Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
507 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
174
86
74
69
35
Contributors
147
94
79
60
32
Categories
377
347
319
94
91
Platforms
492
8
7
3
2
Products / Services
10,665
9,773
6,705
4,421
3,749
507
MITRE Techniques
333
272
136
127
104
CVEs
3
3
1
1
IDS Classtypes
8
3
2
1
IDS Protocols
9
5
Detects the use of built-in Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin, diskshadow) and PowerShell to delete Volume Shadow Copies or disable system recovery features. These activities are commonly used by ransomware to prevent easy restoration of encrypted data.
Detects evidence of malware attempting to identify virtualized execution environments by querying specific registry keys associated with hypervisors (VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V) combined with WMI commands used to gather hardware and system identifiers. This behavior is indicative of environment fingerprinting used by threats like TA4922 to evade detection and analysis.
Detects the BQTLock ransomware loader (start.exe) spawning the primary payload (BQT.exe), which subsequently executes WMIC to perform hardware, virtualization, and sandbox environment enumeration, a technique commonly used for evasion.
Detects the use of wmic.exe to execute remote commands using the /node flag and the 'process call create' command string. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for lateral movement and remote code execution.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (WmiPrvSE.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) with command-line arguments involving standard output redirection (2>&1), often used to capture error and output streams in remote command execution scenarios. This pattern is commonly observed during lateral movement or remote administration activity.
Detects the Amadey loader or StealC information stealer performing situational awareness by enumerating security software via WMI queries for 'AntiVirusProduct'. This behavior is typical of malware attempting to identify and evade defensive tools.
This rule detects network activity associated with lateral movement using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). It specifically looks for a DCE/RPC Bind request that targets the IWbemServices interface UUID, a common method for initializing remote WMI connections to execute commands on remote systems.
Detects the creation or modification of WMI event subscriptions via EventID 5861 from the Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity log. This activity, involving EventFilters, EventConsumers, or FilterToConsumerBindings, is a well-known technique used by adversaries to establish persistence and achieve execution triggered by system events, often resulting in elevated SYSTEM privileges.
Detects the use of Wscript.exe or Cscript.exe to spawn wmic.exe with arguments indicative of remote WMI execution, such as 'Win32_Process', 'process call create', or '/node:'. This pattern is frequently associated with lateral movement, worm propagation (like VBScript-based malware), and ransomware deployment.
Detects the creation of ActiveScriptEventConsumer bindings via WMI process executions, a fileless persistence mechanism used by Showboat malware to survive reboots. The rule specifically looks for 'scrcons.exe' processes with command-line arguments containing 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer' or '__EventFilter'.
Detects the use of the WMIC.exe utility to execute processes on remote systems using the 'process call create' command. This technique is commonly used by adversaries for lateral movement. The rule excludes local execution scenarios.
Detects the use of administrative tools (vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell) to delete Volume Shadow Copies. This activity is a common pre-ransomware step used to inhibit system recovery and force data impact.
Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) spawns common shell or script interpreter processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, cscript.exe, wscript.exe). This behavior is often indicative of fileless remote code execution used for lateral movement across Windows environments, as WMI is frequently abused by attackers to remotely trigger malicious commands.
Detects the use of administrative tools (vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell) to delete Volume Shadow Copies. This activity is a common pre-ransomware step used to inhibit system recovery and force data impact.
Detects suspected sandbox evasion techniques commonly utilized by BeepRAT malware. The rule monitors for WMI queries related to hardware/OS virtualization artifacts (e.g., CIM_Memory, Win32_OperatingSystem), registry enumeration of virtualization keys (VMware/VirtualBox), and suspicious child process spawning of wmiprvse.exe by known loader components (HFY.exe, tcc.exe, LuaJit.exe).
Detects WMI activity used by the BeepRAT loader to query system information (Win32_OperatingSystem, CIM_Memory), which is characteristic of virtualization and sandbox evasion techniques. The rule correlates process creation and WMI event logs with known indicators associated with BeepRAT deployment.
Detects the creation of WMI event subscriptions, including event filters, consumers, and bindings, performed by wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe. This activity is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate execution via the Windows Management Instrumentation service.
Detects BeepRAT malware exhibiting anti-analysis behavior by performing a sequence of environment-fingerprinting checks within a 60-second window. The rule monitors for a combination of registry queries targeting virtualization artifacts (VMware, VirtualBox) and WMI queries for system hardware/OS information (Win32_OperatingSystem, CIM_Memory), which are common techniques used by BeepRAT to detect virtual machines and sandboxes before execution.
Identifies JScript payloads leveraging wmiprvse.exe to query SecurityCenter2 and enumerate installed endpoint protection products, often associated with SocGholish activity.
This rule detects unauthorized attempts to extract credentials from the Veeam Backup and Replication PostgreSQL database. It identifies malicious activity involving the use of PowerShell to interact with the database, including direct psql.exe command line execution, PowerShell scripts referencing sensitive database keywords, WMI-spawned PowerShell processes, and network connections to the PostgreSQL service port (5432).
This rule detects potential attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) following the reconnaissance of security software or AMSI providers. It correlates WMI or registry-based discovery activities concerning security products or AMSI configurations with subsequent PowerShell-based AMSI bypass indicators (such as specific strings or method names indicative of memory patching) occurring on the same host within a 10-minute window.
Page 16 of 25