Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects correlated process creation events where an SSH reverse tunnel (-R) is established and is followed closely in time by the creation of a scheduled task associated with 'SysyService'.
This analytic detects explicit BITS upload configuration through BITSAdmin /Create or /Transfer with /Upload or /Upload-Reply, or PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer with -TransferType Upload or UploadReply.
Adversaries can abuse BITS to send collected files to remote infrastructure.
Adversaries can abuse BITS to send collected files to remote infrastructure.
Detects a potential exploitation sequence against ONLYOFFICE Document Server where an attacker requests sensitive configuration files like local.json or session secrets via /docbuilder, followed by a forged download/save request (downloadas) within an hour from the same source IP.
This analytic detects PowerShell Script Block Logging events that enumerate or read browser cache directories.
PowerShell inspecting Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache files can indicate cache smuggling, where
web content disguised as an image is extracted and staged for execution. The analytic looks for browser cache
paths together with file enumeration or read operations, rather than relying on cache markers or a specific
payload name.
PowerShell inspecting Firefox, Chrome, Edge, Brave, or Chromium cache files can indicate cache smuggling, where
web content disguised as an image is extracted and staged for execution. The analytic looks for browser cache
paths together with file enumeration or read operations, rather than relying on cache markers or a specific
payload name.
This hunting analytic detects network connection events possibly associated with the Cloudflared tool, a tool used to create tunnels via Cloudflare.
Cloudflared is functionally very similar to ngrok, an ingress-as-a-service tool.
It reaches out to the Cloudflare Edge Servers, creating an outbound connection over HTTPS(HTTP2/QUIC), where the tunnel's controller makes services or private networks accessible.
Promote this analytic to an anomaly generating risk or intermediate findings if you do not allow cloudflared to be used in your environment.
Cloudflared is functionally very similar to ngrok, an ingress-as-a-service tool.
It reaches out to the Cloudflare Edge Servers, creating an outbound connection over HTTPS(HTTP2/QUIC), where the tunnel's controller makes services or private networks accessible.
Promote this analytic to an anomaly generating risk or intermediate findings if you do not allow cloudflared to be used in your environment.
Detects the presence of multiple KUKURAT C2 module indicators (portscan, hostscan, processlist, keylogger, screenshot) associated with a single process on a device within a 10-minute timeframe, identifying reflective module loading behavior.
The following analytic identifies specific GET or HEAD requests to web servers that indicate reconnaissance attempts to find vulnerable JBoss servers. It leverages data from the Web data model, focusing on HTTP methods and URLs associated with JBoss management interfaces. This activity is significant because it often precedes exploitation attempts using tools like JexBoss, which can compromise the server. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, leading to potential data breaches and system compromise.
Self deletion through timeout and del
Cortex XDR
Detects command prompt (cmd.exe) executing a command containing 'timeout', 'del', and '/t', commonly used by scripts or malware to self-delete after execution by pausing via timeout and then deleting the file.
The following analytic detects a process located in a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that is spawned by cmd.exe acting as a Chromium native messaging host launcher.
This activity is significant because attackers register a malicious native messaging host so that a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries such as a bundled Python interpreter on demand, giving them a stealthy command and control and persistence channel.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery and run further payloads under the context of the logged-in user. Known legitimate native hosts are excluded.
This activity is significant because attackers register a malicious native messaging host so that a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries such as a bundled Python interpreter on demand, giving them a stealthy command and control and persistence channel.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery and run further payloads under the context of the logged-in user. Known legitimate native hosts are excluded.
Detects the execution of a Python implant script (main.py) via python.exe or pythonw.exe from the SYSTEM user profile, correlated with a matching Windows Registry Run key persistence mechanism.
Detects phishing campaigns leveraging AWS Lambda Function URLs with pre-filled target email parameters used for credential harvesting. The rule correlates email delivery events, URL click events from email protection/safelinks, endpoint network connections to lambda URLs, and cloud app activity referencing these infrastructure endpoints.
Detects potential staging and execution activity where utilities such as expand, xcopy, or attrib referencing .rels.log files are followed by the launch of HTML Help Workshop (hhc.exe) from a temporary directory within a short time window, optionally correlated with ftp.exe command execution.
The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command `Start-BitsTransfer`, which can be used for file transfers, including potential data exfiltration. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because `Start-BitsTransfer` can be abused by adversaries to upload sensitive files to remote locations, posing a risk of data loss. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration, compromising sensitive information and potentially leading to further exploitation of the network.
Detects behavior where a PowerShell process (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) drops an executable named client32.exe into a user profile path and establishes persistence by writing a registry value under the CurrentVersion\Run key pointing to it.
Detects a PowerShell command line execution that builds a GUID-named .ps1 script in the TEMP directory, downloads content into it using curl/Invoke-WebRequest, and subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process with execution policy bypass to run that same script.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task using schtasks.exe that executes a PowerShell script located in the C:\ProgramData\ssh directory or uses known indicators such as the 'WinUpdCheck' task name or 'winc.ps1' script reference, associated with CACTUS ransomware persistence.
Detects Qlik Sense service processes (scheduler, engine, proxy, repository) spawning or dropping remote access tools such as AnyDesk or Plink, a behavior observed in CACTUS ransomware campaigns.
