registered or previously unseen domains.
Identifies emails where the sender claims to be internal, but the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthAs header is not set to 'Internal', indicating a potential Ghost-Sender exploit. This rule focuses on delivered emails to reduce noise and filters out expected external mail gateways and trusted automated senders.
Detects hard deletion of mailbox data to remove forensic email evidence
Detects creation of inbox rules to hide attacker communications from victim
Detects access to the Intune admin portal from devices that are not marked as compliant or lack a device ID. This may indicate potential credential theft, session replay from unmanaged infrastructure, or AiTM phishing proxies bypassing basic MFA.
This rule detects a high volume of successful sign-in attempts to Exchange Online from a single IP address where the UserPrincipalName ends with '@' (indicating an anonymous or malformed UPN) and Conditional Access was not applied. This pattern can be indicative of anonymous SMTP relay abuse, often used for spamming or phishing campaigns.
This rule detects the creation of new transport rules within Exchange Online. Adversaries may create malicious transport rules to forward emails, bypass security controls, or exfiltrate data. Monitoring the creation of new transport rules can help identify suspicious activity.
This rule detects when a user creates two or more email forwarding rules within a one-hour period in Exchange Online. This behavior can indicate an adversary setting up persistence or exfiltration mechanisms for email.
Detects creation of malicious inbox rules via Exchange Web Services for persistence
This rule detects when a user creates two or more email forwarding rules within a one-hour period in Exchange Online. This behavior can indicate an adversary setting up persistence or exfiltration mechanisms for email.
This rule detects when a single user removes permissions from 5 or more mailboxes within a one-hour window in an Exchange environment. This activity could indicate an attempt to cover tracks or disrupt access to mailboxes by an attacker.
Detects installation of malicious Exchange transport agents for email persistence
This rule detects a high volume of successful sign-in attempts to Exchange Online from a single IP address where the UserPrincipalName ends with '@' (indicating an anonymous or malformed UPN) and Conditional Access was not applied. This pattern can be indicative of anonymous SMTP relay abuse, often used for spamming or phishing campaigns.
This rule detects the creation of new transport rules within Exchange Online. Adversaries may create malicious transport rules to forward emails, bypass security controls, or exfiltrate data. Monitoring the creation of new transport rules can help identify suspicious activity.
This rule detects the creation of an email auto-forwarding rule within Microsoft Exchange via the Exchange Web Services (EWS) interface. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to the '/EWS/Exchange.asmx' endpoint containing the string 'ForwardToRecipients' in the client body, indicating an attempt to configure email forwarding.
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