Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,045 detections
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Detects execution and network activity associated with the cache_base operator toolkit, including JuicyPotatoNG (kitanai.exe), RegPwn (nandemo.exe), ufw.exe reverse shell, and upd-ms.bat launching these tools with connections to *.strangled.net on port 7070.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity associated with Potassium by correlating a DNS query for a known C2 domain with a subsequent TCP connection to port 50792 from the same device within a short time window.
Detects sandbox or training hosts performing DNS resolution followed shortly by outbound connections to public IP addresses on ports 80 or 443, which may indicate a firewall misconfiguration or unauthorized egress from isolated environments.
Detects password spraying: a single source IP generating failed
logins against many distinct accounts in a short window. AI-assisted planning
can produce low-rate credential attacks designed to stay under per-account
lockout thresholds; the distinguishing signal is breadth across users rather
than volume per user.
logins against many distinct accounts in a short window. AI-assisted planning
can produce low-rate credential attacks designed to stay under per-account
lockout thresholds; the distinguishing signal is breadth across users rather
than volume per user.
Detects rundll32.exe executing inline JavaScript/VBScript via the
mshtml RunHTMLApplication export or a script payload staged in user-writable
directories. ClickFix chains abuse rundll32 to proxy script execution past
application controls without dropping a conventional executable.
mshtml RunHTMLApplication export or a script payload staged in user-writable
directories. ClickFix chains abuse rundll32 to proxy script execution past
application controls without dropping a conventional executable.
Detects non-browser processes contacting multiple distinct cloud storage APIs within a one-hour timeframe, a pattern indicative of potential multi-service command and control or data exfiltration.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of mscoree.dll outside of standard system and .NET paths, followed closely by network activity connecting to GitHub from the same process within a one-hour window.
Detects successful logon from public IP address via SMB. This can indicate a publicly-exposed SMB port.
Identifies available cross-process memory and thread manipulation telemetry events in DeviceEvents, tracking actions such as remote thread creation, virtual memory allocation, and process hollowing indicators before constructing process injection correlations.
Detects msiexec.exe spawning scripting or programming engines (such as PowerShell or Python) that perform LDAP directory searches and establish outbound external network connections within a specific time window.
Detects the execution of PaperCut reverse SOCKS5 bridge kit operator-side scripts (such as admin_bridge.py, live_reverse_socks5.py, start_socks.sh) or the creation of related Java bridge class artifacts.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects the correlation of remote execution tools (such as PsExec, WinRM, or specific PowerShell remote execution commands) with RDP or ScreenConnect remote management activity on the same device within a one-hour window, potentially indicating lateral movement or unauthorized remote control.
Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying
Detects the use of Inveigh a cross-platform .NET IPv4/IPv6 machine-in-the-middle tool
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe from an uncommon directory
This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the Microsoft SQL Server Management studio.
Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.
Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.
Detects the setting of the TS_SERVE_ALLOW_ALL_INTERFACES environment variable or registry key combined with the execution of Tailscale serve or funnel commands on the same device within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized exposure of local services.
Detects browser cache smuggling (ClickFix/FileFix delivery mechanisms) where a non-browser script interpreter or LOLBin accesses a browser HTTP-cache directory and writes an executable or script payload outside the cache, followed shortly by the execution of a payload from a user staging directory.
Detects suspicious post-exploitation activities, reconnaissance, and command execution originating from web server and PHP lineage processes, indicating potential webshell activity or compromised web applications.
Detects artifacts and execution patterns associated with the Yoba campaign involving fake AI applications (such as ChatGPT, Claude, Codex) containing malicious setup files, sideloaded DLLs (winmm.dll, wmpdui.dll), and cryptocurrency miners (XMRig).
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