Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,907 detections
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Detects the execution of the ROMULUS staging script via PowerShell script block logging (Event ID 4104). The rule identifies specific indicators including the use of environment variable '__ST', '$MyInvocation.MyCommand.Path', dynamic code reconstruction via '[scriptblock]::Create', and a high comma count exceeding 200.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that execute SysMon.py from the non-standard C:\Windows\SystemHealth\Update\ directory, or the corresponding scheduled task creation events.
Detects PowerShell launched hidden and non-interactive with an insecure execution policy and Base64 decode-and-execute, or a script combining Base64 decode-and-execute with browser history collection and WMI shadow copy enumeration, as seen in the Midnight Blizzard (GTG-20006) stager.
Detects the usage of binaries such as 'net', 'sc' or 'powershell' in order to stop, pause, disable or delete critical or important Windows services such as AV, Backup, etc. As seen being used in some ransomware scripts
Detects execution of Defendnot installation via PowerShell one-liner that downloads and executes the Defendnot script from a remote URL.
Defendnot is a hacktool that abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product.
Defendnot is a hacktool that abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to disable Windows Defender by registering itself as a fake antivirus product.
This analytic detects PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) events that use common download methods to retrieve files directly from raw-content URLs on GitHub, GitLab, or Codeberg.
These code hosting services can be abused to stage payloads, but administrators and developers also download files from them.
A match identifies a download attempt; it does not establish that the file was successfully retrieved or executed. Review the full script block, destination path, process ancestry, and related endpoint activity.
These code hosting services can be abused to stage payloads, but administrators and developers also download files from them.
A match identifies a download attempt; it does not establish that the file was successfully retrieved or executed. Review the full script block, destination path, process ancestry, and related endpoint activity.
Detects PowerShell execution performing port checks across multiple internal hosts using Test-NetConnection in a looping construct with output redirected to a log file, indicative of post-compromise reconnaissance (such as LONEPAGE scanning).
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
Detects usage of "Reflection.Assembly" load functions to dynamically load assemblies in memory
Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.
Detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil, PowerShell, wmic, etc.) or log-reading tools (grep, tail) for log enumeration or export when executed by processes that are not standard management or monitoring agents. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary efforts to gain situational awareness or identify security logs.
Detect adversaries enumerate sensitive files
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WMIObject Win32_Group` command using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This method captures the full command sent to PowerShell, allowing for detailed analysis. Identifying group information on an endpoint is not inherently malicious but can be suspicious based on context such as time, endpoint, and user. This activity is significant as it may indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, it could lead to further enumeration and potential lateral movement within the network.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that enumerate Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility exported commands
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
Detects usage of powershell cmdlets to disable or remove ETW trace sessions
Detects PowerShell execution performing port checks across multiple internal hosts using Test-NetConnection in a looping construct with output redirected to a log file, indicative of post-compromise reconnaissance (such as LONEPAGE scanning).
Detects PowerShell processes invoked with obfuscated command lines that enumerate Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility
exported commands and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This technique is used to evade
detections that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
exported commands and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This technique is used to evade
detections that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
Detects a suspected ClickFix social engineering attack where a user is tricked into pasting malicious commands into Windows Terminal, leading to a PowerShell download, followed by the appearance of specific known malicious artifacts (LockScreenContentServer.exe, dui70.dll, or 1.bat) within 15 minutes on the same device.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell to delete shadow copies via the WMIC PowerShell module. It leverages EventCode 4104 and searches for specific keywords like "ShadowCopy," "Delete," or "Remove" within the ScriptBlockText. This activity is significant because deleting shadow copies is a common tactic used by ransomware, such as DarkSide, to prevent data recovery. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to irreversible data loss and hinder recovery efforts, significantly impacting business continuity and data integrity.
The following analytic detects the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet, which allows PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify when this cmdlet is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attacker enabling remote command execution capabilities on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to take control of the system remotely, execute commands, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network, leading to further compromise and lateral movement.
The following analytic identifies the use of PowerShell's Start-Service or Stop-Service cmdlets on an endpoint. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to detect these commands. This activity is significant because attackers can manipulate services to disable or stop critical functions, causing system instability or disrupting business operations. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to disable security services, evade detection, or disrupt essential services, leading to potential system downtime and compromised security.
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