Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects second-stage reconnaissance patterns indicative of the VelvetCake framework. The rule identifies PowerShell execution that combines multiple discovery commands (system information, network configuration, process listing, file system inspection, and antivirus/security software enumeration) within a single execution sequence or related process events.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects PowerShell processes using the .NET System.IO.File methods (SetLastWriteTime, SetCreationTime, SetLastAccessTime) to modify file timestamps, a common anti-forensic technique to obfuscate file creation or modification times.
Detects execution of GitLab Runner registration commands via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EID 4104). This rule identifies potentially sensitive configuration parameters, such as registration tokens or executor configurations, being passed in cleartext during the enrollment process.
Detects anomalous PowerShell script execution originating from GitLab CI runners where the environment variables suggest unauthorized command execution, specifically identifying usage of 'IEX' to execute commands passed via the 'CMD' environment variable, often used in GitRunner C2 techniques.
Detects command-line execution patterns that exhibit hallmark traits of LLM-generated code, such as overly verbose and explanatory comments, appearing alongside common obfuscation or decoding primitives (e.g., base64, iex, eval). This combination suggests the use of AI to assist in creating decoy logic or burying malicious payloads within legitimate-appearing scripts to evade detection.
Detects command-line execution patterns that exhibit hallmark traits of LLM-generated code, such as overly verbose and explanatory comments, appearing alongside common obfuscation or decoding primitives (e.g., base64, iex, eval). This combination suggests the use of AI to assist in creating decoy logic or burying malicious payloads within legitimate-appearing scripts to evade detection.
This rule detects potential screen capture activity performed by either a suspicious executable (SearchTrustedRuntimeSvc.exe) that mimics a screen capture tool or a PowerShell script invoked by Node.js using .NET drawing libraries. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized information gathering, common in remote access trojans (RATs).
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by a Node.js process (node.exe). It monitors for command lines containing common bypass flags (-NoProfile, -NonInteractive, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass) and a specific string pattern 'wra-ps-', which is often associated with malicious scripts or remote access trojans (RATs) being executed via a Node.js application.
Detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET assemblies into memory using System.Reflection.Assembly::Load combined with indicators often associated with fileless payload execution, such as GZip decompression, AES decryption, or method invocation (EntryPoint.Invoke, GetType).
Detects command-line activity indicating an attempt to bypass or tamper with Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) functionality. The rule flags processes invoking GetProcAddress or LoadLibrary to resolve and manipulate AMSI-specific functions like AmsiScanBuffer or AmsiScanString within amsi.dll, a common technique for disabling runtime script scanning.
Detects the addition of a 'DailyFitnessTracker' entry to the HKCU Windows Registry Run key, which is a technique used by Golang-based RATs to establish persistence. The rule monitors both 'reg.exe' command-line operations and PowerShell 'New-ItemProperty' cmdlets targeting this specific registry path.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences by adding exclusion paths, processes, or extensions shortly after the creation of Registry Run keys. This sequence is characteristic of post-exploitation activity where an adversary establishes persistence and subsequently attempts to neutralize security software monitoring of their malicious payloads to avoid detection during future execution.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that utilize hidden window styles and encoded payloads, specifically when the command line or image path references 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to hide malicious scripts and potentially interact with logs in an attempt to masquerade or tamper with Windows Update processes.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (hidden window, no profile, or encoded commands) spawned directly from a web browser process (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Explorer). This behavior is characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into copying and executing malicious PowerShell commands via the Win+R Run dialog or terminal.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity involving compression commands (e.g., Expand-Archive) within APPDATA, correlated with the execution of hypersnap.exe with hidden window arguments, and the creation of persistence via scheduled tasks. This pattern is indicative of automated staging or malicious tool execution and persistence setup.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window arguments from explorer.exe, typically indicative of ClickFix social engineering where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects PowerShell command lines that perform suspicious string manipulation using the .Replace() method on specific obfuscated characters, followed by a Base64 decoding operation. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to reassemble and decode fragmented or obfuscated payloads on the fly to evade static analysis.
Detects suspicious PowerShell commands involving node.js, hidden window styles, and file downloads or transfers.
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