Detects the deployment of multiple distinct persistence mechanisms on a
single host within a short window — registry Run keys, scheduled tasks,
new services, startup folder drops, and WMI event subscriptions. Human
operators typically deploy one persistence mechanism and move on;
autonomous AI agents hedge by deploying several in rapid succession to
ensure at least one survives cleanup.
ARTEX worker agents tasked with persistence execute a checklist of
techniques against the target host in parallel. The resulting telemetry
shows a burst of Sysmon Event ID 12/13 (registry modifications), Event
ID 11 (file creation in startup directories), and Windows Security Event
4698 (scheduled task creation) within seconds — a pattern that is
operationally distinctive.
This detection correlates across multiple Sysmon event types on the same
host within a compressed window. Each individual event may appear benign;
the signal is the co-occurrence.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=ep-process where action='PROCESS_ADDED'
and (lower(image) like '%schtasks.exe'
or lower(image) like '%sc.exe')
and (lower(commandline) like '%/create%'
or lower(commandline) like '%create%')
| groupby system, user
| having count > 2
single host within a short window — registry Run keys, scheduled tasks,
new services, startup folder drops, and WMI event subscriptions. Human
operators typically deploy one persistence mechanism and move on;
autonomous AI agents hedge by deploying several in rapid succession to
ensure at least one survives cleanup.
ARTEX worker agents tasked with persistence execute a checklist of
techniques against the target host in parallel. The resulting telemetry
shows a burst of Sysmon Event ID 12/13 (registry modifications), Event
ID 11 (file creation in startup directories), and Windows Security Event
4698 (scheduled task creation) within seconds — a pattern that is
operationally distinctive.
This detection correlates across multiple Sysmon event types on the same
host within a compressed window. Each individual event may appear benign;
the signal is the co-occurrence.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=ep-process where action='PROCESS_ADDED'
and (lower(image) like '%schtasks.exe'
or lower(image) like '%sc.exe')
and (lower(commandline) like '%/create%'
or lower(commandline) like '%create%')
| groupby system, user
| having count > 2
Detects a single host enumerating SMB shares across many internal hosts
within a compressed window. Autonomous AI agents perform network share
discovery at machine speed after gaining initial foothold — sweeping entire
subnets for readable shares to identify lateral movement paths and data
staging opportunities.
ARTEX worker agents performing T1135 (Network Share Discovery) produce a
distinctive pattern: TreeConnect requests to IPC$ and share enumeration
RPCs against dozens of hosts within seconds. The velocity differentiates
this from legitimate administration where an engineer connects to a few
known shares.
Windows Security Event ID 5140 (network share accessed) and Sysmon Event
ID 3 (network connection) provide the telemetry. Enable object access
auditing on file servers for Event 5140 visibility.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where event_id='5140'
and object_name like '%IPC$%'
| groupby source_ip
| having count > 20
within a compressed window. Autonomous AI agents perform network share
discovery at machine speed after gaining initial foothold — sweeping entire
subnets for readable shares to identify lateral movement paths and data
staging opportunities.
ARTEX worker agents performing T1135 (Network Share Discovery) produce a
distinctive pattern: TreeConnect requests to IPC$ and share enumeration
RPCs against dozens of hosts within seconds. The velocity differentiates
this from legitimate administration where an engineer connects to a few
known shares.
Windows Security Event ID 5140 (network share accessed) and Sysmon Event
ID 3 (network connection) provide the telemetry. Enable object access
auditing on file servers for Event 5140 visibility.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=win-audit where event_id='5140'
and object_name like '%IPC$%'
| groupby source_ip
| having count > 20
Detects password spray activity that distributes attempts across accounts at
a cadence deliberately calibrated to stay below lockout thresholds. Human
operators spray at a fixed interval; autonomous AI agents adaptively tune
their attempt rate based on observed lockout responses. The diagnostic is a
sustained, evenly paced pattern of single-attempt failures across many
accounts — one attempt per account, then a pause just longer than the
observation window, then the next password across the same set.
ARTEX planner agents track lockout policy details discovered during recon
and configure worker agents to spray below the lockout threshold. The
uniform cadence and breadth (many accounts, one attempt each, repeated)
distinguishes this from legitimate failed logins which cluster around
specific accounts.
Requires Windows Security Event 4625 (failed logon). Lower the account
threshold for environments with fewer interactive users.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where action='LOGIN' and status='FAILED'
and logon_type in ('3', '10')
and not user like '%$'
| groupby source_ip, user
| having count > 15
a cadence deliberately calibrated to stay below lockout thresholds. Human
operators spray at a fixed interval; autonomous AI agents adaptively tune
their attempt rate based on observed lockout responses. The diagnostic is a
sustained, evenly paced pattern of single-attempt failures across many
accounts — one attempt per account, then a pause just longer than the
observation window, then the next password across the same set.
ARTEX planner agents track lockout policy details discovered during recon
and configure worker agents to spray below the lockout threshold. The
uniform cadence and breadth (many accounts, one attempt each, repeated)
distinguishes this from legitimate failed logins which cluster around
specific accounts.
Requires Windows Security Event 4625 (failed logon). Lower the account
threshold for environments with fewer interactive users.
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where action='LOGIN' and status='FAILED'
and logon_type in ('3', '10')
and not user like '%$'
| groupby source_ip, user
| having count > 15
Detects a sequence where a process persisted under the WindowsUpdateAssist Run key spawns cmd.exe to execute reconnaissance commands such as 'dir' and 'systeminfo' within a 30-minute window.
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