Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
472 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
342
74
19
16
7
Contributors
91
90
77
52
35
Categories
182
148
81
66
60
Platforms
406
68
63
58
26
Products / Services
10,680
9,761
6,694
4,418
3,744
472
MITRE Techniques
180
121
96
78
71
CVEs
6
5
5
5
2
IDS Classtypes
2
1
1
1
1
IDS Protocols
6
Correlates a high-risk or compromised Microsoft Entra sign-in event with a subsequent device registration (Add device or Register device) performed by the same user account within a 3-hour window.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects the presence of known malicious or suspicious OAuth application IDs as well as specific third-party applications like SkyKick or ConnectWise within OAuth application metadata over a 30-day window.
Detects a single external source IP reading secrets and configmaps across multiple Kubernetes namespaces in bulk within a 1-hour window, which may indicate reconnaissance or credential theft.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects potential Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue or push bombing attacks against Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) accounts by identifying a high volume of MFA failures followed by suspicious or fraudulent report actions, or successful authentications shortly after repeated failures.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects Microsoft 365 activity (Exchange and SharePoint) initiated by known compromised service principal UUIDs associated with the ConnectWise supply-chain attack.
Detects suspicious command execution activities using Azure RunCommand, Custom Script Extension, or Azure Connected Machine Agent combined with potentially malicious command arguments or tools such as PowerShell encoded commands, 'IEX', download strings, certutil, whoami, base64, curl, or wget.
Detects a high volume of Azure Key Vault secret reads or key decryption operations performed by a single caller identity from multiple source IP addresses within a one-hour window, which may indicate credential harvesting or unauthorized access.
Detects non-interactive service principal sign-ins originating from an IP address and location never seen for that specific principal over a prior 30-day baseline period, approximating potential misuse of stolen cloud credentials exposed via environment variables.
Detects five or more Entra ID device registrations by a single account where device names match microsoft-* or WINDOWS-* patterns, occurring shortly after a device code flow sign-in by the same account. This behavior is indicative of device registration abuse or persistent access attempts.
This rule queries the ExposureGraphNodes table to identify and summarize assets that are configured as internet-facing or exposed to the internet.
Detects the removal of user accounts from a specific sensitive Microsoft Entra ID group, which may indicate unauthorized group membership changes or potential privilege escalation activities.
Detects a user account that performs a device code sign-in flow followed by the registration of five or more devices with deceptive names (matching patterns like microsoft- or windows-) within a one day timeframe. This behavior can indicate an adversary establishing persistence or attempting tenant resource exhaustion using compromised accounts.
Detects potential cloud storage object discovery activity in Azure Blob Storage by identifying anomalous listing or enumeration operations from callers, including high request counts, extensive container access, high failure rates, or anonymous authentication.
Correlates a high-risk or compromised Microsoft Entra sign-in event with a subsequent device registration (Add device or Register device) performed by the same user account within a 3-hour window.
Detects an Entra 'Add device' event within 2 minutes after a successful sign-in from an IP never seen for that user in the lookback window, and where the registration originates from that same new IP (rogue device persistence after token replay).
Detects a service principal adding itself or another principal to a directory role in Azure Active Directory, specifically highlighting known ConnectWise supply-chain related activity.
Detects instances where an OAuth token is used from a new IP address and a new country within 24 hours of a successful device-code sign-in for the same user, potentially indicating token theft or abuse.
Page 1 of 23