Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
545 detections
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Detects inbound mail carrying an attachment from a sending server not previously
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
Detects PHP script execution interacting with the Microsoft Exchange Web Services (EWS) API, which may indicate web shell usage, email collection, or exfiltration activity.
M365 Malicious Mailbox Rule Abuse
Cortex XDR
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft 365 Exchange inbox rules that exhibit characteristics of malicious behavior, such as using trivial or blank names, moving items to rarely-monitored folders (e.g., 'Conversation History', 'RSS Feeds'), or containing keywords related to phishing, credential harvesting, or financial fraud.
Detects mail being redirected to an external recipient. Redirection rules are the
classic persistence mechanism on a compromised mailbox: they survive password resets,
require no further access, and quietly copy correspondence to the attacker for as
long as they remain in place.
This is among the most under-monitored controls in most estates, because the rule is
set once and never fires an alert again.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
classic persistence mechanism on a compromised mailbox: they survive password resets,
require no further access, and quietly copy correspondence to the attacker for as
long as they remain in place.
This is among the most under-monitored controls in most estates, because the rule is
set once and never fires an alert again.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_REDIRECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, direction, remoteip
Detects one subject line delivered to an unusually wide internal recipient set. This
is the shape of internal phishing from a compromised mailbox, which is far more
effective than external phishing because it arrives from a trusted colleague and
passes authentication checks.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE' and action='EMAIL_DELIVERED'
| duration 1h
| groupby subject, sender
| select subject, sender, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
is the shape of internal phishing from a compromised mailbox, which is far more
effective than external phishing because it arrives from a trusted colleague and
passes authentication checks.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE' and action='EMAIL_DELIVERED'
| duration 1h
| groupby subject, sender
| select subject, sender, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 25
Detects an unusual volume of externally directed mail from one sender. Mail is a
high-capacity exfiltration channel that is permitted by default, and a compromised
mailbox sending outward in bulk is both data loss and, where the content is phishing,
damage to the organisation's sending reputation.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_SENT_EXTERNAL'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender
| select sender, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
high-capacity exfiltration channel that is permitted by default, and a compromised
mailbox sending outward in bulk is both data loss and, where the content is phishing,
damage to the organisation's sending reputation.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_SENT_EXTERNAL'
| duration 1h
| groupby sender
| select sender, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 100
Detects HTTP requests targeting Microsoft Exchange servers that combine the autodiscover.json URI with PowerShell endpoint parameters, indicative of ProxyNotShell vulnerabilities exploitation (CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082).
Detects a rise in dropped or suppressed mail. Transport rules that silently discard
messages can be used to hide security alerts, suppress notifications of account
changes, or conceal an ongoing compromise from the people who would otherwise notice
it.
Mail that never arrives generates no complaint for some time, which is precisely why
this is worth watching.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action in ('EMAIL_DROPPED', 'EMAIL_SUPPRESSED')
| duration 1h
| groupby recipient, sender, direction
messages can be used to hide security alerts, suppress notifications of account
changes, or conceal an ongoing compromise from the people who would otherwise notice
it.
Mail that never arrives generates no complaint for some time, which is precisely why
this is worth watching.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action in ('EMAIL_DROPPED', 'EMAIL_SUPPRESSED')
| duration 1h
| groupby recipient, sender, direction
Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence
Detects exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint leveraging the ToolShell exploit chain, as well as subsequent post-exploitation webshell activity involving anomalous 'layoutNsp.aspx' naming conventions. This covers initial exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-49704 and associated variants, followed by the deployment of webshells associated with the ToolShell campaign.
Detects exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint leveraging the ToolShell exploit chain, as well as subsequent post-exploitation webshell activity involving anomalous 'layoutNsp.aspx' naming conventions. This covers initial exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-49704 and associated variants, followed by the deployment of webshells associated with the ToolShell campaign.
Detects attempts to exploit a SharePoint vulnerability that involves bypassing SafeControls via quote-injection within the Register directive. The rule monitors POST requests to .aspx files for specific malicious patterns, including the use of 'ignoreParentFrozen' and malformed 'Register' tags that facilitate unauthorized code execution.
Detects exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint leveraging the ToolShell exploit chain, as well as subsequent post-exploitation webshell activity involving anomalous 'layoutNsp.aspx' naming conventions. This covers initial exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-49704 and associated variants, followed by the deployment of webshells associated with the ToolShell campaign.
Detects exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint leveraging the ToolShell exploit chain, as well as subsequent post-exploitation webshell activity involving anomalous 'layoutNsp.aspx' naming conventions. This covers initial exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-49704 and associated variants, followed by the deployment of webshells associated with the ToolShell campaign.
Detects unauthorized POST requests to SharePoint WebPart gallery pages that lack valid authentication cookies, which may indicate exploitation of CVE-2026-65660. The rule monitors for POST methods to specific SharePoint pages while excluding requests that already contain standard SharePoint authentication cookies (FedAuth, rtFa).
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox rules using the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule cmdlets that perform automatic forwarding or redirection of email to external, non-trusted domains. This technique is commonly employed during account takeover events to facilitate covert data exfiltration.
Detects the creation or modification of inbox rules in Microsoft 365 Exchange environments that perform suspicious actions such as forwarding, redirecting, moving, or deleting emails. This rule specifically monitors for rule configurations that target potentially sensitive keywords, indicating a likely attempt to exfiltrate data, hide security alerts, or intercept communications.
Detects anomalous access to the SharePoint WebPartPages.asmx SOAP endpoint, specifically using the GetWebPartPageConnectionInfo method. This query identifies patterns consistent with the exploitation of CVE-2026-65660, where adversaries attempt to smuggle WebPart template markup (e.g., <%@ Register, XamlServices) after legitimate preview methods have been disabled.
This rule detects potentially malicious POST requests to SharePoint endpoints (such as AddGallery.aspx) that include indicators of WebPartMarkup or ToolPane payloads. This activity attempts to bypass the SPUtility.EnsureAuthentication() check that is typically enforced on the ToolPane.aspx page, potentially allowing unauthorized code execution or configuration manipulation.
Detects the creation or modification of Microsoft 365/Exchange inbox rules that suggest malicious staging or exfiltration activities. This includes rules configured for external email auto-forwarding, automatic deletion of messages, or movement of emails into hidden/system folders (e.g., RSS Subscriptions, Archive) which may be filtered based on sensitive keywords related to financial or credential theft (e.g., invoice, wire, payment).
Detects the creation or modification of mailbox inbox rules that configure forwarding or redirection to external addresses, or rules that automatically delete or move messages based on sensitive keyword filters (e.g., 'invoice', 'password'). It specifically looks for indicators of mailbox hiding (hidden rules) which are frequently used by attackers to maintain persistence and conceal activity, particularly following unauthorized access or token theft.
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