Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity involving the enumeration and manipulation of COM objects and .NET assemblies, patterns often associated with reconnaissance or post-exploitation activities. It flags instances where PowerShell scripts utilize specific command-line arguments (e.g., Get-ComDatabase, Get-ComClass, Import-Win32Module, NtObjectManager) in conjunction, suggesting automated discovery of COM infrastructure or assembly loading.
Detects the use of OleViewDotNet or NtObjectManager PowerShell tools to enumerate running COM host processes (e.g., dllhost.exe) and check for the absence of specific security mitigations like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL or COMGLB_UNMARSHALING_POLICY_STRONG. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activity aimed at identifying targets for fake-marshaled CoGetInstanceFromIStorage exploit chains.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., WebClient, hidden flags, or WebDAV paths) spawned directly from browser processes like chrome.exe or msedge.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with fileless delivery techniques where an attacker attempts to download and execute scripts directly from an internet-facing source.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands intended to gather system information, such as OS details, boot time, or video controller configurations. These techniques are often used during the discovery phase to profile a target machine before further malicious actions.
Detects active attempts to disable or interfere with security products, including EDR agents and antivirus software. The rule monitors for the use of 'sc.exe' to stop or reconfigure services, 'taskkill' to terminate security-related processes, and PowerShell commands utilizing 'Set-MpPreference' to modify Windows Defender real-time protection settings. These actions are frequently observed as a precursor to ransomware deployment or other malicious activities designed to evade detection.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution patterns involving encoded commands, hidden window styles, or common download cradles combined with code obfuscation techniques. This rule monitors PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (Event ID 4104) for combinations of indicators often used by threat actors to evade detection, such as Base64-encoded strings, hidden execution flags, network download utilities, and script obfuscation techniques.
Detects PowerShell processes using the .NET System.IO.File methods (SetLastWriteTime, SetCreationTime, SetLastAccessTime) to modify file timestamps, a common anti-forensic technique to obfuscate file creation or modification times.
Detects PowerShell processes using the .NET System.IO.File methods (SetLastWriteTime, SetCreationTime, SetLastAccessTime) to modify file timestamps, a common anti-forensic technique to obfuscate file creation or modification times.
Detects PowerShell processes using the .NET System.IO.File methods (SetLastWriteTime, SetCreationTime, SetLastAccessTime) to modify file timestamps, a common anti-forensic technique to obfuscate file creation or modification times.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects potential multimodal prompt injection attacks where an AI agent process ingests a file (PDF, image, etc.) from a browser or mail client and subsequently performs suspicious downstream activity, such as spawning a shell with execution primitives or making network connections to rare, non-reputable external domains. Covers T1204, T1059, T1105
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
Detects PowerShell command execution containing specific strings associated with the Veil framework XOR decoding routine, including a hardcoded key and the use of the -bxor operator for payload deobfuscation.
Detects the use of .NET reflection APIs (specifically System.Reflection.Assembly::Load) within PowerShell script blocks. This technique allows for the dynamic loading of .NET assemblies into memory, often to execute obfuscated or encrypted payloads without writing them to disk, which is a common tactic for bypassing file-based security controls.
Detects the use of PowerShell Stop-Process being used to terminate common scripting and .NET-related processes, a behavior associated with the Veil#Drop loader to clear potential conflicts or interference from legitimate host processes.
Detects the use of [ScriptBlock]::Create() within PowerShell command lines. This method allows for the dynamic construction and execution of arbitrary PowerShell code entirely in memory, a technique often used by fileless malware and frameworks like Veil#Drop to evade disk-based detection mechanisms.
Detects PowerShell command lines that simultaneously utilize .NET cryptography classes (TripleDES or AES) for decryption and runspace pipeline creation. This pattern indicates an in-memory execution technique where malicious payloads are decoded and executed directly within the PowerShell process, effectively bypassing disk-based security controls.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to evade detection through programmatic runtime creation using Runspaces (RunspaceFactory, CreatePipeline, AddScript) combined with cryptographic operations or dynamic string substitution techniques. This behavior is often associated with obfuscated malware payloads attempting to execute code in memory.
Detects the use of PowerShell string concatenation to construct the malicious C2 domain 'merabs.pro'. This technique is used to bypass simple string-based detections that look for the full domain name in command-line arguments.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to download common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) or remote access tools from the internet. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious actors attempting to establish persistent remote access to a compromised system.
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