Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects unauthorized processes attempting to read sensitive configuration files (secrets.json, config.yaml) associated with AI coding assistants like Cline and Continue. By filtering out known, legitimate IDE and development processes, the rule highlights potential file-grabber activity indicative of an infostealer attempting to exfiltrate plaintext LLM API keys.
Detects evidence of the Antino backdoor performing sleep-masking shellcode evasion. The rule monitors for 'slc.dll' being sideloaded by 'GatherOsState.exe' and the subsequent invocation of memory management APIs (VirtualAlloc, NtAllocateVirtualMemory) paired with memory protection changes (VirtualProtect) or thread context modification, which are characteristic behaviors used by Antino to mask malicious shellcode in memory between execution intervals.
Detects the suspicious retrieval and immediate execution of Agentic AI configuration files (e.g., AGENTS.md, KNOWLEDGE.md) from remote sources using common command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of an adversary injecting malicious agent instructions or unauthorized configurations into an AI environment.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign, which commonly targets users with fake error messages to trick them into executing malicious commands. The rule identifies communication with known malicious infrastructure (domains and IP addresses) found in CommonSecurityLog events, while implementing filters to exclude common security scanners and deduplicating per-host alerts.
This rule performs indicator-based detection for the SectopRAT malware. It monitors network activity for connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and backup domains, as well as file and process creation events matching known malicious SHA256 hashes associated with the malware.
Detects outbound network connections to known SectopRAT C2 infrastructure, specifically targeting the hardcoded IP 98.142.252.140 or the non-standard port 15847 often used for encrypted exfiltration.
Detects command-line operations indicative of bulk data export, dumping, or unauthorized scanning against vector databases (e.g., Pinecone, Chroma, Milvus, Qdrant) and caching backends (e.g., Redis). Such activities may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate training data, embeddings, or context stored within an AI agent's memory backend.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks, recurring jobs, or webhook subscriptions by a user identity flagged as an AI_AGENT. This activity is monitored for persistence, especially when the event lacks a descriptive context or targets external networks, suggesting potential unauthorized agent behavioral drift or malicious persistence.
Detects network navigation to Google Sites pages that match patterns associated with known Ledger-impersonating phishing campaigns. These sites are often reached through redirect chains involving Google Ads, cloud storage, and rotating domains.
Detects suspicious processes frequently polling Hugging Face repository endpoints (discussions, raw files, commits). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using public code/dataset hosting services as a covert command-and-control (C2) channel to fetch instructions or exfiltrate data, bypassing traditional network filters by blending in with legitimate developer traffic.
Detects UNC6240 PSEMHUB.war web shell/tunnel/trojanized installer artifacts by distinctive content markers (x.jsp, u.jsp, tunnel.jsp/jspx, Ple64.exe)
This rule detects potential exploitation of the Oracle PeopleSoft PSEMHUB component vulnerability (CVE-2026-35273). It identifies suspicious POST requests to the PSEMHUB HttpListeningConnector servlet, including obfuscated URL paths, followed by the creation of suspiciously named .jsp or .jspx files in the PSEMHUB.war application directory, which is indicative of a web shell deployment.
Detects Neo-reGeorg tunnel.jsp/tunnel.jspx servlets used by UNC6240 to establish SOCKS5-over-HTTP(S) tunneling from compromised PeopleSoft PSEMHUB.war hosts
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the Lunex Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) campaign. It aggregates telemetry from file creation, process execution, and network connections to identify the presence of known malicious hashes, C2 IP addresses, phishing-related domains, and specific payload URLs.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects the presence of zero-width, non-printing, or bidirectional-override Unicode characters in command lines, commonly used for obfuscation or prompt injection.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities indicative of malicious driver installation. It identifies the creation of an irregularly named .sys file in temp directories, the use of curl.exe to retrieve symbols for a potentially malicious driver, and the subsequent registration/start of that driver as a Windows system service.
Detects non-browser processes (e.g., non-chrome.exe/msedge.exe) modifying critical browser configuration files such as 'Secure Preferences' followed by near-simultaneous writes to extension-related directories like 'Extension State' or 'Extensions'. This pattern is indicative of a malicious attempt to bypass browser security integrity checks to silently install or load unauthorized extensions.
The rule detects correlation between the creation of persistence-related Registry keys (specifically Windows Run keys or Browser Native Messaging hosts) and the execution of the schtasks.exe utility to create or manage a task related to 'psychedelicloveUtils'. This pattern suggests an adversary attempting to maintain persistence by linking Registry-based autostart mechanisms with a scheduled task.
The rule detects correlation between the creation of persistence-related Registry keys (specifically Windows Run keys or Browser Native Messaging hosts) and the execution of the schtasks.exe utility to create or manage a task related to 'psychedelicloveUtils'. This pattern suggests an adversary attempting to maintain persistence by linking Registry-based autostart mechanisms with a scheduled task.
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