Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects anomalous activity involving the legacy Microsoft Azure AD Graph API (graph.windows.net) originating from users who lack corresponding entries in standard Entra ID (AuditLogs) sign-in or management activity logs. A high frequency of these undocumented API calls (more than 5 in an hour) from a specific user and IP address indicates potential unauthorized reconnaissance or access attempts attempting to bypass standard audit logging.
Detects high-frequency requests to WordPress REST API batch endpoints, which are commonly used in automated exploitation or scanning attempts against WordPress installations. An unusual volume of these requests from a single client IP within a short time window is a strong indicator of unauthorized probing or exploit activity.
Detects rapid sequence of unsuccessful (401) followed by successful (201) POST requests to the WordPress user API endpoint from the same source IP, indicating potential brute force or account enumeration attempts.
Detects potential SQL injection attempts against Azure App Service endpoints (specifically /wp-json/batch/v1 and /batch/v1) by identifying SQL-specific characters in URI query parameters that correlate with SQL syntax error logs within a 5-minute window.
This rule monitors container logs for attempts to access the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) via the 169.254.169.254 endpoint to request OAuth tokens or access Azure Key Vault secrets. Such activity within a containerized environment is often indicative of credential theft or discovery attempts by an adversary attempting to escalate privileges using the container's managed identity.
This rule detects 'Push', 'Put', or 'PutManifest' operations on the 'mongo' repository using specific tags ('mongofr', 'latest'), which may indicate an attempt to overwrite or inject a malicious container image into a critical database registry.
Detects Microsoft Graph API requests that query directory role assignments specifically looking for highly privileged roles such as Global Administrator, Exchange Administrator, or Security Administrator. This activity may indicate an adversary is enumerating privileged roles to identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement within an Azure/Microsoft 365 environment.
This rule monitors for the execution of Azure CLI commands used to enumerate role assignments and Azure Container Registry (ACR) details. Adversaries often perform this reconnaissance to identify high-privilege accounts, discover container registries, or map out permissions to facilitate lateral movement or persistence within an Azure environment.
Detects a single authenticated user account or client performing a high volume of requests to sequential object IDs on the same API path within a short window. This pattern is characteristic of Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) or Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) exploitation, where an attacker attempts to gain unauthorized access to data records that do not belong to them by iterating through predictable numeric identifiers.
This rule detects potential prompt injection attempts targeting AI systems by looking for specific keywords related to AI models (gpt, claude, copilot) in HTTP logs, combined with suspicious characters or commands commonly used in injection attacks (e.g., <script>, javascript:, eval(). The rule triggers if 5 or more such attempts are observed from a single IP within an hour.
Detects unauthenticated POST requests directed at the '/accessv2' endpoint of an Azure Application Gateway originating from non-internal IP addresses. This behavior is associated with the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-8037.
Detects high-volume data access or exfiltration from Azure/Office 365 cloud environments via common scripting/automation user-agents. The rule monitors API requests to users, mail, drive, or files endpoints by non-standard clients (e.g., python, curl, Go) from previously unseen locations, calculating a risk score based on the number of endpoints accessed and the total data volume.
Detects creation of Intune device management scripts, a potential privilege abuse vector.
This rule detects anomalous Azure AD sign-in behavior where a single user account authenticates from two or more distinct subnets (class C) within a 10-minute window. It specifically focuses on non-interactive logins or token issuance (e.g., refresh tokens) that are successful (resultType 0) and ignores service principal activity, which may indicate account compromise, session hijacking, or automated credential misuse.
Detects unauthenticated POST requests directed at the '/accessv2' endpoint of an Azure Application Gateway originating from non-internal IP addresses. This behavior is associated with the exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-8037.
Detects high frequency administrative modifications, such as user creation/deletion, password resets, or group membership changes, performed by service accounts associated with Azure AD Connect or Microsoft Entra Connect. This behavior may indicate account compromise where a service principal is being abused to perform bulk identity management operations.
This rule detects anomalous Azure AD sign-in behavior where a single user account authenticates from two or more distinct subnets (class C) within a 10-minute window. It specifically focuses on non-interactive logins or token issuance (e.g., refresh tokens) that are successful (resultType 0) and ignores service principal activity, which may indicate account compromise, session hijacking, or automated credential misuse.
Detects anomalous activity consistent with the Velvet Ant 'Operation Highland' methodology, which leverages Nginx/FastCGI to bridge external requests to internal SSH execution. The rule monitors three conditions: 1) HTTP POST requests to internal endpoints containing SSH-related command parameters; 2) suspicious Nginx configuration modifications or reload events; and 3) spawning of SSH processes by FastCGI handlers. Findings are correlated by time and entity to identify potential persistence or lateral movement mechanisms.
Detects Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role activations that occur outside of standard business hours (before 07:00 or after 19:00 UTC, or on weekends) or involve high-privilege roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator, Security Administrator).
Detects high-volume data access or exfiltration from Azure/Office 365 cloud environments via common scripting/automation user-agents. The rule monitors API requests to users, mail, drive, or files endpoints by non-standard clients (e.g., python, curl, Go) from previously unseen locations, calculating a risk score based on the number of endpoints accessed and the total data volume.
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID application configurations, specifically updating the 'RedirectUri' or 'ReplyUrls' to point to potentially external or unauthorized domains. This technique is often used in OAuth-based application-consent phishing campaigns to redirect authorization codes to adversary-controlled servers.
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